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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM 
An Important objective of railroad regulation is to 
prevent exploitation of the public throti^ rates, fares, 
and charges, which yield amounts in excess of the revenue 
needs of carriers. Not only should regulation "be directed 
toward elimination of monopoly profits, but from time to 
time it must be concerned with the question of whether or 
not railroad earnings are sufficient to maintain adequate 
transportation services to the public, and are fair to those 
who have invested funds in the industry. When rates are ad­
justed on particular traffic movements so as to maximise in­
come, it woiild seem that little could be accomplished further 
if resulting revenues prove inadequate. However, changes 
in operating expenses, in fixed charges, in volumes of traf­
fic, or in demand for transportation, individually or sev­
erally, may render revenues insufficient to meet operating 
costs or furnish a return on Invested capital. Under such 
circumstances, it becomes necessary to reoxamlne railroad 
rates and to raise or lower the general rate level in order 
to increase railway earnings. 
Most, if not all of the above factors were present dur­
ing the early postwar period, when the natlon<s railroads on 
April 15, 1946, asked the Interstate Commerce Commission for 
permission to increase their freight rates by 25 per cent. 
2 
on short notice. The petition, if granted, would have mermt 
an advance in freight charges by a percentage hi^er than 
any single rate increase proposal made by the carriers over 
a period of 25 years. The subsequent proceedings were in 
the nature of a general rate level or revenue case. This was 
known as the Ex Parte 162 case, an analysis of which is the 
main concern of this dissertation. 
The substantial increases proposed by the carriers in 
1946 presented the regulatory authority with separate though 
related problems of rate control. One was concerned with the 
statutory requirement of reasonableness of the increased 
charges in the absolute sense, while the other involved a 
determination of the effects of rate advances upon the finan­
cial structure of the carriers. Prom a negative viewpoint, 
the task of the Commission was to prevent the carriers from 
charging too much for transportation, which indirectly meant 
restricting the earnings that could have been realized from 
the users of the railway service. In a positive sense, the 
problem was one of approving such rate advances as would not 
only protect constitutional guarantees against confiscation 
but would tend througji the resulting operating income to sus­
tain railroad credit and attract the necessary capital to 
maintain an adequate transportation system. 
To establish railway charges at proper levels In 1946 
required a forecast of the probable trends of operating ex­
penses and traffic volume, and as Instruments for this purpose. 
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a reasonable detemlnation of the rate base and rate of return. 
Thus, the extent of the rate increases allowed the rail car­
riers in the Ex Parte 162 case would determine their con­
tribution in the expansion of national economic activity dur­
ing the transition period. 
Nationwide freight rate advances of the magnitude in­
volved in the 1946 litigation cannot help but have important 
repercussions on economic, social, and political activity 
throughout the country. For that reason, a detailed analysis 
would be most desirable and extremely significant. However, 
the complex business interrelationships inherent in a dynamic 
economy make a precise Investigation very difficult, and thus 
the Immediate study has as its purpose a discussion of the 
rate level proceedings on a rather broad basis. The author 
fully realizes that a general treatment of so important a 
topic leaves many questions vinanswered, and solves few of 
the economic problems arising from rate level case. Yet, 
it is believed that a report of this type may serve as a 
foundation upon which future research pertaining to the rail­
road rate level may be developed. As such, the study should 
be considered as an effort to present some of the Issues 
which lead to freight rate level controversies, and in a 
limited manner, as a survey of the general economic effects 
of decisions in such cases. In no sense should it be thought 
of as representing a complete or final analysis of the sub­
ject. 
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Since the Ex Parte 162 case was primarily concerned 
with the frei^t rnte level, the study will center upon rates 
on frei^t cari'ied by the Class I railroads. These are the 
major railway carriers of the nation, so classified because 
as individual roads they receive gross operating revenues 
in excess of one million dollars annually. Excluded from 
the discussion are statistics relating to passenger fares, 
express charges, or rates for other seiTTices, except where 
it has been impossible to segregate them from data pertaining 
to freight traffic and revenues. 
Chapter II presents a historical review of the railroad 
freif^it rate level under early coiamon law, and emphasizes the 
events which led to State and Federal regulation. A brief 
sujmnary of legislation affecting rates between the years 
1887 and 1940 is given in conjunction with an analysis of 
the great freight rate cases in the period 1910 through 1938. 
Railroad performance during the second '^'orld V/ar is the 
topic examined in Chapter III. First to be introduced are 
the operations of the carriers in the period betv/een the two 
great v/ars with specific attention directed to a discussion 
of the rate level during the depression years. A major part 
of the cliapter is devoted to the contributions made by the 
railways during the war emergency, and the effects of a 
World War upon such items as revenues, traffic volume, ex­
penses, and competition. Issues loading to the 3Sx Parte 148 
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i-ate lovol case, decided in 1942, and later suspended, con­
cludes the inquiry. 
Problems facing the nation's rail carriers during the 
early postwar years are analyzed in Chapter IV, It opens 
with a short introduction of national economic trends, and 
folloY/3 with a discussion of the economic forces which re­
sulted in the Ex Parte 162 rnte level petition. Following, 
the suspended 1942 rate case is analyzed. The remainder of 
the chapter la devoted to a comprehensive examination of the 
Ex Parte 162 proceedin^js, and its disposition hy Commission 
action. 
Tlae tliree succeeding chapters attempt to trace the ef­
fects of the rate-level decision on certain segments of the 
national economy. Generally, the period of time covered 
approximates six months, "beginning January 1, 1947, at -idiich 
date the Ex Parte 162 rate advances \7ere effective, to 
July 1, 1947, when the railroads again petitioned the Inter­
state Commerce Commission for hi{^er rates, Tlie first area 
to he examined pertains to railway finances. Secondly, the 
decision is discussed in terras of the interterritorlal frei^t 
rate problem of the nation. Finally, the rate level decreo 
la analyzed for its probable effects on producers, consumers, 
and agencies competitive v/ith railroads. 
A description of the characteristics and significance 
of railway finance introduces the reader to financial prob­
lems of the rail carriers. Stressed in this chapter are 
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qtieotions rolnting to the need of the railroads for ade­
quate rovonues, problems of valuation as a rate base, the 
aggrogate rate of return, and railroad credit. The Ex Parte 
162 decision is discuased in terms of these topics. 
The effect of increased rates on the interterritorlal 
froif^t rate problem of the nation is the subject presented 
in the second of the chapters analyzing the rate level 
decisior,;. Information is given to show how carriers operating 
in each of the various freight rate territories were affected 
financially through the proceedings. Regional v/artime and 
postwar changes in marketing activity are then discussed in 
order to point out the effect of higher freight rates on 
future economic development of these areas. Attempts have 
been made to predict the effect of rate advances upon fiiture 
traffic moving within and between the several territories 
or regions. 
The last discussion chapter analyzes the decision from 
the point of view of certain producers, consumers, and rail­
road competitors. Pour broad classes of commodities have 
been selected for a study of the rate increases upon their 
distribution. Those so chosen are Products of Agriculture, 
Lumber and Products, Products of Mines, v/ith special atten­
tion given to the coal industry, and the production and 
distribution of Steel. A section is devoted to the 
possible reaction of consumers to higher frei^t rotes, 
while another briefly analyzes the possible effects upon 
7 
competitors of the railways. Summaries and conclusions v/ill 
he found in Chapter VIII. 
In addition to the discussion chapters, three appendices 
are presented in the report. Appendix A consists of two 
charts. One outlines geographically the Prei^t Classifica­
tion Districts. Tlie other shows the major Freight Class Rate 
Territories of the nation. Appendix B includes 12 tables 
of statistical data covering certain aspects of railroad 
perforniaiice over periods of time, cornyuratlvo fic^vres on 
levels of national economic activity in v/ar years as compared 
v/ith prewar years, railroad financial data, and tables rela­
tive to tlie effect of freight rate advances on the coal and 
steel industries. Appendix C presents a suiTunary of the 
interterritorial frei^t rate problem of the United States, 
and gives a brief description of the Class Rate InveBtigntion 
instituted by the Interstate Comrnerce Commission in 1939 and 
decided in 1945, Tliese ore inclixded for the purpose of 
giving a reader some bfloi.<ground material for the chapter 
pertains.ng to interterritorial rates. 
Two general methods of Investigation were used in ap­
proaching the research problem. One involved a survey of 
the available relevant literature. 'Hie other attempted to 
gather data througla personal correspondence and contact with 
private industries, such as those operating in the fields 
of coal, steel, lumber and agriculture; Federal agencies, 
particularly the United States Department of Agrictatiore, 
B 
United States Department of Coimnorce, "Uhited States Depart­
ment of tlio Interior and Interstate Commerce Commission, 
and certain State agencies including the Iowa Coiimaerce Com­
mission. 
As mentioned previously, this report is intended to 
open a path for those who may v.ish to pursue fixct^ner in­
vestigation of the effects of railroad rate level decisions 
upon the national economy. If, tlir-ough the discussion 
which follows, a better appreciation of general freight 
rate level issues is developed among studonts of transpor­
tation, or those simply interested in the subject, the author 
will feel well repaid for his time and effort. 
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CHAPTER II 
A BRIEF HISTORICAL STMM/-RY OP RAILROAD RATE 
REOULATION AND A REVIEW OP OIIE GREAT FREIGHT 
RATOl LEVEL CASES 
Tlie influence of improved ineans of tranarjortation upon 
the rapid expansion of Industry and commerce of the United 
States dui'ing the latter half of tho nineteenth centuj'y lod 
histoi'ians to doocribe the period as the "Railway Age."^ 
1, Kirkland, E. C. A History of Anericnn Economic LiJTe. 
New York, P. S. Crofts and Go. 1^39. Chapter 10. 
paasljn. 
In a basically agrarian economy, the swift extension of rail­
roads to all sections of the nation furnished the key to a 
new inc3ustrlalism, and developed a new coordination between 
extractive, manufacturing, and agricultural industries. Con­
struction of railway lines into hitherto unexplored coimnercial 
areas opened new markets, greatly accelerated the tempo of 
production, and enlarged the processes of exchange between 
productive and distributive agencies. As a consequence, there 
arose a marketing system which today has become of immeasurable 
significance in the economic life of the nation. 
Railroads pioneered in the development of complex cor­
porate organization and resulting monopolistic proctlcos led 
finally to government regulation. 
Beginning with the period before the passage of tho Act 
to Regulate Commerce, this chapter will briefly attempt to 
10 
examine rate level problems and regulatory changes which af­
fected rate-making policies. The first section will describe 
early methods of control, and following sections will trace 
rake regulation from 1887 to 1910; through the great rate 
cases prior to and dui'ing the war period; in the twenties; 
and during the thirties. 
l\ate Ifegulation Before 1887 
The earliest form of transport regulation was based upon 
coinmon low, v/W.ch provided that adequate service be furnished 
to all, vdthout discrimination, and under reasonable charges. 
Common law failed, however, to achieve effective regulation. 
Povrerful railroad corporations with their vast resources of 
financial and legal strength made difficult the position of 
the average dipper as he attempted to prove discriminatory 
practices or unreasonable rates. Under common law the only 
recourse for damages arising from injury was the law suit, 
but few users of carrier services could afford litigation aa 
such cases passed from court to court. Pressure for changes 
in regulation arose from the inequities developed under this 
2 
regulatory procedure. 
2. Healy, Kent T, The Economics of 'I'ransportation in America, 
New York, Ronald Press. 1940. pp. 375-376. 
Regulation independent of comiiion law was attempted 
through cl:iarters voted to the railroads by state legislatiares. 
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Under their provisions corporutions were granted the ri{^t 
to construct the roads, and as an incentive were given many 
concessions to facilitate expansion. As a regulatory medium 
the charter possessed only a temporary advantage. Two basic 
weaknesses appeared. First, each state became the agency 
issuing contracts, the provisions of which in many cases 
were conflicting and controversial. Charters could not pre­
vent corporations from operating in states other than the 
one originally issuing the contract. Second, the acceptance 
of the legal doctrine which stated that corporations were 
citizens of the state creating them, and as such "shall be 
entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in 
the several States," narrowed the effectiveness of charter 
3. Section 2, part 1, Article IV of the United States Con­
stitution, 
control. Charters were held by the courts to be contracts, 
4 
amendable only by the consent of both parties. In addition. 
4, Dartmouth College v, Woodward, 4. TOieat, 518, 4 L, 
Ed. 629, 
the Increasing growth of population and industry accompanied 
by public enthusiasm for railroad expansion led most people 
to forget their desire for regulation. Rail construction, 
it was felt, could be achieved more rapidly through the re­
moval of resti'ictions, and ultimately Lhe issuance of charters 
12 
became a routine matter under the laws of incorporation with 
little influence upon regulatory control. 
Following the failure of charter regulation, control 
was attempted 137 raeans of State Coinralasions first established 
in Maasachusotts in 1869. 'fliose cornniisalons were advisory 
In craaracter with little power of enforcement, but they had 
the full support of the state in investigating and publish­
ing critlcijJTis of railroad prncticos, in the hope that forces 
of public opinion would require the carriers to revise their 
policies. Hoivever, abuses continued In spite of publicity. 
In the West corporate expansion, the depression of 1873, 
falling agrlcultviral prices, and losses from the collapse 
of railroad securities spurred a feeling of discontent 
among farmers. Anger mounted against alleged unfair treat­
ment by the railroada, and engendered foriintlon of an or­
ganized protest knom as the Granger movement, encompassing 
farm interests In Illinois, Iowa, Mime so ta, Wisconsin, Mis­
souri, Nebraska, and Kansas.® Working ttirough state legls-
5. For the raoet complete work on the subject, sec Bxjck, 
S. J. The Granprer Movement. Cambridge, Harvard TTni-
versity Press. 1923. 
latures, the fJrnnge obtained constitutional ainendments 
which declared the railroads to bo public hl^ivAjys, subject 
to this new form of state controlj in securing statutes which 
fixed rates and prohibited discriminations, particularly 
that v/hich granted lower rates for a longer carriage of 
traffic than for a shorter haul over the same route and In 
the same direction. To be certain that these practices were 
controlled, the commissions were given full powers of en­
forcement. 
Railroads refused to recognize the ri^t of the states 
to regulate their activities and fought the legislation 
throijgh every court, finally losing in the crucial case 
against Illinois in 1876, The Supreme Court in the "Granger 
cases" ruled that the railv/ays were affected with a public 
interest, and the states had the power to regulate them. 
6. Munn v, Illinois, 94, U. S. 113. 1876. C. B. & Q. R,R. 
Co". V;"Towa, S. 155. 1877, Peik v. 0. & Iv. V;. R,R, 
Co., 94 U.S. 164. 1887. ^ & St. P. R.R. Go. v. Blake, 
94 a.S. 180. 1877. ' -
Hov/ever, witii the return of prosperous conditions, the farm 
groups directed their attention to other matters, leaving 
the railroads fi'oo to intensify their efforts for repeal or 
modification of the legislation. 
By 1872 these problems received attention by the Federal 
Government. The Windom Committee, appointed by the Senate 
in this year, presented its report in 1874, emphasizing "in­
sufficient facilities, unfair discrimination, end extor­
tionate charges.""^ In tho following 12 years several bills 
7. Transportation Routes to the Seaboard, 43d Gongress, 
Ist Session, Senate Report 307, part 2, p. 71. 1874. 
To protect the public, major reliance was placed upon 
competition as the clilef means of abolishing abuses. 
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calling for regulation wero presented to the Congress, but 
none was successfully passed. Continued abuses resulted in 
an investigation cf the. transportation problem by tlie Cullom 
CoTiMibteoj v/hose T-eport in 1885 brouglit vrltli it a bill pro-
0 
vidin/;'; for a permanent adrtrl^rlstrntive corranission. In the 
8. 49th Congress, 1st 
pp. 157-166. 1886, 
Seasio'.i, Senate Report 45, part 1, 
same year the Supreme Court handed down a decision in the 
Wnbosh case, reversing in part its xnilings in the Granger 
cases. It declared that regulation of interstate coirunerce 
v/as a rif^it restricted excliisivoly to the Federal Government. 9 
9, "A statute of a State intended to regixlato (transporta­
tion) from one State to another is not within the class 
of legislation which the States may enact (even) in the 
absence of legislation by Congress." '/.'abash, St. .Louis, 
and Pacific Railway Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557, 558. 
1886. 
In the face of this decision, legislation was speedily 
enacted and the Act to Regulate Commerce WPS signed into 
lav; on February 4, 1887.^^ 
10' 24 Statutes at Large, pp. 579-387, 1887, 
The Act was intended to protect shippers and can.iiunities 
from unfair practices and unduly hig^i rates. Administration 
was to be effected through the Interstate Coijuuerce Commission, 
15 
whose jtirisdiction originally extended over common carriers 
"engaged in the transportation of persons or property wholly 
by railroad, or partly by railroad and partly by water, 
when both are used under a common control, management, or 
arrangement for continuous carriage or ^ipraent," The first 
section laid down one of the principles of common law — 
"rates shall be just and reasonable." Section two covered 
the area of unjust discrimination, while the third declared 
unlawful the practice of "undue preference or undue preju­
dice." The so-called "long and short haul principle" was 
defined in section four, and the fifth covered aspects of 
"pooling." Sections six to ten introduced the concept of 
"legal" and "lawful" rates. Rates required for publication 
under section six were required to be charged to all ship­
pers alike. It was considered a criminal offense and a civil 
wrong for roads to deviate from the published rates, and 
such procedures covild result in an action to recover damages 
by the injured shipper. While the rate to be charged was 
defined by the statute as legal, it was lawful only if it 
was reasonable. The shipper had to pay the legal rate, but 
n n 
could recover damages if he could prove it unreasonable. 
11. Arizon^i Grocery v. A. T. & S. P. Ry. Co., 284 U. S. 
370, 384. 1932. 
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Rate Level Problems Prom 1887 to 1910 
One of the significant v/^eaknesses of the original man­
date was the lack of express authority for rate-making power. 
Outside of the provision calling for "reasonableness," Con­
gress made no attempt to establish a guiding formula for 
determination of rates. However, the Commission from its 
origin interpreted the Act to assume this responsibility, 
and for a decade following 1887 the authority to prescribe 
rates was exercised without serious challenge on the part 
of the carriers and courts. But assumptions of such power 
v/ere rudely shattered in 1897. In handing down an opinion 
in the Maximiun Freif^t Rate Case, the Supreme Court declared 
that the power to designate rates in the future was not 
1 P 
among those granted to the Commission by Congress. Pollow-
12, Interstate Commerce Commission v. C. W. 0. & T. R.R. 
Co., 167 (). S. 47^. l897. In delivering the opinion, 
"Justice Brewer concludeds "First, the power to prescribe 
a tariff of rates for carriage by a common carrier is a 
legislative and not an administrative or judicial function. 
Second that Congress has transferred such power to any 
administrative body is not to be presume or implied from 
any doubtful and uncertain language ... If the Congress 
had intended to grant such power to the Interstate Com­
merce Commission, it cannot be doubted that it would have 
used language open to no misconstruction, but open and 
direct. Third, incorporating into a statute the coimnon 
law obligation resting upon the carrier to make its 
charges reasonable and just, and directing the Commission 
to execute and enforce the provisions of the Act does not 
by implication carry to the Commission or Invest it v/lth 
the power to exercise the legislative function of pre­
scribing rates which shall control in the futiire . . . 
17 
tlie power to prescribe rates or fix any tariff for the 
future is not among the powers granted to the Commission," 
ing the decision, the Commission ceased issuing orders re­
garding rate relationsliips and discrimination# Since they 
had no power to establish reasonable rates, they had no 
authority to administer the sections of the Act covering 
discriminatory practices, Ihis situation was to continue 
13 
until partly corrected by the Hepburn Act of 190G, 
13, 54 Statvites at Large, part 1, pp. 584-595. 1906. 
A nmber of forces combined to cause the passage of 
this legislation. First, the grov;th of railroad combina­
tions, following the outlawing of pools in 1887, had reached 
huge proportions. Second, rates had shown a general upward 
movement since 1900, due partly to the rising prices of labor 
and materials, and partly by the restriction of competition 
by the carriers. In the third place, there was a large degree 
of financial manipulation among carriers in the various sec­
tions of the nation. However, the legislation was not enacted 
without a struggle. Railroads bitterly opposed it and set 
up one of the most highly organized campaigns of propaganda 
and lobbying in the railway history. 
The most important provision of the Act was that which 
authorized the Commission, upon complaint and after hearing, 
to prescribe maximum rates. Such power was to be exercised 
18 
only after existing rates had been found vmlav/ful, and ex­
tended to joint rates and through routes* Througli routes 
could be establinhed when the carriers refused to do so, 
Maxiinuin joint rates and their division hetween participating 
carriers could too prescribed. Orders were to "be effective 
upon 30 days notice. It should toe noted that the lav/ did 
not give the Commission authority to prescribe rates on their 
own initiative, but only when existing charges were found 
unreasonable or unlav/ful. Since the power of the Commission 
was strictly limited to the ijrescrlption of maximum rates, 
3 4 
neither an exact nor a minimum charge could be fixed, " 
14. Additional provisions of the amendment are analyzed in 
Daf^ffett, S, Principles of Inland Transportation, 3d ed, 
New York, Harper & Bros, 1941. pp. 743-745. 
The position of the Supreme Court on cases arising after 
1906 differed considerably from that of former periods. No 
longer did the Court pass upon the v/isdom of the Comralosion's 
orders, but set them aside only v/hen there was a violation 
of the Constitution, or when the regulatory body had gone 
beyond the pov/ers oonferred by the Congress. Revlev/ of facts 
was made only to the extent of determining lawfulness of 
orders,^® The Court also ruled that cases would not be 
15. In Interstate Commerce Coirmii.s3lon v. Illinois Central 
R«R,, Sl5 U.S. 452, Idld, the Court stated (p. 470): 
"Beyond controversy in determining whether an order of 
19 
tho Comiuisslon ohall bo suspended or set aside, we must 
consider, (a) all relevant questions of constitutional 
power or ri^it; (b) oil pei-tinent questions as to whether 
the administrative order is within the scope of the del­
egated authority under which it pur£)orta to have been 
made .... Power to make the order and not the mere 
expediency or v/isdom of having mHdo it, ia the question"; 
This doctrine WHS further followed in Interstate Coi^erce 
Comroission v. Union Pacific R.R., 222 U, S. 541. r&iS. 
accepted for ruling until a finding had been made by the 
Cortimisslon -- that all matters of original jui'isdiction v/ere 
in the hands of the Commission. Ihese principles have held 
ge.nei'ally dov/n to the present. 
The absence of organized pressures by the carriers for 
increases in rates, and by shipper interests for rate de­
creases, seemed to indicate that the rat© level during the 
first tv/enty odd years of regalation was reasonably satis­
factory. Rate adjustments in isolated instances had taken 
place sporadically, but for the most part these could not 
be classed aa rate level proceedings. 
The Great Rate Level Cases, 1910 to 1920 
Petitions in the first general rate level case were filed 
*l A in the suEuner of 1910. Carriers operating in Official 
16. Advances in Rates -» Eastern Case, 20 I.C.C. 243. 1911. 
Advances In Rates - Western ^ ase, 20 I.C.C, 307. 1911, 
20 
Territory requested Increases In all class rates and In many 
conunodity rates. V^estcrn carriers presented claims for In-
17 
creases in commodity rates only. Advances viere to approxi-
1'7. For a description of the three major freight classi­
fications see Chart 1, Appendix A. Freight is classified 
throu£;;h groupini3 into llnilted nuiabers of "classes" the 
many different articles v/hich are carried by the railroads. 
The purpose of this practice is for ease and convenience 
in quoting rates on a limited nuraber of groups of articles 
rather than on each individual commodity separately. 
Ratings assigned to commcditles depend upon the method of 
packing, the typo of container, and v/hether or not they 
are shipped in carload or less-than-carload lots. 
Coimnodity rates are difficult to describe because of the 
wide diversity of rate-making practices. Some comciiodlty 
rates are tied to the class rate structure by use of 
column rates; that is, by making rates on comsaoditiea a 
certain percentage of class rates, ^ther covimiodity rate 
stn.icture are entirel;/ related to class rates. 
The freight classification does not show the rates, but 
only the group to v;hich certain commodities have been as­
signed. Rates on various classes are published in tariffs, 
which may be class tariffs, or comniodlty tariffs, i^ee 
Locklln, D. r. "Rates and Rate Structure." National 
Resources Planning Boaz'd Report. Transportation and na­
tional •^'ollcy. Washington, D. C., Govt, -frint. Off. TL942. 
pp. 87-90. Further description v/ill be found in "Summary 
of the Inter territorial I'i'eight Rate Problem." Appendix C. 
mate 10 per cent, and T,7ere to become effective v/ithln 30 days, 
Hov/ever, since the Congress at this time vJas debating ad­
ditional amendments to the Act to Regulate Commerce, the 
railroads voluntarily postponed the effective dates of their 
new tariffs until the reasonableness of the porposed rates 
could be determined In light of the prospective legislation. 
Passage of the Mann-Elklns Act in 1910 brought additional 
18 poi./er to the Coitmilssion. One of its Importuivt feat^jires 
18. 56 Statutes at Larf'.e, part 1, pp. 539-557, 1910. Dls-
cussion ot the Amendment is foimd In Locklin, D, P. Eco­
nomics of Transportation. 5d Kd. Chicago, Richard D. 
Irwin, Inc., 1947. pp. 229-232. See also Dixon, P. H. 
"'Phe Wonn El kins Act, -Imratding the Act to Regi^Q-ate Com­
merce." Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 24. 
pp. 593-5y8. August, 1910. 
wfia that of suspension and inveatigntior^ of iT.tes. It was 
nov/ possible for the Gorraniasion to dela^/" t;he effoctive dtitea 
of proi^OBod rfitoB until investigation could satisfy them cSf 
the validity of rate changes, 'i'he bvirden of proof as to the 
reasonableness of nev/ rates v/as placed upon the carriers, 
and such proof v/as made applicable to the increased rates 
rather than the proposed rato increases. Another important 
provision gave the Qoiffinission authority to initiate in­
quiries at their discretion as to the appropriateness of 
existing rate levels. 
The fii'st general rate cases v/ere essentially of a 
revenue nature, based primarily upon alleged increases in 
the operating costs of the carriers. t'Vhile consideration 
was given to Increased costs in the decision, the Commiesion 
felt that these would be absorbed by an expanding volume of 
traffic. The requests were denied, although the door was 
left open for a rehearing on the petition if and when chang­
ing econoroic conditions made it necessary. 
19. "y/e do not say that the carriore may not 5.ncren3e 
their income. We trust that they may, and confidently 
believe they will. If the time does come when througti 
changed condition it rmy be ahovm tliat their Income 
fears are realized, or approaching realization, and 
from a survey of the vjhole field of operations there is 
evidence of a movement which makes against the security 
and lasting value of legitiwiote investvsio'nt and cidecunte 
return on the value of these propei'ties, this Commission 
will not hesitate to give its sanction to increases 
which will be reasonable." Western Case, 0£. cit., 
p. 379. 
During the next two years marked increases occurred in 
the operating expanses and capital charges involving taxes, 
installation of safety devices, grade crossing elimination, 
compliance with state '"full crew" laws, etc. ITie carriers 
maintained that as coats increased, the existing rate struc-
tui'c did not provide enough revenue to enable them to earn 
a fair return on the fair value of the property used in the 
20 public service. Eastern carriers in 1913 petitioned for 
20. 'Ihe Fifth and Fourteenth ilmendments to the Constitu­
tion declared in part that "no person shall be deprived 
of life, liberty or property without due process of law; 
nor shall private property be taken for public use with­
out just compensation." Reasonable rates to the shipper 
meant charges which v/ould allow tor tho easy movemont of 
his traffic, but to the carriers, rates considered reason­
able mij^at be so low as to involve the confiscation of 
property without due process of law. In the case of 
Smyth V. Ames, 169, U. S. 466-546, 18Q8, tho first at-
tempt was"made to establish criteria of rate z'easonable-
ness pertaining to the use of carrier property. The 
decree of the Court dealt with the basis upon which rates 
should be fixed so aa to avoid confiscation, and intro­
duced tho doctrine of "fair return on the fair value of 
property used." See Chapter V. pp. 150-157, 
23 
a reopening of the Eastern Case, proposing a general 5 per 
PI 
cent Increase in rates in Official Territory, The powers 
21* Five Per Cent Case, 31 351. 1914. 
of rate suspension were invoked immediately, and an investi­
gation was undertaken to deteiTp.ine the validity of the car­
rier claims. After hearings lasting almost six months, the 
increases v/ere granted as requested. Originally, these v/ere 
applied to the western part of Official Territory but later 
22 
were extended to the entire area. To measure the concept 
22. Ibid., pp. 404-405. 
of "fair return on fair value" the Commission accepted book 
value figures of the railroads although fully aware of the 
shortcomings of these records. Their valuation project, only 
recently initiated, could not be used for the determination 
of a reasonable rate base at this tirae.^^ Approval of the 
23. 37 Statutes at Large, part 1, pp. 701-703. 1913. Valu-
ation of property was needed for the purpose of regiilating 
the general level of rates; was essential for a measure of 
reasonableness other than that indicated In the doctrine 
of Smyth v. Ames. See Bigham, T. R. Transportation 
Principles andTroblems. New York, McGraw-Hill Publishing 
'Uo~, 1946. pp. 167-168. 
Increases was based lax-gely upon revenue considerations, 
although the decision was by no means vuianimouG, Goimnission-
ers Harlan and Cloraonta, in diacenting, attacked tlie majority 
ruling on the grounds that revenue needs should have been 
only one factor among man;/ considered. Thoy concluded that 
the issue was on of "reasonableness of rates;" for as long 
as the carriers would not cooperate in instituting certain 
intei'nal economics, and in correcting maladjustments and dis­
criminatory practices. It was morally wrong to alloB the in-
P4 
creases purely on the basis of financial needs." 
24. Five Per Cent Case, op.clt., pp. 335-337. 
Almost iMmodiately petitions for advances on bulk car-
25 load commodities wei'e filed by Western carriers. An ex-
25. .Kvftfa.te.rn Rnto .DafiR,, 35 T.0.0. 497. 1915. 
amination of tlrieir financial position clearly ahov/ed a dovim-
ward trend in operating income. Claims of the carriers that 
the decline in earnings had an adverse affect on the flow of 
new capital into the industry, while recognized by the Com-
misaon and borne out by the facta, did not seem to receive 
the attention it merited. The application for relief was 
denied. 
26 
26, Commissioner Daniels, dissenting, declared: "It is 
"believed that such comparison (with the Five Per Cent 
Case) will not show a single Important ground on the 
"bs^is of which the carrier reveauef; were declared in­
adequate, and on the basis of which increases were first 
allaved in one area of Official Territory and later ex­
tended to other areas within this classification, vihere 
the same or even stronger reason is not found for similar 
conclvisions here." Ibid., p. 655, 
Between 1914 and 1916, the United States was actively 
engaged in supplying food and materials to the belligerents 
in the European VJar. As a result, traffic and income of 
the carriers sharply increased, but rising costs of materials 
and labor plus the imcertalnty of the period of v/ar traffic 
caused the railroads to hesitate in making improvements In 
plant and equipment. Revenues wore favorable during 1916, 
but by the date of the nation's entrance Into the War, the 
carriers v/ere in serious financial condition. Commenting 
on the situation, lY, D. Hines stated; 
Our entry into the V/ar forahadowed a tremendous 
incroaae in railroad traffic, although the railways 
had not been able to satisfactorily handle the traf­
fic already demanding their services; it forahadowed 
further serious shortages of labor, materials and 
supplies, and further increases in the cost of capital, 
and Increased difficulty in dealing v/ith the labor 
situation, 27 
27, Hinas, W. D, '/jar History of ^erican Railroads, New 
Haven, Yale University Press, 1&28, pi, 9, 
These problems were brought to the attention of the Commission 
27 
when the carriers, coincident with our entry into the War, 
28 
requested nation-wide increases in rates. 
28» Fifteen Per Cent Cage, 45 I.C.C. 303. 1917. 
Because of the emergency existing the railroads sug­
gested that the Commission waive the suspension and investi­
gation procedure and allow the rates, in the form of general 
horizontal percentage increases, to become effective on less 
than statutory notice. Mils proposal was denied. No emer­
gency of national scope v/as found to justify a general in­
crease, hut Eastern carriers were given increases in class 
rates. 
The controlling factor in the decision was that of 
revenue needs. In finding adversely, the Commission examined 
earnings during the last quarter of 1916, and the first quarter 
of 1917. In their opinion, the trend of revenues did not 
29 Justify immediate relief. 
29. "The complexities of the war economy were almost en­
tirely disregarded; the general trend toward greatly in­
creased costs, under pressure of largely uncontrollable 
forces was measxired solely by its month to month effects; 
the relative absence of protests against the proposed 
advances, reflecting a widespread recognition of the 
necessity for stimulating adequate transportation service 
was deemed to possess only slight relevancy." Sharfman, 
I. 1**1 Vol. 3—B, p. 30. 
Voluntary coordination of the carriers during the first 
28 
nine months of the war period did not produce the efficiency 
necessary for the movement of war traffic, and President Wilson 
ordered the government to control and operate the carriers 
as of December 26, 1917, Legal support for the move v/as given 
30 in the Federal Control Act of March 21, 1918, which declared 
30. 40 Statutes at Large, p. 451. 1918, 
in part that just compensation should "be given to the owners 
for the use of their property, and, in addition, conferred 
rate-making powers \apon the government agency in charge of 
operations. To direct the activities of the carriers, the 
Secretary of the Treasury, William C. McAdoo, was selected 
as Director-General, later succeeded by Walker D. Hines. 
Prom the beginning of the Federal control period, it 
had been recognized that rate increases were inevitable, and 
on May 25, 1918, the level of rates was Increased throu^ 
the issuance of General Order No. 28.. The new tariffs called 
for a.n advance of 25 per cent on all class rates, interstate 
and Intrastate; from 15 to 75 cents per ton on commodity 
rates covering iron, coal, and coke; an advance of 25 per 
cent on all other commodity rates. Since the increases were 
mad© on a general basis for the nation as a whole, and on 
the theory that the railroads were being operated as a single 
unit, there waa little or no consideration of their effect 
on any particular carrier or groups of carriers. 
29 
The advances were expected to prevent an operating def­
icit for 1918, but proved Inadequate by approximately $200 
million. Operating costs, particularly wages, had risen 
rapidly (Saring the entire year while the 3.ncreaaeB were made 
effective for only the last six months. 'Ihe advances had 
no precedent in the history of regulation. Tlioy were exempt 
from the established customs of rate-making procedures of 
the Commissionj exempt also from the SO day publication 
notice as required by statute; not subject to investigation, 
suspension, nor approval by the Commission; and their reason­
ableness was not an issue to be questioned. The Commission 
reverted to an advisory board, operating under the direction 
of the Railroad Administration, deprived of its traditional 
3X dominance in the field of regulation. 
31. Sharfman, I. L., 0£. cit.. Vol. 1, pp. 164-166, "The 
net cost to taxpayers of government operation from 
December, 1917, to March, 1920, amounted to more than 
$1,600 million .... Prom an operating point of view, 
the Administration acconplished much, especially during 
the period of active conflict, and the financial deficit 
is to be explained primarily by the deliberate policy of 
keeping the level of rates low so as to check inflation. 
In clearing up congestion the government succeeded where 
the companies failed, Althou^ rates should probably have 
been increased more than they were, the failure to do so 
did not increase Hie cost of transportation to the country 
as a whole,, and in times of war, profit may not be the 
best standard of rate making. Railroads were operated at 
a leas in England and Prance as well as in America," 
Bigham, T,, op,cit,, p. 573, See also Hines, W, D,, op, 
cit., pp. 237-23jrr 
The war experiences of the railroads marked the end of 
30 
the period of negative or restrictive regulation. Policies, 
formulated and practiced, were those which prohibited rail­
road abuses, rather than those which xvould have led to con­
structive programs of equitable relationships between carriers 
and the public. Omission of legislative standards for the 
protection of carrier credit was one of the outstanding weak­
nesses of the Congressional directives. A tremendous burden 
was placed upon the Commission when it v/as requested to in­
terpret "fair return and fair value;" concepts which were 
for from definite when stated by the Courts. The conflict 
between the States and the Federal authority caused much 
32 
confusion in ttie attempt to stabilize the rate level. 
32. See particularly the Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U. S. 
352, 1913, and Shreveport Gases, 83 l.C.C. 31, 1912; 
34 I.C.C. 472, 1915; 41 I.C.C. 83, 1916. 
Finally, the lack of authority over the issuance of securities 
made more difficult the operation of rate-making policies, 
and all a//ed unsound financial programs to be followed by 
individual railroads, thus fvirther accelerating a weakened 
credit position. War brought these problems to the atten­
tion of the nation, and the turnijog point in the philosophy 
of regulation came with the Transportation Act of 19S0, 
31 
The Period of the Nineteen Twenties 
Congress passed the Transportation Act in February, 
33 1920. It was designed to rehabilitate carrier credit for 
33. 41 Statutes at Larp;e, part I, pp. 456-499. 1920. The 
Act contained both temporary and permanent provisions. 
Those of a temporary nature related to the return of the 
carriers to private operation; the adjustment of disputes 
arising out of the period of Federal controlj the funding 
of the goveriment guarantee for 6 months from March 1, 
the date of cessation of control. Permanent provisions 
related to rates, combinationa, securities, service, and 
labor disputes. For a summary of the Act, see Blgham, T. 
op. cit. pp. 173-181. More complete detail will be found 
In Rich, E, J, "The I'ransportation Act of 1920," America n 
Economic Review. Vol. 10, pp. 507-627. September, 1920. 
the purpose of maintaining and expanding the nation's trans­
portation system. Power to prescribe minimum rates was added 
to the authority to fix maximum rates granted by the Hepburn 
Act of 1906. Incorporated also were controls over security 
issues, and a modification of the rate suspension powers of 
34 the Coinraission. But the section which has been described 
34. Authority to regulate securities was made throu{^ the 
addition of iSectlon 20a. Rate suspension procedure was 
amended by shortening the suspension period from 120 days 
plus 6 months to 120 days plus 1 month, the charige being 
made in the Interests of the carriers. Since carrier 
losses during suspension proceedings could not be re­
covered, it was hoped that this change iTould help reduce 
deficits. 
as the heart of the Act provided for the ftamous rule of rate-
32 
making, wliicli dQclax'ed that "in the exercise of its power 
to prescribe just and i*easonable rates, the Cornmlssion v/as 
to initiate or adjust these rates in such a xnannei* that 
the carriers as a 'vvhole or as a wholo in such territories 
as may he designated will earn on the aggregate an annual 
net or^erating Income equal as nearly as may he to a fair 
return on the aggregate value of the property used in the 
35 
service of transporation," Tlie Commission was further 
35. Section 422, amending the Interstate Commerce Act by 
inserting Section 15Q. The territories set up for this 
purpose were Eastern, Western, Southern, and Moiontain-
Pacific, See Chart 2, Appendix A, 
directed to make use of the results of its valuation pro.iect 
in the determination of the values of carrier property; also 
to give due consideration "to all of the elements of value 
rocognized by the law of the land for rate making purposes."^® 
36. Ibid., Paragraph 4. 
In determining the rate of return, consideration further was 
to be given to the transportation needs of the nation end 
to the probcble demands for increased facilities. 
The retui'n deemed fair was fixed at 5.5 per cent by 
Congress for a period of two years following March 1, 1920. 
In addition one half of one per cent coixld be used at the 
•'•O 
discretion of the CoHinission for capital expenditures by the 
carriers. Tb.ore vrasi no guarantee of the percentage of re­
turn to individual raili-oada or to railroads in the groups 
dosiganted by the Coimiiission, Uinoe the proviaiorio v/ere 
designed to support the credit needs of the carriers it was 
felt that Coiiir>rlsslon response to the diioctive nii^at easily 
result in a condition of surplus earnings by certain in­
dividual railroads. Because of tliis, a novel feature in 
Anei'lcan x'egulatory legislation was introduced. 'Ihe recap­
ture clause provided for the limitation of earnings over a 
particular return, and the disposition of any surplus. A 
carrier receiving in any year earnings In excess of six per 
cent v;as to divide it into two equal funds, one of which was 
to be used in paying fixed charges in years of depressed 
revenues. The other v/as to be controlled by the Coimnission 
for the purpose of making loans to carriers to meet capital 
oxpendituros, to meet maturing oblipjatlons, or to be used 
by the Conimlssion for the purchase of equipment and facilities 
for lease to the• carriers. Only v/hen the carrier reserve 
reached X'lve per cent of the value of the property of the 
railroad could the fund be used for other lawful purposes. 
57. Sharfman, I. L., o£, clt., Vol. 3-B. p. 220, supra. 
Piirther provisions of the Act dealt with the relation­
ship between the Interstate Coratnei'ce Commission and State 
54 
Coiiu ills si oris in mal:ters of rate policy. These nev/ sections 
r'ecog;Tlaed .the dominance of tlie Federal rate-making authority 
even when applied to intrastate vates, insofar as such auth­
ority waa iLccesaary to tJie effective reg^ilatloix of Lvteratate 
38 
commerce. Under these provisions, whenever the Comrnisflion 
38. Section 41G, paragraph 3 and 4, ainonding Scot ion 13 
of the Interstate CoraTnerce Act. 
after hearing had found rates on intrastate traffic to be 
unduly discriinlnator^/' as agsinst persons and places iii intra­
state commerce on one hand and against interstate commerce 
on the other, they could prescribe the rate to be chars?3d 
*20 
in order to remove the jnaladjuatment caused by state action.*^^ 
39. Before the passage of the Transportation Act of 1920, 
the exact or minimum rate, or the specific method thought 
necessary to remove the undue discrJ-minations, could not 
be prescribed by the Commission, Rather, the carriers 
v;ere allowed to adjitst their rates in accordance \vlth the 
Act not to exceed the maxima authorized. In biie elimina­
tion of undue prejudice, they could lawfully reduce the 
interstate rates to the basis of the state rates, or in­
crease the latter to the level of the foimer, or equalize 
the tY;o in such a mamier as to do av7ay with the undue 
preference. See Araiual Report of the interstate Commerce 
Commission. 1916"!; pp. aO-^TI I'he effect's of" this" prac­
tice are outlined in Railroad Commission of Louisiana v, 
A. T. & S. P. R.R. Co., 4l I.C.'"dT"'8~5, 121-1"82. 1916~ 
In view of the establishment of the nev/ rate policy in­
corporated into Section 15a, the extension of Federal power 
over state rate-making procedures was of far reaching im­
55 
portance. For example, substantial limitations of carrier 
revenues as a result of rotes authorized by state bodies 
have been held to constitute discrimination against inter­
state coratnerce, and to justify the jurisdiction of the Com-
40 
mission over intrastate rates. Thus, powers of rate regu-
40. SeG Intr-astate Rates Within Illinois, 59 I.C.C. 350, 
1920; also "Wiiconaln" Passeripjer l^area, 69 I.G.G. 391, 1920. 
It Yfaa found in these cases that the rates and fares es­
tablished by state commissiona which were lower than 
those authorlJied in Increased Rates, 19S0, 58 I.C.C. 2J?0, 
1920, were unduly prejudiced against interstate commerce. 
Exercise of the Conmiaslon's authority in the Wisconsin 
Passenger Pares case was fully sustained by the Supreme 
Court in WTao'onsin R.R. Goimnisaion v. G, B. & Q. R.R. Co., 
257 U. S. 563, WS2, 
lation on the Federal level became hi^ly centralized, for 
rate structures as well as rate levels, even though directly 
applicable only to intrastate commerce, could be brou^t 
under dcmiinant control of the Commissioii. 
Termination of Federal control brought new agitation 
for rate advances from the carrlers.^^ It was generally 
41. Ex Parte 74. Increased Rates, 1920, 58 I.C.C. 220. 
1920. 
agreed that the deficits incurred under Federal operation 
justified the petition. "Ehe first problem confrontii^ the 
Commission was the determination of the valuation flgxires 
as a base for the proposed increases, With no guide yet 
given for the jurlginent of fsli' vuliie, they ju-'ocoodod to use 
the data of their valuution project. Tb.e carriers argued 
foi' book vjilue aa the baae for the calculation of fair return, 
asserting that inveatinoat fij^ures,- admittedly difficult to 
aacertnin, wore at le^ast as comprehensive as the Comnission's 
data, not yet corriialeto for a single railroad. The issue 
was resolved by the entablir.lirfient of nn aggregate value of 
flS,900 million, some (pi,100 jrdllion less thaxa the book valxie 
AO 
estimstes.^'^ The significance of the pr-ocedurc xiqq not so 
42. Sharfraaii, I. L., 0£. clt., Vol, 3-B. p. 307. 
much in the mechanics used in reaching the valuation amount 
as it was in the fact that valuation figixrea were used for 
the first time in tiie processes of rate control, and thst 
these figures adjusted for nev; investment and accrued de~ 
Xjreciation have largely served as tlie basis for computing 
fair rettu'n in all subsequent general rate level cases. 
The petition callod for horizontal increases of 30 pesr 
cent for the Eastern carriers, SI per cent for the Soutiicrn, 
and 24 per cent for those in IVestern Territoi-y. Increases 
awarded amovrnted to 40 per cent to Eastern carriers, 25 per 
cent for tliose in Southern Territory, 35 per cent for the 
Western railroads, and 25 per cent for those in Mountain-
Pacific Territory. Rates between territories v/ere to be 
Increased by 33.3 per cent. All increases were effective 
43 
upon five days' notice. 
43, ]?3: Parto 74, 02. cit., pp. 246-247. 
For fl few months carrlerr revemj.es Increased to such an 
extent that finfmcrlal problcma appeared to bo aolved. TIow-
cver, mnladjUGtmonts In the nntlon's post wp.r econor.-iy brought 
unomplo;innent end decllniiig conauincr piircliasing povver. Traf­
fic volurno dTOppod and by tlic end of 1920 many of the ratl-
ronds Iwd beon vuaable to earn thoir opcrnting escponsea. 
Particularly hard hit v/ero tliosc cnrr^flnij 0 heavy voluino of 
agrloultural traffic. The decision v;as tnade or. the asnvimp-
tlon that the national economy could afford the Increased 
costs of transportation but xinder chongcd economic conditions 
It was necessary to appraise the rete level fror. the vlev/-
po'j.nt of the shipper iuterestu. 
The first indication, of discontent came from, shippers 
of livestock and grain, and gave emphasis to tvvo slgnifictirit 
phasep of rate control.First, charges which were remunera-
44. Natioml Llvootock Shippers League v. A. T. & Ci. F. 
li.li* Go«, 63 I.C.C. 107. 19^1, Rates on Grain, Grain 
Products and Hay, 64 I.G.G. 05, 1921. 
tivo to carriers must bo reasonable to shippers; second, 
adequate ]:'evenuGs might bo more effectively realized under 
certain conditions through reductions X'jither than througl-i 
58 
Increases In retes. 'Phe livestock petition wsa denied, the 
Coinmission fearing th«t the loss in revenues thrt)ugb the 
pi'oposGd reductions would "be a serious blow to the fiiiGGces 
of the carriers Involved. HOWCVCT*, it was fou.nd thn b groins 
and hny v,-ere carrying s disproportionate share of the trans­
portation hurden, but it was also pointed out that the car­
riers hnndling this traffic had not yet earned their fair 
return. In the hope oT stimulating traffic and increasing 
carrier revenues, and at the same time atteinptlng to solve 
the problem of "unreaaonablenesa" of rates, the Coifsnission 
ordered rates reduced on these products. 
The experiment of decreasing charges on limited types 
of commodities did not prove successful. As the price level 
of the nation declined, transportation rates reniaitied rigid, 
and It v/as the contention of shipping groups that the rate 
level v/aa a harrier to business recovery and the return to 
noriual traffic conditions. They argued that rate reductions 
•were necessai'y, and the Cornmission on its own motion insti­
tuted a general rate level investigation late in 1921, which 
45 
reaulted in the general rate decreases of 1922, Rate 
45. Reduced Katos, 1922, 88 I.C.C. G7G. 1982. 
reductions were iiiada effective throughout the nation after 
July 1, 1922, amounting to 14 per cent in the F.ast, 12.5 por 
cent in the South, 5 per cent in the V/est, 12,5 per cent in 
39 
the Mountain-Pacific area, and 13,5 per cent interterri-
46 
torially. 
46. Ibid., pp. 734-737, 
One more rate level case during the twenties needs com­
ment, In 1925, claiming financial necessity, carriers In 
the Western and Mountain-Pacific territories requested hori­
zontal rate increases. Some 15 months later the petition was 
47 denied. The nation by 1926 was in the midst of an indus-
47, Revenues In Western District, 113 I.C.C, 3. 1926. 
trial boom but agriculture remained In a depressed condition, 
a fact which was responsible for most of the shipper com­
plaints concerning rates. Groups nflio shipped commodities 
long distances to markets, and had benefited by the rigidities 
modifying the rise in frel^t rates during two preceding 
decades, now suffered from that same rigidity viiien the situ­
ation was reversed, despite the efforts of the Commission 
to extend special ald,^® 
48, (Ehe most serious situation was found in the areas pro­
ducing cotton and wheat, and raising livestock. These 
were the products whose abnormal demand during the war 
years had insulted in large surpluses as competing nations 
throxighout the world slowly increased production. As 
farm prices declined because of decreased demand and 
40 
rising world supplies, farmers costs failed to fall in 
proportion. Wages, Interest payments, taxes, and trans­
portation were rigidly fixed by conditions over which 
the farmer had no control. See Wright, C, W. Economic 
History of the United States. New York, McGraw-Hill 
Publishing Co. 1941• pp. 980-981. 
The "fair return" doctrine incorporated into the Act 
of 1920 became a weapon of the Vi/eatern carriers. The rate 
of return had been less than the percentage decided upon by 
the Commission in 1922, but showed a definite improvement 
from 1922 to 1925, This trend seemingly negated the claim 
of financial emergency, and neither increases nor decreases 
Y/ere authorized. However, the Commission expressed a willing­
ness to examine proposals for an upward revision of class 
rates in Western Trunk-Line Territory. There can be little 
doubt that the decision was influenced, at least partially, 
by enactment of the Hoch Smith Resolution of January 30, 1925. 
Attempting to relieve the depression in the agricultural 
areas, the advocates of the ability principle of rate-making 
succeeded in having their ideas embodied into a law which 
stated that the "true policy in rate malclng to be pursued 
by the Interstate Commerce Commission in adjusting freight 
rates should take into consideration the conditions which 
ml^t at any time prevail in our several industries, insofar 
as this is legally possible to do, to the end that coramcaities 
freely move." In a later section, the Commission was 
directed to adjust rates particularly in the interest of the 
41 
"I'reeclora of movement ... of the products of agriculture 
. at the lowest possible lawful rates compatible v/ith 
It 49 the rraintenance of an adequate transportation syatem. 
49. 45 Statutes at Lar^e, part 1, pp» 801-802, 1925« ITie 
ability principle of making rates may be interpreted to 
mean the ease with which some commodities can bear high 
rates and not result in the destruction of the traffic. 
Some types of traffic move only on rates n^ich are so low, 
but sill fall vjithin the minimum requirements of the Com­
mission, as to assure that the traffic will be tied to 
the rails. "It was the common belief that Congress was 
attempting to make the railroads a sort of balance viieel 
in the national economy. Prosperous industries were to 
support the railroads throu^ higher rates, while the 
railroads were to come to the rescue of depressed indus­
tries by charging lower rates for the movement of their 
products. Depressed commodities were to be carried at 
rates which were considerably higher than the cost of 
sejrvice justified. The idea received short shrift in the 
Supreme Court, which declared in Ann Arbor v* U.S., 
231 U. S. 658, 1930, tliat if Congress had really intended 
to establish a rule of rate making under which the com­
modities of depressed Industries should be carried at 
rates below cost, it had failed to employ langaage nec­
essary to convey such a meaning. If Congress had adopted 
a rule stating explicitly that the commodities should be 
transported at less than cost, it was implied that the 
rule would have to be declared unconstitutional. In 
other words, it was the opinion of the Court that legis­
lative authority could not make rates on individual com­
modities which wei^e below a standard necessitated by the 
nattire and coat of transportation «ervice." Van Metre, 
T, W. T3?ansportation In the United Stateo. Chicago, The 
PoTindation Press. 1936. pp. 264-265. F'or an enlighten­
ing discussion of the meaning of the Hoch Smith Resolution 
see the opinion of Commissioner Eastman in Grain and Grain 
Products, 164 I.C.C. 619, 718. 1930. 
Railroad problems of this decade were accelerated through 
development of the motor carrier Industry, and not oriLy did 
the rail carriers suffer losses in passenger traffic, but 
4:2 
of the short hf^ul freight traffic was diverted to trucks. 
Because of the flexibility of operation the new industrial 
giant offered a more serious competitive challenge to tlie 
railways than had the waterways. Motor carrier rate regula­
tion was under the jurisdiction of the Individual states and 
proved very unsuccessful. To meet the rising competition, 
railroads were forced to adjust to the rates quoted by motor 
carriers, leading to decreased revenues where the competition 
existed. The significance of truck competition in the trans­
portation industry was not fully realized until the early 
thirties; and finally with the passage of the Motor Carrier 
Act of 1935, the agency was brought under control of the Com­
mission.^^ 
50. 49 Statutes at Lar/?:e, part 1, pp. {>45-667. 1935. The 
Act vjos made l^art II of the Interstate Commerce Act. 
The Period of the Nineteen Thirties 
By 1931, the industrial depression had adversely af­
fected every section of the nation. In terms of carloadings, 
railroad freight volume dropped 30 per cent under the 1929 
levels, while revenues showed a decline of 32 per cent in 
51 
the same period. Part of the depressed condition could 
51. Moulton, H. G., et al. The American Transportation 
Problem, Washington, D, C., The jSrookinR Institution. 
1933. p. 50. 
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be attributed to the rising trend of competition; most of it 
resulted from the general business depression. In the situ­
ation, there were tv/o courses for the railroads to follow. 
One Involved a program of substantial retrenchment in operat­
ing and capital expendlt\3res whicsh probably would have in­
tensified the depression; the other would cont^.mxo a normal 
operating policy in the hope that the depression would be 
shox't lived. l>uring 1930, the latbei' course v.'a s followed 
unsuccessfully. Economies in expenditures piled up deferred 
maintenance charges; dividend pa;wients v/ore suspended; wages 
could not be reduced without a long period of conference, 
mediation, and arbitration; and rates could not be increased 
unless approved by the Commission, Employees could be dis­
charged, expenditures for supplies and materials could be 
curtailed, but it was considered to be economically unsound 
52 
and socially inexjjedient to pursue these policies too far. 
52. Wilson, G. L. The Transportation Crisis. Ilew York, 
Sears Publishing Co. 1933. p. 269. 
Accordingly, the carriers requested on June 16, 1931, 
a general Increase of 15 per cent in frei^t charges, with 
53 
• exceptions on certain types of traffic. The sole objective 
53. Fifteen Per Cent Case of 1931, 178 I.C.C. 539, 1931; 
179 X.C.C. 215, 1931. 
44. 
or the pt'oixj st'd advnnnes wun to incroaso the net operating 
incorae sufficiently to ii'elieve the emergency throatonliis 
their finances, After a reviev.' of tlie railway situation 
pr'or to 1930, the Commission readily agreed that the car­
rier incorae had declined, and that credit showed a tendency 
tovmrd impairmont, tint dJ.d not agr-oe that th.e solution lay 
in rato IncreaseR. Contrasting the position of the rail­
roads in 1931 v/ith that in 1921;, the Goinnission declared 
that "frei(;^it rates constitute a greater re3.ative "bvii'don 
upon industry than ever hefore, and at n time v;hon induatry 
has gravely ImpalrtJd stamina to sustain the "burdeia. 
54, Ihid.. pp. 573-573, 
Note was made of the poRRllale effect of the proposed in­
creases on diversion of traffic to other agencies, 'ilie fear 
that a 15 per cent increase mi^t make the position of the 
carriers even inoi'>o precai'ious throu^. loss of traffic led 
the Comraission to conclude that "it is our contention that 
the increase in freight rates and charges would increase 
revenues, if at all, only temporarily, and that its ultimate 
effcct, not long postponed, could he to harm rather than 
help the railroads ... that such an increase would raise 
the rates on many kinds of traffic above a .just and reason­
able level, 
55. IblcU, pp. 57G-577. 
In denying the petition, the Coimnlssion pointed to 
poaalbllities of Grovernment assistDTice, and to economies 
which might result through carj^ier cooperation. It was 
felt that the recapture clnuse tihoiild be repealed because 
of its complicating effects on rate-making procedures; that 
regulation should be extended to all competitive agencies 
in the industry of transportationj and that railway manage­
ment should adjust their policies to the changing reauire-
ments of the ti>ansportation field, IlaveverjCven thou^i the 
general increases were adjudged uruiecessary, some immediate 
relief was effected throtig^ small temporary advances in 
56 
specific commodities. 
56. Ibid., pp. 587-590. 
Pew industries suffered greater economic devastation 
than did the railroads during the period from 1929 to 1933. 
Business volume was cut in half. Half of the railroad em­
ployees had been laid off. The great majority of carriers 
had ceased paying dividends; many were insolvent; others 
escaped the banla*uptcy courts only through the leniency of 
their creditors. Legislation designed to relieve the acute 
financial condition was passed In June, 1933, and consisted 
4G 
of temporary measures for iTTraediate relief nnd permanent 
57 
airiGndnients to the Interstate Commerce Act, ?!inergency 
• 48 Stntutea at Large, part 1, pp. 211-221. 1933. The 
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act was an amendment to 
the Interstate Commerce Act. A full discussion of the 
legislation is found in Harberson, R, V/,, "The Emergency 
Railroad I'ranfsiportntion Act of 1933," Journal of Political 
Economy. Vol. 42, pp. 106-126. February, 1934. 
provisions hoped to d.imlnate unnecessary expenditures 
arising from the failure of the carriers to coordinate 
their operations, and had as its objectives the encourage­
ment of carrier action to avoid wastefvil duplication of 
services; the promotion of financial reorganizations so as 
to reduce fixed charges; and provision for an immediate study 
of methods of improving the general transportation position. 
To carr-y out these objectives, the Act created a Federal Co­
ordinator of Transportation, who v/ith the assistsi-ice of 
regional coordinating committees was to study means for 
accomplishing economies of operation. The emergency pro-
58. Appointed as Coordinator was Commissioner Joseph B. 
Eastman, Alttiough the carriers were relieved from the 
antitrust laws to the extent necessary in the promotion 
of coordinating plans, the project itself was severely 
restricted. The Act provided that the number of employees 
in the service of a carrier could not be reduced, by 
reason of coordinating plans, below the niuuber in service 
during May, 1933; and further, that no employee could be 
placed in a worse position by proceedings under the Act; 
also that the railroad v/as to reimburse employees for 
expenses incurred in moving from one place to another 
47 
under changed v/orking conditions. wTillo these restric­
tions were designed to protect the position of employees, 
they substantially prevented any coordinating plans, for 
programs v/hich v/ould result in important economies usually 
required some savings in expenditures for labor. 
visions were to remain in effect for one year, but were ex­
tended by the President to Juno, 1935, and by Joint resolu­
tion of Congress until June, 1936. Permanent provisions 
related to railroad combinations and the rule of rate-making. 
One repealed the Recapture Clause retroactively, while another 
amended the Valuation Act by permitting the Commission to 
collect data upon which valuations could be made current 
rather than making it mandatory to keep valuations up-to-date 
59 
as a matter of course. 
59. On the question of combinations, the Act attempted to 
remedy defects in the consolidation provisions of the 
Transportation Act of 1920, The legislation eliminated 
the distinction between consolidations and acquisitions 
of control; brou^t holding companies under the jiirisdic-
tion of the Commission; and gave the Commission authority 
to approve any consolidations, mergers, purchases, leases, 
operating contracts, or acquisitions of control which it 
found (1) to be in harmony with the plan of consolidation 
as drawn up in the Act of 1920, and (2) that they promote 
the public Interest. Rate provisions were designed to 
make the rule of rate-making more flexible. Eliminated 
v/as the provision that the Commission was to establish 
rates so as to provide for the carriers as a whole or in 
groups a fair return on the fair value of their property. 
The new rule was stated as follows: "In the exercise of 
its power to prescribe just and reasonable rates the Com­
mission shall give due consideration, among other factors, 
to the effect of rates on the movement of traffic; to the 
need, in the public interest, of adequate and efficient 
railv/ay transportation service at the lov/est cost consis­
tent with the furnishing of such service; and to the need 
48 
of revenues sufficient to enal)le the carriers, under honest, 
economical, and efficient management, to provide such serv-
48 Statutes at Large, 220 amending Section 15a of 
the Interstate Commerce Act, June 16, 1933. The new rule 
made no mention of the fair return doctrine and listed 
factors other than revenue needs to bo taken into considera­
tion. For f\irther discussion see Bi^^am, T., cit., 
pp. 184-185; Daggett, S., og, cit., p. 565. 
In view of the severe and continuing decline in the com­
modity price level without a corresponding decline in the 
rail freight rate level, the Commission in 1933 initiated 
on its own motion a general rate level investigation.®^ The 
60. General Rate bevel Investigation, 1933, 195 I.C.C. 5. 
1933. 
proceedings centered around the question of rate reductions. 
Shippers claimed that the value of the transportation serv­
ice had declined because of the hi^ relative rate level and 
the unavailability of competing carriers, and that the exist­
ing level of rates was preventing the movement of traffic. 
Such claims contained a good deal of truth, for the evidence 
conclusively showed the disastrous effects of the depression 
upon industry in general, although an equally gloomy picture 
v/as presented in regard to the financial condition of the 
railways. 
In attempting to follow the nev/ rule of rate-making, 
the Commission pointed out that both value of service and 
revenue considerations were involved in their investigation. 
49 
They decided. In view of the Congressional mandate, that the 
existing rate level was not Tinreasonalile. Professing to 
see an upward trend in the price level of the nation, the 
Commission disraissed the argument of the shippers, and agreed 
with rallv/ay management that any general red-uction of rates 
61 
would not increase the absolute volume of traffic. In 
61, "The disparity between commodity prices and frei^t 
rates existing in March has already been materially les­
sened ... all Indications point to a further lessening 
of the spread between prices and rate levels." Ibid., 
p. 62, 
regard to the stimulating effects of lower rates upon traf­
fic volume, it was noted that during the depression, prices 
had been reduced much lov/er than rates could have possibly 
been reduced v/ithout further financial stress, and yet no 
great volume of business had resulted. It was therefore 
concluded that further rate reductions v/ould lead only to 
further losses in earnings; that the inevitable result would 
be to throw more carriers into receivership or reorganiza-
62. A further discussion on the Rate Level Investigation 
of 1933 will be found in Chapter III, pp. 61-69, 
The failure of the Emergency Transportation Act to re­
lieve financial distress was evidenced by the petition of 
50 
the railroads on January 15, 1935. It requested permission 
to "file upon short notice blanket supplements to existing 
rates effecting general increases in freight rates and 
charges." In many respects, the decision in the case paral­
leled that of the Fifteen Per Cent Case.^^ Ihere pas perhaps 
63. Cf., pp. 26-27. 
more weight attached to revenue factors, a fact which called 
forth dissenting opinions from four of the Commissioners. 
They argued for greater consideration of the elements of 
"reasonableness, diversion of traffic, and the assumption 
of m.anagerial discretion by the Commission."®^ Ko uniform 
64. Ex Parte 115, £p. clt. See dissenting opinions of 
Commissioners Tate, Atchinson, Porter, and Miller, 
pp. 64-76. 
horizontal increases had been requested; rather a 10 per cent 
advance in the nature of flat increases on commodities car­
ried on a long-haul basis was proposed. The decision granted 
a seven per cent emergency increase to remain in effect 
until June 30, 1936, later extended to December 31, 1936. 
In an effort to offset the loss of revenues expected upon 
termination of the advances, the railroads in October, 1936, 
petitioned for permission to increase carload rates on a 
large number of so-called "basic heavy commodities."®^ Many 
51 
65. Emergency Prei^ht Charges, 1936, 215 I.C.C. 439. 
1936. 
of the proposed advances were volxmtarily withdrawn by the 
carriers during the hearings as they came under attack of 
66 
the opposition in regard, to reasonableness. Aa in previous 
66. Ibid., pp. 760-762. 
cases, revenue considerations were paramount, "ihe justi­
fication offered by the applicants for the increased rates 
is, in the last analysis, very largely a revenue justifica­
tion — in other words, they need the moiiey and these are 
6*7 the places vAiere it can be got^ The fact that the ad-
67. Ibid., pp. 737. 
vances were to bo used as substitutes for the emergency in­
creases carried much wei^t in the decision to grant the 
requests. 
The final rate level case of the thirties was Instituted 
in Hovember, 1937, and decided in fdarch, 1938.^® The car-
68. Ex Parte 123. Fifteen Per Cent Case of 1937-1938, 
226 I.C.C. 41. 1938. 
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riers requested 15 per cent Increases to be permanent upon 
all frei^t rates and charges, "including those granted in 
the emergency cases." The basis of the requests lay in the 
increases in costs, particularly wages, payroll and retire­
ment taxes, materials and fuelsj and in a declining volume 
of traffic as represented by statistics of revenue carload-
in,3s, and net railroad operating income. However, while ac­
cepting the arguments of the carriei's relating to the neces­
sity of the proposed liicreaKos, the Commission considered 
15 per cent to be larger than necessary. Advances of 10 
per cent on industrial commodities with exceptions, and five 
per cent on agricultural commodities were granted. 
69. Ibid., p. 139. 
The Ex Parte 123 advances did not check the trend of 
the carriers toward bankruptcy, a fact whicli brought addi­
tional requests for assistance from the Federal government. 
In 1938, upon the request of President Roosevelt, tv/o com­
mittees were formed to study and make recommendations on 
the railroad situation. One drawn from the Commission made 
suggestions covering measures of iiranediate relief; extension 
of government loans; elimination of land grant rates; and 
establisliment of new machinery for raili'oad reorganization. 
Long range suggestions dealt with the necessity for greater 
internal economies and tho promotion of efficient coordina­
tion between all transportution agencies to eliminate waste-
*70 ful competition. 'ilie other vms composed of repre«enta-
70, Immediate Relief for Railroads. House Document No. 
58o, 75th Congress, 3d Seasioxi, 1938. 
tives of railway labor and railway management. On at least 
71 five ijoints the tv/o reports were in agreement. As a 
71. Bigham, T. G., og. ext., pp. 187-189. 
direct consequence, the Tranaportation Act of 1940 becamo 
72, Public Law Ro. 785, 76th Congress, 3d Session. 1940. 
For a complete summary, see Dewey, R. L., "The Transpor­
tation Act of 1940," i\Bierican Economic Review. Vol. 31, 
pp. 15-26. March, 1941. 
Act of 1940 was fijind amen tally an oij.tcome of the 
business depression and the severe competitive situation 
in the transportation industry. Its most important accom-
plisliment was the transfer of the inland water carriers 
from the jurisdiction of tho Maritime Commission to the 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Amendments were made to 
Part I of the Interstate Comraerce Act, one of the most 
significant being that of the declai-ation of o national 
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transportation policy. Another liberalized the Coirfinission's 
authority over combinations and omitted the requirement 
relative to the prrjparr.!tion of ti plan of consolidation. 
Any voluntary lolan of coordination ncemod to be doomyd by 
inclusion cf the prevision which stuted that, dui'liiij; a period 
of fotir years from effective date, the employees of carriers 
directly concerned shall not be placed throTigh unification 
in a worse position with respect to employment. A Reseerch 
and Investigation Board v/as authorized for a period of two 
years, and could be e:x:tended for a similar period by Presi­
dential proclamation. Its function was to study relative 
economy and fitness of rail, motor, and v/ater transporta­
tion; the question of public aids to each of the agencies; 
and the problem of taxation in each area. Pull commercial 
rates for railroad transpox'tation were required to be paid 
by the government for the carriage of persons or p3?operty 
for civil purposes. The need for continued study on the 
problem of greater possible economies in the railroad indus­
try v/as made evident through the amendments covering unflca-
tlons, mergers, control acquisitions, and pooling. Ho sig­
nificant changes took place in the rule of rate-making. 
Before many of the provisions of the Act could be 
tested, the nation vjas suddeiily plunged into its second major 
vmr within 2!3 years, and the carriers were called upon to 
cai-ry the major share of wartime traffic. Problems relating 
to war transportation v/111 be discussed in the chapter which 
follov/s. 
CIL-VPTER III 
THK .PITiRIOD OP UPHEAVAL, 1940-1945 
Modern warfare demands a hlglily efficient transporta­
tion system. Domestically, the fjreateat responsibility for 
the wartime movement of men and inatei'lals is placed upoxi the 
railroads. The importance of the railroads in a war econcmy 
natur-olly terj5s to direct public attentioii to many of their 
problems. I'/hile the war did not solve any of the vital is­
sues facing them in peacetime operation, it did contribxite 
toward an easing of financial bui'dena which had plagued the 
Industry for many years. At the same time, however, the 
Industry was confronted with now and more difficult opera­
tional problems which threatened to destroy its effective­
ness as an Instrument in the successful prosecution of the 
war. 
As a basis for comparison, it is necessary briefly to 
survey the general status of the railroads during the period 
betv/een the great wars. This is the objective of the first 
section of the chapter. Following, an attempt is made to 
analyze the rate level problems of the early depression 
years, ITie third section will discuss railroad operations 
during the war years, while those follov/ing are devoted to 
an appraisal of the effect of the War on agencies competi­
tive v/ith the rail carriers; and the War as it affected 
operating expenses. The chaptcr will close with an analysis 
of the only rate level proceeding of the period. 
The General Status of the Railroads 
in the Intorwar Period 
Developments which occurred within the industry between 
the years 1921 to 1940 are stunrtiarized in Table 1, Appendix B. 
Pour representative years have been chosen to measure trends 
in physical operations and revenue factors, Tlie year 1921 
has been selected because it portrays the first complete 
year of private operation, following the period of Federal 
control during the first VJorld Vvar. The year 1926 has been 
included since peak performance was reached in such items as 
freight cars available, number of employees, tons of revenue 
frei^t carried, rail ojjerating revenues, and rail operating 
exponaen. 
In 1929, maximum levels were attained in net revenues 
from operations, in net ralH-V/ay operating income, in net 
income after charges, and in the number of m3.1es of track 
operated. Also in this year, a record low was established 
for the number of railroads in the hands of receivers. The 
final year of normal peacetime operation before the second 
V/orld War was 1940.^ 
1. Omitted from this analysis are statistics for the early 
depression years, Ihese will be compared v/ith operatixig 
data of the twenties in the second section of this chap­
ter. 
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There were 27,000 miles more of track operated in 1929 
thnn in 1921, By 1940, hov/ever, mileage had been reduced 
to approximately seven per cent under that of 1929. Pev/er 
locomotives were used in 1940 as compared ^vith 1921, while 
the number of cars in use reached a peak in 1926, and de­
clined thereafter. 'jPhe decrease in numbers was more tlian 
offset, hov/evcr, by an increase in the aggregate tractive 
power of locomotives; and by an increase in the aggregate 
capacity of freight cars. By 1940, the number of locomotives 
in use had declined some 56 per cent under those used in 
1921, but the average tractive effort,, measured in pounds, 
had increased approximately 54 per cent. The decline in 
available freight cars over the period averaged about 33 per 
cent, v/hile the decline in the aggregate capacity in tons 
was roughly 17 per cent.. 
Employment in the railroad industry shov/ed a general 
upward trend between the years 1921 and 1926, but declined 
over 44 per cent betv/een the latter year and 1940. Reduc­
tion in labor costs as a result of decreasing employment 
during the period was partially offset by rising wage rates, 
especially during the late thirties. The influence of labor-
saving machinery and more efficient operating methods may 
be indicated by the fact that employment figures were ap­
proximately equal in 1921 and 1929, but the tons of freiglat 
carried over the nine year period Increased by almost 50 
per cent. 
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Tonnage of freight originated in 1940 waa slightly 
higher than thnt of the year 1921 • Preij^t traffic in­
creased cojisiderably throughout the twenties, rining from 
940 million tonn in 1921, to 1,339 million tons in 192. By 
1932, however, the tonnage orisinatod was less than half 
that of 1929. 'ITie trend reflected the increasing competi­
tion offered by other transportation agencies, and the de­
pressed position of the national ecoxiomy in that year. A 
gradual improvement was noted through 1937, when the billion 
ton level v;as reached for the first tljue since 1929. Al-
,though tonnage declined again in 1938 and 1939, the carriers 
transported mor-o than a billion tons again in 1940. By 
comparison, the traffic carried in the latter year averaged 
less than 25 per cent of that cari'ied in 1929. 
Gross revenues from operations amounted to ^•i5,516 mil­
lion in 1921, rose to .j:iG,332 million in 1926, and remained 
practically cos^tant for the next three years. Between the 
years 1929 and 1937, revenues decreased at a rapid rate, 
reviving somewhat during 1937, but afterward declinijig to 
1940. Military preparations during 1940 carried total 
revenues to the highent point in a decade of operations, 
bixt the level was only 67 per cent of the rev-nues rt^celved 
in 1926. Operating expenses amounted to 82,7 per cent of 
the operating revenues in 1921, the highest ratio of any 
year in the terwar period. The ratio fell to 73.1 per cent 
by 1926, and doclined further to 71.7 per cent at the end 
of 1929. Throuoihout the thirties, it ranged from a 1931 
high of 77.1 per cent to a 1936 lov/ of 72.3 per cent. The 
1940 operating ratio of 71,9 per cent was approxiiaately equal 
to that of 192'J, despite the fact that operating revenues 
for 1940 were but 68.4 per cent of those of 1929. Although 
the ratio in the former year was lowei" than it had been at 
any time diiring the thirties, it was generally considered 
to be above the level which would allow the raili'otida to 
2 prosper undei' normal operating conditions. 
2. ''The ratio must be kept dovni to less than 70per cent 
if the railroads . . . are to have net rr^venues that will 
enable them to pay the high taxes levied on themj to im­
prove their facilities as they must to meet competition 
and to serve the public efficiently; to meet fixed charges 
and to pay stocidiolders a fair rate of dividends that 
must be paid if nev; capital is to be secxired without un­
duly increasing the funded debt." Johnson, E. R. Th6 
Railroad?! and Public Welfare. Hew York, Sim;tiens-Boardman 
Publishing Corp. 1944, p. 40. 
No item listed in the table illustrates more clera rly 
the depressed condition of the Industry than the carriers 
in the hands of receivers or trustees throughout the period. 
The low point v/as reached in 1929 with 29 roads in receiver­
ship. Tliis firnxre represented fever ^ nll^7aYF: than in 
1921, and 16 less than in 1926. By the end of 1940, however, 
103 carriers were either in the process of reorganization 
or had been declared insolvent and were petitioning for 
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reorganlzsation. This represented en increase of 74 rail-
•Z 
roads in receivership over a period of 12 years.^ Tax 
3, Tlie carriers in receivership in 1929 operated o total 
of 5,703 miles of track. By 1939, 108 carriers with a 
total of 77,013 miles vie re in "bankruptcy. In 1940, 103 
carriers representing 75,270 miles were in receivership. 
Interstate Commerce Commission. Statistics of the Railvmys 
of the U.S. 1940. Washington, D. C., Govt. Print. Off, 1941. 
Table l5l, p. 149. 
payments in 1921 took five cents of every dollar of operat­
ing revenue; by 1939, the amount had increased to about nine 
cents J and in 1940, it was over nine cents. 
The total net operating income, after taxes ai>d rentals, 
vras somewhat hi^er in 1940 than in 1921, but was only 52 
per cent of that earned in 1929. The rate of return on in­
vestment in 1929 was almost five per cent; in 1940, it had 
declined to two and one half per cent. Net income by 1940 
had fallen by more than lip700 million \mder that of 1929. 
For all roads, the average rate of dividends paid to stock­
holders in 1921 was four per cent; in 1929, six per cent; 
v/hile in 1940, it had been reduced to two per cent. In both 
1939 and 1940, almost two-thirds of the amount distributed 
as dividends was taken from reserves, not from current income. 
The larger share of distributed dividends came from a smaller 
ntmber of railroads having surplus funds upon which to draw. 
Net operating income for any given year depends on the 
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extent to which carrier expenditures must be increased, or 
may be decreased or postponed, A sharp fall in traffic and 
revenue, as was experienced during the depression, will 
usually force a reduction in expenses to as lov/ a level as 
possible consistent vrlth operations. Maintenance and equip­
ment expenditures are particularly affected in a period of 
depressed activity, and postponement in one period ulti­
mately results in abnormally hig^ expenses and lov/er rates 
of return in future periods. The revenue and income posi­
tion of the carriers at the end of 1940 may be sijmmarized 
by reference to the railroad p- tition presented in 1941 for 
rate increases? "Average annual operating revenues during 
the 1931-1940 period . . . were less by 37.6 percent than 
during the 1921-1930 period; average annual net railway oper­
ating income was less by 48.1 percent, while net income after 
fixed and contingent charges was lower by 93.5 percent."^ 
4. Interstate Comitierce Commission. Ex Parte 148. In­
creased Railway Rates, Pares, & Charges, 1942. 248 I.C.C. 
545, 552. 1'^. 
The Rate Level Problem in the Depression 
In view of the severe decline in the commodity price 
level between the years 1929 and 1932, certain producers and 
shippers sought to obtain relief from the relatively high 
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level of freight charges. To support their contentions. 
5. Primarily responsible for the petitions filed Jfjnuary 25, 
1933, were producers of farm, coal, and lumber products. 
However, since the economic factors involved ap!)lied gen­
erally to all comjnodities, the Commission on its own mo­
tion decided to expand the investigation to include all 
interstate freight, Ihe case was taken under considera­
tion on March 31, 1933, and decided on July 31, 1933. 
General Rate Level Investigation, 1935, 195 l.C.C. 5, 
1&33, supra at p. a. 
the following arguments were presented: First, the value 
of railroad service had declined by reason of the decreased 
level of commodity prices and the cheaper" service afforded 
by motor and v/ater carriers; second, the existing level of 
rates had reduced the radius of distribution, thus tending 
to Injure or destroy industries which competed in distant 
markets; third, the value of the service to the shipper based 
upon the value of the commodity and the availability of a 
cheaper means of transportation i^ould take precedence over 
cost of service, plus a reasonable return. 
6, Ibid,, p. 12. 
A considerable amount of data v/as offered as evidence 
of the adverse effect of the depression upon industry in re-
lationsliip to tlie railroad rate level. Based upon revenues 
per ton-mile, the existing level of rates was found to be 
about 24 per cent belov/ the peak of 1921, and 13 per cent 
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7 below the level authorized in 1922,  Against this, fectory 
7. Ibid., p. 12. 
employment in March, of 1933, was 57 per cent and factory 
payrolls 37 per cent of the 1923-1925 levels, while whole­
sale ccnunodity prices stood at 60 per ccnt of the 1926 
level. Gross income from agricultural products in 1932 
v;as 57 per cent below that of 1929, "Using 1910-1914 prices 
as 100, those paid for commodities purchased (by the farmer) 
ranged between 54 and 59 pej:' cent higher than prewar in the 
years 1924 to 1929, were 46 percent higher in 1930, 26 per­
cent hi^er in 1931, 9 percent in 1932, and 1 percent in 
March, 1933. At the latter date, therefore, the commodities 
which the farmer bought coat him substantially what they did 
before the v/ar, while his own selling prices have been reduced 
one half. The ratio of the two sets of prices gives what is 
comiuonly designated as the purchasing power of farm products. 
'ITie ratio ranged between 85 and 92 in the years 1923 to 
1929, fell to 80 in 1930, to 63 in 1931, 53 in 1932, and 48 
in February, 1933."® 
8. Ibid., p. 14. 
It was argued that the proposed reductions would tend 
to hold or return diverted traffic to the rails and thus 
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lessen the disorganizing effect on their businesses of the 
Increasing competition made by cheaper forms of transporta­
tion. 
However, an equally gloomy picture v/as presented by the 
carriers, llie net railway operating income in 19oS amounted 
to 5ii326 million as compared v;ith o603 million in 1921, and 
$1,252 million in 1929. Earnings in 1932 failed to cover 
fixed charges by more than $152 million, and 60 companies 
with a total mileage of 41,560 v/ere in the hands of the re­
ceivers or in the process of reorganization. Operating ex­
penses in 1932 were lov;er than in any year since 1921. The 
reduction v;as due not only to decreasing demands for service, 
depressed material prices, lov;er v/ages, and increased effi­
ciency, but also to the postponement of maintenance expendi-
ttires. The number of revenue ton-miles in 1932 was approxi­
mately half the number of 1926. A poor financial record had 
virtually destroyed the credit of the railroads, despite the 
continued need for capital to provide adequate service.^ 
9. Ibid., pp. 45-56. 
Basic to the proceeding was the legal question of whether 
or not the revenue needs of the carriers or the value of 
service to the shipper should be the controlling factor in 
determining the reasonableness of the general rate level. 
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Shipping interests contended that there was no possibility 
of carriers earning s fair return unless industry recovered 
from Its depressed state, thus revenue considerations v/ere 
irrelevant. They declared further that Supreme Court de­
cisions had recognized value of service as the paramount 
factor in judging the reasonableness of rate levels. ITne 
railroads, on the other hand, argued that revenue considera­
tions should be the coni,rolling element in deciding the in­
vestigation and they pointed also to t'mpreme Court decisions 
10 to support their position. Furthermore, in view of the 
10. Supreme Court cases used by the opposing parties will 
be found discussed in Sharfman, I. L. The Interstate 
Commerce Commission . Vol. 3B. New York,' The Commo'n-
v/ealth Fund. 19o6, pp. 202-5203. See also General Rate 
Level Investigation, 1953, op. cit., pp. 59-60. 
fact that they failed to earn their fixed charges in 1932, 
the carriers claimed that no general reduction on rates was 
legally permissible. The Commission faced the issue by de­
claring that it considered both revenue and value of service 
considerations legally pertinent under its statutory author-
11 ity. It decided that the prevailing level of rates 
11, In deciding the 1931 case, the Comraission had stated 
that section 15a enacted in 1920 "had not made revenue 
needs the 'paramount and controlling factor' in the de­
termination of a reasonable general level of rates" but 
that "factors which theretofore v/ere relevant and en­
titled to consideration, notwithstanding the revenue 
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needs of individual cnri'iera, are still relevant and en­
titled to consideration, notwithstanding the revenue needs 
of the carriers in the aggregate or hy rq^'OUDS," Fifteen 
Per Cent Case, 1931, 178 I.C.C. 539. 1931*. p. 564. 
Attention "w.-is "also directed to the amended rule of rate 
making enacted June 16, 1933, which ordered the Commiasion 
to give consideration among other factors, "to the effect 
of rates on the movement of traffic; to the need, in tJae 
public interest, of adequate and efficient re ilv/ay trans­
portation service at the lowest cost consistent v/ith the 
flemishing of such service; and to the need of revenues 
sufficient to enable the carriers under honest, economical, 
and efficient management, to provide such service. Public 
Law No. 68, 73d Congress. Section 205. 
had not been found unreasonable, 
'I'he decision was influenced partly by the upward trend 
in the volvime of business during the first and second quar­
ters of 1953. In addition, the Commission professed to see 
a further general Improvement in the price level through the 
government's recovery program. In denying the rate reduc­
tions, they attacked the position of the diipoing groups by 
declaring that " . . . while the value of the service to 
the Clipper when measured solely by the decline in commodity 
prices and by the depressed condition of industry has been 
lowered ... a general reduction in rates at this time 
would threaten the possibility of furnishing adequate service 
to the public. The benefits which accrue to the average 
shipper from a general reduction in rates would be small 
compared with the disastrous effects on respondents revenues 
and credit. 
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Qp» clt.j p. 69. 
It was thought that rate reductions would not increase 
the total volume of business or increase rail freight traf­
fic except possibly through the recovery of some tonnage 
previously lost to motor and water carriers. Despite the 
admitted relevancy of both value of service and revenue needs 
in determining rate level reasonableness, in the end the con­
trolling emphasis was placed on revenue considerations. 
Dissenting from the majority decision wace Commissioners 
Atchison, Lee, and Porter. Their conclusions were based on 
the fact that rates since 1922 had been kept on an equal or 
generally rising level in spite of significant declines in 
operating expenses and a sharp fall in commodity prices dur­
ing the period. They maintained that new competition could 
be met effectively only if the basic rate level was lov/ered 
at this time; furthermore, they were convinced that rates 
which had not been reduced throu^i competitive pressure were 
"I 
unreasonably hif^.^ 
13. Ibid., pp. 72-81. 
Maintaining the basic level of rates in the face of the 
convincing evidence presented by the dippers was tantamount 
to permitting the railroads to exploit their position with 
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respect to non-competitive traffic. Shippers who could not 
avail themselves of alternative means of transportation not 
only had a heavier burden imposed upon thevn, but also v/ere 
subject to discriminatory practices as compared with those 
who benefited through voluntary competitive rate reductions, 
ll/hether or not rate reductions of a general natiire would have 
enhanced the financial position of the carriers is impossible 
to determine. However, it may be suggested that many of the 
depression Ills could be traced to extreme rigidity in parts 
of the price structure; and furthermore that railroad T«tes 
comprise one of the important rigid forces. In view of the 
relatively hl^i level of frel^t charges, the 1933 proceed­
ings resulted in official endorsement to continue the malad­
justment . 
To the extent that the maintenance of a rigid rate level 
obstructed economic recovery, it contributed unfavorably 
toward the long-run financial position of the railroads. 
Also, the decision when viewed against the expanding sphere 
of competition tended not only to preserve current rate-
making practices, but endangered the non-competitive traffic, 
and thus threatened the flow of railway earnings. By its 
conclusions, the Gomraisaion apparently hoped that preserva­
tion of the status quo would result in increased carrier 
revenues, and thus support the efforts of the Government to 
reverse the forces of deflation. However, there appears to 
be evidence to v/arrant a conclusion that the Commission did 
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not correctly analyze the economic situation then existing. 
\7hile some question may be raised as to the amount of finan­
cial aid provided through the decision, one fact clearly 
emerged from the investigation. Revenue was considered of 
such importance that the purpose of the amended rule of rate-
making was interpreted to mean that everything possible should 
be done in the interests of making carrier operations reason­
ably self-supporting, 
American Railroads in the Second V/orld War 
Jfor tv/o years preliminary to the entrance of the nation 
into the War, the defense program gave the railroads some 
preparation for the greatly increased services to be expected 
of them for the duration of the emergency. As war industries 
were developed, the carriers were suddenly confronted with 
demands which threatened to become greater than existing 
facilities could fulfill. Equipment held idle was gradually 
brought back into service. Orders for new rolling stock were 
placed for delivery as soon as was possible. Had it not 
been for this degree of preparation, it is difficult to see 
how the carriers could hove performed as well as they did 
during the following period. 
By its nature, transportation was more important to the 
belligerents of the second World War than in any other in 
history. Every wnr, from the beginning of time, has been 
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one of movement, but the hostilities of 1939-1945, fou^t 
on five of the six continents and all of the seven seas gave 
a new meaning to the tcjrm. Not only did it involve rapid 
movement of ravif material to the combat areas, but it required 
the production and use of larger and more powerful weapons, 
greater masses of men, speedier transportation, and tremendous 
volumes of war supplies carried over longer distances. 
The emergency which struck America in December, 1941, 
was huge and iiTimediate, but within a matter of weeks hundreds 
of thousands of troops and equipment were being moved by rail 
in every direction. At the same time the carriers were 
called upon to transport the major part of the rising war 
production; to take over services formerly supplied by inter-
coastal shipping; and to mtiltiply the tank-car movement of 
oil into the eastern states more than 70 times over. All of 
these developments doubled the demands on the railroads be­
tween 1939 and 1942, then doubled them again between 1942 
and 1944. 
Government i>olicy largely dictated the place of the 
railroads in the national economy during the war. Administra­
tive procedures, havever, .were substantially different from 
those followed during 1917-18. Eleven days after the attack 
on Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt Issued an executive 
order establishing the Office of Defense Transportation, to 
be headed by a director who would "discharge and perform 
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his responsibilities under the direction and supervision of 
the President,The order applied to domestic transporto-
Executive Order Ho. 8959* issued on December 18, 1941. 
See Eastman, Joseph,B. '"riie Office of Defense Transpor­
tation," Annals of the Ara^lcan Academy of Political and 
Social Science, Philadelphia, 'November 1945. pp. 1-4, 
tion, including railroads, iTiotor carriers, inland waterv/ays, 
pipe lines, air transport, and intercoastal shipping. The 
Office of Defense Transportstioii was to have supervision 
over these agencies and WJ-'S to work with the Maritime Com­
mission in the matter of rates, rotites, and services; and 
with the VJar and Navy Departments with regard to movement 
of troops, supplies, and materials. To direct the activities 
of the Office, the President selected Joseph B. Eastman, a 
member of the Commission, and formerly Coordinator of Trans­
portation during the depression period. It was generally 
agreed that no better choice could have been made. 
Railway operation and aervice 
Turning now to a discussion of the operational trends 
between 1941 and 1946, the reader is referred to Table II, 
Appendix B, which presents statistical data showing devel­
opments in general traffic and service efficiency of the 
carriers. In round numbers, tons of frei^t originated in-
crcascd from 1 billion in 1940 to almost 1,5 billion in 1944» 
A new all-time high was reached in 1942, again in 1943, and 
once more in 1944. Prei^t ton mileage by the latter year 
had practically doubled over the prewar average. 
Almost twice as many revenue ton-miles offi>eight were 
handled in 1944 as in 1940, with only 1,600 more locomotives 
and 116,000 additional cars. Longer trains averaging more 
miles per day were hQnd].ed in larger numbers than over before. 
The average haul per-ton in miles showed an increase of about 
21 per cent in 1944 and 1940, v/hile the net ton-miles per 
freight car increased by nearly 68 per cent over the same 
period. Freight cars acoommodated more tons per trip, and 
the improvements in construction allowed more miles per car 
and required a fewer number of stops along the route. The 
vastly increased freight load was carried v/ith approximately 
one-third fewer locomotives and cars than v/ere operated at 
the peak of the first V/orld War. To function in this manner 
required a highly efficient operating plant, efficient op­
erating methods, a hi^ level of planning, coorc3ination, 
and cooperation, not only among the railroads, but among the 
shippers and x'oceivers of freight, and betv/een all and the 
govei'nment agencies which were concerned directly with 
transpox-tation. 
lahiile it is imposeIble to analyze in any one index 
overall carrier performance from the standpoint of operating 
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efficiency, the one coming closest to so doing is that of 
average ton-miles per freight-train hour. It is highly 
significant since it combines the various load and speed 
factors and dio^vs the unit output of the average hour of 
freif^at train operation. Table II will show this average 
to be computed on tv/o bases; gross ton-miles of cars and 
contents jier freij^t-train hour, and net ton-miles per 
freight-train hour. Compared v/ith the year 1940, gross ton-
miles in 1944 increased by 11 per cent, but if contrasted 
with 19521, the average Increased by almost 151 per cent. 
Het ton-miles per freight-train hour increased between the 
years 1940 and 1944 by almost 24 per cent, \Mien compared 
v/ith 1921, the increase v/ould be 141 per cent. Due to reduced 
volume in 1945, both averages showed sli^t declines, but 
the reduction was less than one per cent below the 1944 
average s. 
Another important set of operating statistics are those 
of daily mileage of locomotives and freight cars. Here, as 
In other pei'formance aspects, all previous records were 
broken. Locomotive mileage averaged a gain of 16 per cent 
in 1943 over 1940, while the increase in actual average 
miles covered per day was 17. Freight cars averaged 12 
miles more on a dally basis in the same period, a gain of 
34.3 per cent, Diiring 1946, reduced traffic volume resulted 
in a decline in equipment mileage. On a dally basis loco­
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motives averaged 4.3 miles less than in 1944, v/hilo cors 
showed a decrease of 2,6 miles. 
Maximum frei^t losdn por-car and per-train were neces­
sary to meet war demands. Since ne"w equipment was not forth­
coming, some adjustment in the load factor was necessary in 
order to meet the split-second schedules of train operation. 
Minimum load orders were issued hy the Office of Defense 
iransportation, and the cooperation of Clippers and the 
various governmental agencies in holding to these minima niade 
possible the record movement of freight. Net tons per-trnin 
and net tons per-car reached a peak in 1944. On a per-train 
basis, the net gain was 260 tons in this year as compared 
with 1940, which represented over a 33 per cent Increase, 
Net tons per-day increased an average of 5.1 tons during the 
period, a 20 per cent increase over the level of 1940. 
Slight recessions in all averages occurred in 1945. The 
movement of traffic required an increase in the mimber of 
trains on the rails, and because of this fact, average speed 
on a per-hour basis between terminals showed a decline. 
Average speed in 1940 was 16.7 miles per-hour, dropping to 
a low of 15.4 miles, per-hour in 1943, then showing a sli^t 
improvement in 1944. 
Railroad finance 
Next to be discussed is the financial record of the 
carriers during the war pariod. Statistical trends in 
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revenues and earnings between 1940 and 1945 are compiled in 
Table III, Appendix B, The large voliame of freigjnt handled 
broiifT^^t proportionatG increases in the gross operating reve­
nues of the railroads. From somewhat ovsr ('A hillion in 
1940, revenues almost doubled by 1943, and reached a peak 
in the following year. However, between 1940 and 1945, op­
erating expenses more than doubled and continued to rise by 
over i.vVSO million during 1945, while in the latter year, 
revenues showed a decided decline as compared with 1944. 
Over the period covered in Table III, revenues increased by 
107 per cent, but operating expenses increased by 131 per 
cent, 
While gross earnings v;ere at their maximum level in 1944, 
net incotne after charges reached its hif^est point in 1948, 
In comparison with 1940, a gain of nearly 400 per cent was 
recorded, topping 1929, the previous year of maximum earnings 
by Bome 5^15 million. Increased operational costs and het^vier 
wartime taxes were responsible for this development. The 
anomaly of successive increases in gross revenues with suc­
cessive declines in net income continued to operate in 1943 
and 1944, giving rise to a major postwar financial problem. 
For the first time in seven years, operating revenues in 
1945 declined to a point which led to an appreciable loss 
in net income, Betv/een 1944 and 1945, gross revenues de­
creased 5.7 per cent, net railway operating Income decreased 
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23.1 per cent, while net income after charges declined 32,8 
per cent. Operating expenses, however, increased over 13 
per cent. 
Bervitig to of set the war time gains in revenuen were 
increased wages, increased inaberial prices, and higher taxes. 
Taxes on propei'ty, and on personal and corporate incomes 
were made extremely heavy during the war years, but their 
burden upon the railroads seemed particularly oppressive. 
In 1940, tax accruals amounted to ;|:396 million. By 1943, 
taxes had Increased more than fivefold. Tlaroughout 1944, 
they remained constant, and declined substantially Ijy the 
end of 1945. between the years 1940 and 1943, carrier tax 
liability increased by 41,453 million, and during the four 
years of war, railroads paid a total of nearly :;;;6,271 mil~ 
lion to the Federal Government. This is a vastly diffextent 
picture from that of the first World '<ar, when the cost of 
Federal operation to the Government exceeded by a wide margin 
the taxes paid by the x'ailways into the Federal Treasury, 
'ihe high tax liability Vi^as largely due to the heavy income 
tax pro;.;ram of the nation, but railroads also paid large 
amounts in property taxes, and in contribvitions toward 
pensions, annuities, and unemployment compensa v.ion to the 
increcisod labor force. 
Operating ratios and the rate of retux'n on property in­
vestment follov/ed closely the trends of revenues, operating 
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oxpensoa, nnd net incoine. The operating ratio In 1940 had 
stood at 71.9, dropped to 61.6 in 1942, rose gradually 
throughout the next two years, and jumped suhatontially 
between 1944 and 1945. Evon v/ith an increase of over 100 
per cent in revenues Tbetv^een the years 1940 and. 1945, the 
ratio at the end of the latter year v;a3 some 7.3 per cent 
higher than that of the former. The high point of the ag­
gregate rate of .return v/as 5.50 per cent in 1942. It repre­
sented the highest average over a period of 25 years, slightly 
over the 5.45 per cent earned in the year of 1926. By the 
end of 1945, the return \vas slightly hi^er than that of 
1940. Both averages were influenced by the increases v>iiich 
had occurred in ope.rational expenses over the period. War 
earnings hroi;ght 31 carriers out of receivership. Percentage 
dividend payments showed little increase, for most of the 
earnings were used to retire nearly $2 billion of debt. 
Wartlne effects on competition 
Transportation service in the United States is rendered 
by five major agencies, the carriers of which compose what 
is popularly known as the "domestic system.The term 
15. Exclusive of frelgb.t forwarders, brought mder juris­
diction of the Interstate Comirierce Commission In 1942. 
"system" is used in a rather loose manner for full coordlna-
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tion of the respective gr-oups has not yet been achieved in 
the sense that each separ^vte r.gency ftinctions In the area 
hest suited to its ahilit^f. However, coordimtion to a 
certain decree han been accornpliehed sr. shovm. in a dcsci'ip-
tioii of the rolf; of each ageiicy in the i rr.nsportatl on indus­
try. 
To £307ne extent, each 'orm of transportation occupics 
s distinct field of service In the economy, even though sorae 
of the trnffic carried is highly competitive in nature, Rail­
roads handle the hulk of hl,gh-and medium-grsde traffic trnna-
ported on n loxi^; distance "basis. Water carriers usually 
cnrry the low-grade commodities at o slow rote of speed 
within roach of their linen. Motor carriers take less-carlood, 
loccil, and specialized traffic us^^ally on r. short-distance 
haul. Pipe lines specialize in and control amost completely 
the petroleum trafficj and airlines transport hi£_';h-grode 
T A 
articles emphasising speedy delivery. 
16. Further summary -vylll he found in Bigha:"., T. C. Trans­
portation, Principles and Problems, McGravz-lIill Book Go. 
Inc. iTew york. IWg. ppT 96-97, 
See also Board of Investigation and Research, i'lational 
Troffic Pattern, Senate Document Ho,83, 79th Congress, 
1st Session. Washington, D. C,, Govt, Print. Off, 1945. 
It may be doubted that the railroads will ever again 
achieve the position of dominance held in the field of 
transportation at the beginning of the Twentieth Century, 
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llie relatively recent grovi'th of new coinpefcltion carries the 
warning that no matter hov/ the nation may weather future 
periods of depression, the railroads will be confronted 
with nev/ problems of a coinpo^titive n-ituro. Motor carriers 
and the airplane have takoii traffic frora the railways mich 
may never be rocoverocl. Its loss has forced the railrotida 
f 
to place heavier burdens against long-distance traffic, 
v/ith the result that local distribution has tended to be 
relatively less expensive, vArlle long hauls are more and 
more costly for shipporr.. 
In the fields of water, motor and air transport, ti-af-
fic ia carried imder tlu'oe distinct classifications J private 
contract, and coramon carriers. Private operators carry row 
raateriols and fabricated parts in their ovm equipment and 
in connection v/ith their own business. iVith the exception 
of reaso:.able requiroiuents the promotion of safety opera­
tions, and preservfcitioxi of public investment in ways and 
structures, the CoiiKrlssion exercises ao control over' them. 
On the otlinr hand, contrrc!; and cormiion carriers in dorcier.tic 
cornriiGice ai-e I'oqLiii-cd to conform to rcgiij.a biox^s established 
for eacli by statute, as a drainistered by the public authority. 
17. Requirements for these carriers Include the following: 
Minimum and maximum rates and charges to bo regulated for 
the coitDTcon carriers, minimun rates for the contract car­
riers, Certificates of public convenience and necessity 
required of the coiTirAon carriers, and permits of the con­
tract carriers before beginning operations. For a complete 
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suiinnary of the regulation, and classification of motor 
carriers, see Daggett, R, Principles of Inland Trans­
portation, Nev/ York, Harper & ^ros"^ 1941» Chapter 32. 
'Ihe regulation of water carriers is well covered in 
Locklln, D. P. Economics of 'I^ansportation. 3d Ed. Chicago, 
Richard D. Irwin Co, 1947. Ciiapter 31, For additional 
detail, see The Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 Statutes at 
Large, part 1, pp. 543-567. 
A summary of the distribution of commercial frei^t in 
the nation "by agencies for the year 1926, and "between the 
years 1939 and 1944, is presented in 'fable I, An accompany­
ing table presents the percentage increase or decrease in 
toix-iniles, 1939 over 1926, and 1944 over 1939. Reference 
to the first of these tables will show that water carriers 
have ranked closest to the railroads as carriers of freight 
in peacetime years. Competition is provided in bulk coia-
modities, the most important of ishich are grain, coke, coal, 
snnd, gravel, stone, lumber, and petroleum. Trucks compete 
in the less-carload shipments over short distances. The 
capacity of the average intercity motor truck Is small as 
compared to the rail frel^t car, but the advantage of flexi 
bllltyhas caused a significant diversion of this type of 
traffic from rail to motor carriers. 
The total volume of traffic carried by the pipe lines 
is large, althou^ this agency services fewer customea?s 
directly and handles fewer individual commodities than any 
other. Most of the crude petroleum and o growing ^are of 
the gasoline traffic are carried by this form of transpor-
81 
tatlon. Generally the movement of oil by pipe line is more 
economical than by any other means of transport, for their 
operation Involves relatively little labor expense, and both 
maintenance and ri^t-of-way expenditures are low. 
In terras of traffic volume handled, air carriers are 
the least important of all agencies. Air transport becomes 
highly significant when measured in terms of quality rather 
than in freight tonnage. Shippers interested in speedy 
service will use airplanes. Its greatest contribution to 
date has been more in the movement of passengers, express 
and mail, than that of commercial freight. 
In the years 1926 to 1939, total freight ton-miles 
carried by all groups declined by 9,4 per cent. Railroads, 
which carried 76.4 per cent of the total traffic in 1926, 
carried only 62.3 per cent in 1940. However, between the 
years 1939 and 1944, total traffic rose by 99,3 per cent, 
and the railroads increased their proportion by 120 per 
cent. This improvement may be measured against the decline 
of 25 per cont in the proportion handled by the rail car­
riers in the prewar period. Thus, the railroads regained 
a considerable part of the traffic previously lost to 
their competlt-ors, although they did not reach the relative 
position held in the years before the depression. 
The only other agency to show an Increase in ton-miles 
carried during the war were pipe lines, but these years 
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Tahle I 
Distribution of COHnTiex"Clal Prei^^at in the Unitod States 
Between the Agencies of Transport, 1926, 1939-1944^J-
Agency 1926 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 
Ton-Miles (Bill ion a 
Steam Railroads^ 451 338 378 481 644 733 745 
Great Lakes^ 83 69 88 104 112 104 106 
Rivers and Canals 10 20 22 27 26 26 31 
Motor Trixcks 24 43 51 57 50 48 49 
Oil Pipe Lines 22 63 67 78 75 96 132 
Air Carriers .011 .014 .016 .033 .052 .069 
Tot als 590 534 607 748 909 1110 1065 
'''^Source; Association of American Railroads, Economic and 
Transportation Prospects, VJashinRton, D,C. January, 1946, 
Table 55. p. 127. 
1. Includes mall and express. 
2. U.S. domestic traffic only. 
simply continued the trend in evidence throughout the late 
thirties. In 1931, the number of barrels of motor fuel 
delivered by refineries to pipe lines v/as 13 million; by 
1940, it had increased to 97 million, and the demands of 
mechanized war more than doubled the latter total by 1944.^® 
18. For further detail see Interstate Commerce Coimiisslon 
Bureau of Economics and Statistics. Statistics of Oil 
Pipe Lines, 1921-»1957. Statement No.'356'il Washington, 
D.C., 1939; also by the same agency, Statlstica of Oil 
Pipe Companies for 1944. Statement Ifo. 4526. iVashington. 
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Table II 
Percent Increase or Decrease in Ton-Miles"'^ 
1939 1944 
Agency over over 
1926 1939 
Railroads 25^ 120 
Water Carriers 4^ 54 
Oil Pipe Lines 191 110 
Motor Trucks 83 15 
Air Carriers 527 
All Agencies 9.4^ 99.3 
"source; Association of Ainerican Railways, Kconomlc and 
Transportation Prospects, Washington, D.G. January, 
1946. p. 128. 
1. Decrease, 
The rate of growth might be shown by a comparison of rail­
road revenues from petroleum traffic in the fevo years, 1931 
and 1940. Rail carriers received ^?242 million for the move­
ment of crude petroleum in 1931. By 1940, income declined 
to $137 million, a 46 per cent loss. At the same time con­
sumption of both gasoline fuel oil and natural gas was 
rapidly expanded. \''ihile natural gas does not compete di­
rectly or divert traffic from the railways, it does deprive 
them of traffic indirectly. Many industries and homes have 
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substituted natural gas for coal as fuel, and coal supplies 
one of the largest single items of railroad revenue. ITie 
urgent need for petroleum as a war material was responsible 
for the outstanding development of pipe lines during the 
v/ar period. The loss of tankers in the intercoastal traffl,c,and 
the inability of rail carriers to handle the siipplies from 
the producing areas to the Eastern coast resulted in the con­
struction of pipe liiies by the Federal Government, The 
longest of these, referred to popularly as the Big Inch, 
covered some 1,340 miles, and extended from Lonf^lew, Texas, 
to the refining centers of the mid-Atlantic states. It 
reached its maximum operational point between the years 1943 
and 1945, Of the total traffic carried in 1926, pipe lines 
were responsible for 3,7 per cent. By 1940, they carried 
11 per cent of the total, and at the end of 1944, 12 per 
cent of the total traffic volume was handled by them, 
Water carriers operating on the Great Lakes showed a 
sli^t gain in ton-miles between the years 1940 and 1944, 
but their proportion of the total ton-miles handled by nil 
groups fell by 5,5 per cent in the v/ar years. Motor car­
riers, likewise, had shown a tremendoxis gain in their share 
of total traffic between the years 1926 and 193S, but suf­
fered a 4 per cent loss during the years 1940 t o 1944. vVater 
carriers had handled 15,6 per cent of all traffic in 1926; 
18,1 per cent in 1939, and only 12,9 per cent in 1944; and 
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motor trucks which carried 4 per cent of the domestic traffic 
in 1926, doubled this volume by 1939, "but showed oriLy 4.7 
per cent of the total in 1944. Althou^ the relative growth 
of air transport has been fairly large, its share when com­
pared to the total handled by all agencies is still very 
small. 
All of the data presented indicated a reversal in the 
position of the railroads during the v;ar when compared with 
the prewar period. 'AQiereas the rail carriers were handling 
a smaller volume of a smaller total of domestic freight, 
they now carried a larger proportion of a larger total of 
the nation's traffic. It may be granted that the condition 
was temporary, and was caused to no small extent by the res­
trictions on ncvj- equipment for water and motor carriers; to 
the shortages of manpower for their operations; and to the 
rationing of fuel by the Government. In spite of this, the 
analysis does show that the railroads are the backbone of 
the transportation system of our nation; that they and they 
alone are the only mode of transport able to meet the demands 
of the economy in time of emergency. Notwithstanding this 
fact, there appears little doubt that the wartime competitive 
situation will again be reversed in the postwar years. 
Effects of the war on operating expenses 
Table IV, Appendix B, presents data Bummarizing the 
operating expenses of the railroads between the years 1940 
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and 1945. Over the six year period costs of materials, sup­
plies, and fuel practically doubled, despite the attempt of 
the Government to control the general price level of the 
nation, Obvioasly these figures reflect Increasing costs of 
labor and raw materials, which were problems common to all 
indiistry. 
Vflhiile materials, supplies,and fuel comprise an important 
port, it is the expense of labor which is the primary factor 
in railroad operational expenses. Estimates vary as to the 
proportion of labor costs to total expenses but normally 
wages and salaries constitute over 60 per cent of operating 
. 19 
costs. 
19. Further data may be found in Federal Coordinator of 
Transportation. Comparative Labor Standards; in Transpor-
tation, 1937. Wa"Silngton, D. Gi l'939. For' general cost 
summaries, see Interstate Commerce Commission. Statistics 
of the Railways in the United States, 1944. Table 151. 
p. 128. 
Average rail employment between the years 1940 and 1945 
increased by almost 40 per cent. Total payrolls rose from 
something less than ijp2 billion in 1940 to almost §4 billion 
in 1945, Part of the rise was the result of increases in 
the number of railroad workers, but a good share of it came 
as a result of wage increases granted in 1941 and 1944, In 
both instances the labor disputes after having passed through 
the various steps prescribed by the Railway Labor Act were 
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settled through the personal intervention of President Roose­
velt.^® 
20. For a summary of the wartirae developments, see Northrup, 
H.R. "'iChe Railway Labor Act and Lnbor Disputes." American 
EconoTnlo Reviev/, vol, 36, No, 3, June, 1946, pp. 324-343. 
The Railroad Rate Level Case of 1942 
Wage increases granted in 1941 were estimated to cost 
about n^312 million per year; prices of materials, supplies, 
and fuel were rising, and in addition the V.'ar Department had 
recommended that certain precautionary measwea, estimated 
to cost ;;|30 million, be taken by the carriers in order to 
protect propei'ty and operations. With this evidence the car­
riers petitioned for increases in rates, fares, and charges 
21 
on December 13, 1941. The increases if granted v/ould have 
21. Ex Parte 148. Increased Railway Rates, Parer., and 
Charges. 1942. 248, I.O.C. 1^, ' llae freight 
increases sou^t v/er-e in the nature of a uniform 10 per 
cent on all commodities, except those on coal, coke, and 
iron ore. The proposed Increases on excepted items, in 
terms of cents per 100 pounds, are shown in detail in 
Appendix I of the report. 
been the first since the Fifteen Per Cent Case of 1937-1938, 
at Vi/hich time the carriers v/ere given 10 per cent on indus­
trial commodities and five per cent on agricultural products. 
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with certain excoptiona, 
llie railways alleged that the proposed increases would 
not be unreasonable, would not divert trnffic, nnd would in­
crease revenues an estimated f;?3l37 million per year. In 
general, shippers recognised the emergency faced !y the rail­
roads, and asked that the increases be made only to the ex­
tent justified by the evidence, and that such increases be 
published as emergencies with a definite expiration date. 
The carriers pointed out that tho roads were not at­
tempting to obtain revenues for wage Increases granted in 
1941, but rather because of the trend of future operating 
costs. Uniform percentage Increases were advised as the 
quickest and most practicable method of obtaining the needed 
revenues, since any attempt at adjusting rates on individual 
commodities won.ld likely resvilt in protrr^cted negotiations 
between the parties concerned. Rail carriers could see no 
likelihood of competitive conditions compelling a reduction 
in rates because of the diminished truck and water competi­
tion. Rail facilities were all in use or held in reserve 
to meet the Increasing need for transport; v/liile further 
equipment purchases entailing huge expenditures would have 
to bs made. If adequate and efficient services were to be 
given, they felt that they should be permitted to earn reve­
nues sufficient to perform them. Shippers took no exception 
to these statements, l%at protests v/ere made were directed 
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to the queation of whether or not the increases should be 
on a "nnlform" or "flat" hasis; that is, whether the in­
creases should he obtained by the imposition of a percentage 
or varying percentages on trnffic in general, or by menns 
of an addition of certain umounts to the going rates on 
Op 
individual commodities. 
22.  Ibid., pp. 572-573. 
After reviewing past cases which had rer.u,lted in general 
rate Increases, the Cominission on March 2, 1942, proposed 
nation-wide percentage advances. The increases v/ere .-justi­
fied because of the improvement in business conditions, and 
the ability of indtistry in general to stand higher charges; 
xipv/ard trends in the costs of operation of the railroads; 
the loss of revenues by the land-grant roads through the 
carriage of government traffic.However it was pointed 
23. In answer to protests that a considerable part of the 
increased expenses of the carriers could be recouped by 
a waiver of the "land-grsnt" rate privilege, which allowed 
the Government to transport property on the basis of one 
half of the established rates, the CoimriiBsion replied: 
"The waiver of the land-grant privilege can come only 
from Congress. By the Transportation Act of 1940, Congress 
evinced an intent to restrict this privilege, but it left 
the law in the condition as to which nov; both shippers 
and railroads complain. ITe have long felt the imposition 
of the land-grant deductions was unfair, and that the 
main objective of the original grants long ago had been 
mot so thoroughly that now it is equitable that the Gov­
ernment should pay the same reasonable I'ates for its 
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transportation that its citizens do." Ibid.,pp. 608-609. 
out that the "need for the increased earnings is subject 
to some discount on account of the prospect for a further 
growth in traffic and the consequent greater net earnli"vgs 
24 In 1942." The increases recoinjnended by the CoininiSBion, 
Ibid., p. 610. 
however, were reduced from the 10 per cent proposed by the 
carriers to a general six per cent on industrial commodities 
and three per cent on agricultural products, with individual 
adjustments of three to six cents per ton on products of 
mines,The authorized advances were to become effective 
25. Ibid., Appendix 2, pp. 621-625. 
not later than May 15, 1942, upon 10 days' notice, and unless 
modified or terminated In further proceedings, were to ex­
pire six months after the termination of the war. However, 
because of favorable earnings the increases v/ere later sus-
pended In subsequent hearings. ° 
26. Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1942, 
original report, MaircR"^, 1942, 248, r.C.G. 545; report 
on fiirther hearing, April 6, 1943, 255 I.G.C. 357; sup­
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plemental report, November 8, 1943, 256 I.C.C. 502j 
second supplemental report. May 12, 1944, 258 X.C.C. 455; 
supplemental report on further hearing, December 12, 1944, 
259 I.C.C. 159. 
Summary 
The period between 1921 and 1930 found the railroads 
in a relatively prosperous condition. But during the thir­
ties, as a result of the business depression and rising 
competition with the transportation industry, the railroads 
operated below capacity with earnings small or nonexistent. 
So great was the concern over their financial position that 
the Commission felt compelled to maintain fi-'elght rates at 
a level comparable to that of the twenties. Economic devel­
opments of the second decade of the interwar period fell 
with particular force upon the railways, and by 1940, over 
32 per cent of the total railroad mileage was in bankruptcy. 
War greatly enlarged the nation's transportation require­
ments, Rail carriers handled the major proportion of the 
increased traffic, and financial results of expanded opera­
tions brought net income in 1942 to a level slightly hij^er 
than that of the previous hi^^ of 1929. For this reason, 
the Commission suspended rate increases granted in 1942. 
From this year to the end of the war operating revenues 
reached new peaks, but because of increasing operating expenses 
and taxes, net income gradually declined. However, wartime 
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operations reversed the depressed financial position of the 
previous decade, and enabled the carriers to reduce a sub­
stantial amount of their funded debt. 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE PETITION AND DECISXOII IN 'HIE EX PARTE 162 
RATE LEVEL CASE 
Conversion of a nation from war to peacetime activities 
is usually characterized during the transition by lov/ levels 
of industrial production, short supplies of goods and serv­
ices relative to their demand, upwardtrends in prices, and 
general unrest among labor. The year 1946 proved no excep­
tion to the general rule. It experienced most of the economic 
ills which follov/ in the v/ake of a major war, v^^ile it set 
a pattern of its own in response to the general conditions 
of the period. It will be remembered as a year of futility 
and fumbling; a year in which the most widespread public re­
action was uncertainty and bev;ilderment. 
The problems of the railv/ays at the beginning of the 
transition were many and varied, but their difficulties were 
representative of those which plagued all transportation 
agencies, and in many respects were similar to those of all 
industry. Vifar had given the rail carriers an opportunity 
to overcome some of their prewar distress but at the same 
time had helped create new problems not easy of solution. 
The question confronting them at the beginning of 1946 was 
wiiether or not they could maintain at least some of the 
financial gains made throughout the war period, or would 
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revert to their cornpnrsitively unpatlsfactory position at 
the close of the nineteen thirties. Answers lay in the 
movement of economic forces as the nation proceeded in re­
conversion to peace. 
Before examining the rate level cases of 1946, It seems 
desirable to devote "brief attention to economic conditions 
existing at the beginning of the year — to the trends which 
led to postwar inflation, Hiis will be the first objective 
of the chapter. Following it will be a sunmary of the is­
sues leading to the petition of the railroads for increased 
rates, A discussion of the rate proceedings and their dis­
position by Commission action will complete the analysis of 
this topic. 
The Transition Period -- A Summary of Economic Trends 
Conclusion of the second World War found the United 
States with an economy geared to the highest levels of pro­
duction in its history. Industrial production had more than 
doubled its prf;war output by the end of 1944; while mining, 
agricultxire, domestic trade, and exports, all showed sub­
stantial increases,^ Unemployment, approximately nine 
1, See Table V, Appendix B, 
million in 1939, had been wiped out diiring the war years as 
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women and overage workers replnced If? million men drawn into 
the armed forces. Pears that unemplojuient after the war 
would disturb a smooth transition v;ere largely dissipated 
"betv/een August, 1945 and early 1946, During this period 
over 80 per cent of munitions production had ceased, several 
million workers lost their Jobs, and bout five million men 
and women were demobilized from the military forces# Yet 
civilian employment rose above the level existing at the end 
of the war. By early 1946, 52 million persons were gainfiilly 
employed.^ 
2. Committee for Economic Development, Jobs and Markets, 
Nev/ York, McGraw-Hill Pub. Co. 1946. Chapter 2. By mid-
1947, employment had reached 60 million, yet labor short­
ages continued to be acute in many areas of the nation. 
See United States News. Aiigust 1, 1947, p, 11, 
Increased employment, high wages, and restricted civil­
ian production and consumption throughout the war period 
combined to establish a huge fund of purchasing pov/er avail­
able to meet previously postponed demands. The need for 
foreign relief and rehabilitation in the imrjiediate future 
afforded a trade potential which would run into billions of 
dollars, and this factor when combined with domestic economic 
conditions assured the nation of continued hlgli levels of 
employment and prodixction. By 1946, the United States had 
on one hand a huge productive capacity available for peace­
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time utilization; on the other, had an opportunity to sell 
its goods and services in markets already in existence. 
Of major Importance in the transition v/as the problem 
of inflation. To comhat its force, close coopei'Qtion of 
business, government, labor, and the general public was 
vitally necessary. But the spirit of harmony which existed 
throughotit the emergency was swiftly torn apart at war's 
end as each group moved to obtain its "riglatful share" of 
the postwar economic potential. The general public demanded 
an immediate return to normal conditions; industry called 
for an easing or elimination of wartime controls; and labor 
insisted on high v;ages in order to maintain war earnings, 
even though a large percentage of their income had been re­
ceived throu^ overtime employment. 
Consumer rationing was the first war control to be 
eased. S6me of the major conmodities were placed on the free 
list imunedlately follov/ing the end of hostilities in Japan. 
Market prices then presumably were to substitute for the 
public authority in directing distribution of scai'ce goods. 
However, short supplies, high levels of purchasing power, 
and continuing price controls made impossible an adjustment 
in the forces of general demand and supply. As prices 
exerted upward pressure upon the control mechanism remain­
ing, wage demands arose and were sxipported to some extent 
by Government, As a result, labor-management disputes in 
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the "basic industries .flared ixp across the nation. Piecemeal 
price adjustments became the national policy until the sum­
mer and fall of 1946, when the entire program of price con­
trol collapaed. Because of these developments, thus v/hat 
could have been the shortest and most satisfactory interval 
of industrial retooling in the nation's history turned out 
to be a protracted struggle "between labor and industry, and 
industry and Government, 
By the summer of 1946 the nation was caught in o vicious 
spiral of v;age-price inflation. Wholesale and consumer prices 
rose substantially over the levels of 1945. In most cnses 
these advances meant further v/age demands and vifould result 
in higher prices. Basically the boom during 1946 was the 
result of production lagging behind demand factors. The so-
called period of prosperity generated maladjustments in all 
economic activity by disrupting the normal relationship of 
some prices to others, and by developing excesses of one 
kind or another. It made economic trouble for some groups 
while aiding others. However, there v;aa little evidence In 
sight at the end of 1946 to indicate that the problem of 
inflation v/ould be eased during 1947. 
Transportation During the Early Transition Period 
Railroads emerged from the v/ar in a relatively favorable 
position. Properties generally were in good physical condition 
9U 
oven though deferred maintenance aTnounted to some $350 mil-
lion. Althou^ operating inccrae had shown a declining 
3« 59th Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commisaion, 
November 1, 1945. Washington, D. C., Govt. Print. Off. 
10467 p. ^  
trend since the peak year of 1942, there had been a marked 
reduction in fixed interest charges througli debt retirement 
arid reorganization. Some operating techniques developed 
under emergency conditions were likely to be carried over to 
the postwar years. War demands and the anticipated future 
competitive situation furnished a stimulus for iinprovemonts. 
Less favorable but common throughout the entire transportation 
industry were the rising costs of labor and materials and 
the uncertainty as to future volxjjnes of traffic because of 
the expected restoration and expansion of competitive 
agencies.^ llie railroad plant required very little physical 
4. Ib^., p. 7. 
ratooling in order to convert from war to peacetime operation. 
Both motor and water carriers of property suffered 
traffic losses during the war period and had been forced 
temporarily to suspend some of their functions. 'Ihose able 
to operate faced a further transitional problem of adjusting 
to the loss of war production traffic. Ihere was little 
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doubt but that both agencies would redouble their efforts 
to gain peacetime biisiness in sufficient volume to compensate 
for the decline in their v/ar traffic. Motor carriers hoped 
that v/urtiire technological improvements in vehicles and 
fuel would provide greater operating efficiency in the futurej 
that j'elaxation of some state regulations in respect to 
weight and size of trucks v/ould remove barriers which had 
prevented the jnovement in interstate motor traffic in the 
past; and that future highway inprovementn would result in 
lower operating costs. However, rising equipment prices, 
labor costs, and operating expenses tended to offset some 
of this optimism. V.'ater carriers faced similar problems. 
Physical facilities had to be replaced and nev/ contacts made 
with shippers so as to recover traffic lost to other agencies 
during the war years. 
Pipe lines, expanded tremendously dviring the war, were 
in possession of facilities which would allow for further 
penetration into markets of a narrow range of products handled 
by competitors, P.Iajor problems centered around the disposi­
tion of the Government-owned lines, the future vise of which 
would have an important effect upon all agencies with the 
possible exception of airlines. Carriers by air were certain 
that traffic would increase over prewar levels but it was 
expectod that their activities would bo generally confined 
to the areas of passenger service, mall, and express. There 
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seemed to be little fear that airlines would make on oppreci-
able dent tlie freight handled "by other forms of transpor­
tation, in spite of the pulolicity given to such plans as 
flying boxcars. 
In a coGipotitive sense, the ti^ansportotion problem in 
early 1946 v/;.s of much broader scope than that existing in 
1920, Since the first World VVar there had been a rebirth 
of inland waterv/ay servicej an extensive growth of truck 
lines J a long-distance extension of pipe lines; and a phenom­
enal deve].opmeiT.fc of air carriv^^s. Both Conp/reBS and the 
Commission faced a situation much more complicated than that 
which had risen 25 years before. Not only v^ere they con-
cei''ned v/ith individual agencies, but also the relationships 
between the various groups. The Commission, in particular, 
seemed to be well aware of the complexities of the future.^ 
5, "Discussion of the problems peculiar to each of the 
forma of transportation tends to give too little emphasis 
to the problems which cut across tv/o or more kinds of 
transportation. There are not only compc titivo relations 
to consider, but also questions as to the control and use 
of one form of transportation by another .... At this 
time it is too soon to foresee these problems in clear 
detail." Ibid., pp. 10-11, 
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Issues Leading to the Ex ^arte 162 Petition 
Transitional economic trends had an iinmediRte effect 
upon the railronds. Labor disputes throughout the nation 
reduced and unhnlanced troffic, v,^ile strikes in the auto­
mobile, coal, and steel industries slov;ed down deliveries 
of vitally needed equipment and supplies » It was apparent 
that the rail carriers would be faced with v/age demands 
from the re,ilY.'ay imions. It v/as expected that total an­
nual operating cOv^ts v/ould continue to rise throughout 1946. 
Increased expenditires had to be offset by increased rates 
even thou.3h the advances v/ould be made in the ffice of de­
clining traffic. Coats v/ere on a postv/ar levelj rates v/ere 
prewar. There was no other ifssue. 
The railway brotherhoods had placed requests for higher 
wages and for changes in working rules before the carriers 
at the end of 1945. On January 16, 1946, representatives 
of management and eighteen of the unions. Locomotive Engi­
neers and Trainmen excepted, agreed to arbitrate their dif­
ferences. It was further agreed that rules changes should 
be temporarily suspended. Arbitration boards began hearings 
Pebmary 18, and on April 3 suggested an award of 16 cents 
an hour in basic wages, to be retroactive to Januar;/ 1, The 
unions rejected the proposal and petitioned for a hi^er 
amount on April 15 and May 5. Refusal of the Engineers and 
I'rainmen to arbitrate led to an appointment of an emergency 
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ract-findiiig board by the i'resident. Heuriiiga v/ere conclvided 
on April 0, and their report Ciurpiod the sarae awards ^ b those 
granted tliroiigh the arbitration proceedings. The two unions 
6, Bee 1'raffic World. June 1, 194G, p. 1632. 
v;ould not accept the decision, insisting that changes in work­
ing rules ho disposed of simultaneously with wage questions. 
To force action on these Issues, they called a nation-v/ide 
strike for May 18."^ 
7. See Business vVeek. June 1, 1946, p. 16. See also Time. 
June 3, IWg, pp. 20-23. 
The strike notico moved the Government to activity. On 
May 17, President Truman ordered J. M. Johnson, Director of 
the Office of Defense Transportation, to take control of and 
operate the railroads. On the following day the strike was 
postponed to Kay 23. On Llay 22, the Government intervened 
hy publicly proposing an additional increase of 2.5 cents 
per hour in lieu of working rules changes for a period of a 
year. Ei^teen of the unions accepted but the Engineers and 
Trainmen rejected it once more and struck on the next day. 
The strike was so effective that ofily 100 of 17,500 scheduled 
passenger trains and 240 of 24,000 scheduled freij^t trains 
were operated, and for 48 hoixrs the economy was at the raercy 
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of the two ruilv/ay unions, I'vvo days later, while the Prer.i-
dent wns addressing a joint session of Congress requesting 
legislation to outlaw strikes against the pTiblic interest, 
O 
the unions voted to return to v/ork. The final agreement 
8. "That the threatened railroad strike went as far as it 
did came as a shock to everybody. No one thought, until 
deadline approached, that the engineers and trainmen v/ould 
actually strike the roads, and it seemed inconceivable 
that they v/ould strike against the government after seizure 
of the roads. A. Johnston and A. P. '/Oiltney are quemiloas 
and blustery, but the railroads had not been striick for 
more than 20 years .... 'lliese brotherhoods, these elite 
of labor unions had battened behind the Railway Labor Act 
for so long that most people assumed that they had for-
/3;otten how to throw their weifijit around." Kev/ Republic. 
May 27, 1946, pp. 749-750. 
called for wage Increases of 18.5 cents per ho^ir, 16 cents 
of TAjiich was to be retroactive to January 1, while the re­
mainder was to be effective as of May 22. Government con­
trol of the carriers was relinquished on May 26. The car­
riers estimated that the wage grants would add some $691 
million annually to payrolls and would Increase payroll taxes 
q 
by approximately !j;j41.5 million annually. Hourly compenaa-
Railway Age. January 4, 1947, p. 28. 
tion to employees as a result of the wage increasjes of 1946, 
compared with that received in the years of 1945 and 1939 
is tabulated in Table III. 
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Table III 
Average Railway Employee Straight Time Compensation Per He^r 
Jtine, 1946 as Compared with June, 1945, and June, 1949"^ 
Group 
June 
1946 
June 
1945 
Percent Percent 
increase Increase 
1946 1946 
compared June compared 
to 1945 1939 to 1939 
Executives, Of­
ficials and Staff 
Assistants ^^2,799 Jjl32.409 
Professional, 
Clerical and 
Genera 1 1.164 .944 
Maintenance of 
Way and Struc­
tures .915 .713 
Maintenance of 
Equipment and 
Stores 1,103 .920 
Tra nsp ortation: 
Other than Train, 
Engine & Yard .991 .806 
Yardmasters, 
Switch-tendera, 
Hos tiers 1.291 1.102 
Yard and Engine 
Service 1.294 1.102 
All Employees 1.129 .926 
16.19 #2.266 23.52 
23.31 .773 50.58 
28.33 .514 78.02 
19.89 .716 54.02 
22.95 .615 61.14 
17.15 .877 47.21 
17.42 .908 42.51 
2.192 .730 54.51 
Source: Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of Transport 
Economics and Statistics. Monthly Comment on 
Transportation Statistics. Vi/ashington, D. CT 
October 14, 1946, p. 1 
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The wage settlement increased overage hourly earnings 
in June, 194S over June, 1945 from 16.19 per cent for the 
Executive group to 28.33 per cent for the group classified 
under Maintenance of V/ay and Structures. As compnred with 
the 1939 figures, the increases ranged from 23.52 for the 
former to 78.02 per cent for the latter. Over the same 
period all employees gained to the extent of 54.66 per cent. 
Compared-to 1939, prices paid for materials, supplies, 
and fuel were expected to "be higher "by some !|167 million 
during 1946. Ihis represented an Increase of 33 per cent.^® 
10. Ibid., pp. 1-2 
During the war the carriers had been able to meet th« heavy 
expenditures because of the tremendous volxime of traffic 
handled even though less net income was realized from the 
traffic of 1944 and 1945 than from the lighter movements 
of 1942 and 1943. Under the conditions existing in the 
spring of 1946, the railroads were being squeezed between 
the increasing level of postw r costs and the rate level of 
prewar years, llie combined effect of a lower relative volume 
of traffic and rising operating expenses placed the carriers 
in a critical financial position vAilch could have wiped out 
all gains made during the war period unless relief in the 
form of increased rates was granted by the Commission. 
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Statistics pi-'ef-enting trends in traffic and revemxes 
are shown in Tables IV, V und VI which follov/. The data 
cover the first six months of 1946, and are of particular 
interest when compared percentagewise with the correspond­
ing period of 1945. Upon the information contained in these 
tabulations, the rail carriers justified their petition for 
increased rates in April, 1946. 
Table IV 
Percentage Changes in Selected Items of Railroad Performance, 
1945 as Compared witti 1944j 6 Months of 1946 as Compared V/ith 
A Similar Period in 1945^'" 
Item 1945^ 
Per cent 
1945 
under 
1944 1946^ 
Percent 
1946 
under 
19453 
Revenue Ton-Miles 
(Millions) 684,148 7.62 272,359 25.32 
Ton-Miles Revenue 
Freight Per Car Mlle^ 30.18 1.44 to
 
CD
 
•
 52 6.03 
Ton-Miles Revenue 
Freight Per Train Mile 1,034 1.07 973 9.66 
Revenue Ton^Miles Per 
Mile of Road 2,853 7.51 1,201 25.14 
Average Length of Haul 
of Revenue Freight 458.14' ^ 3.20 232. 3® 6.07 
""Source: 60th Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Com-' 
mission, November 1» '1946. Washington, D.C. 194^. Ap­
pendix C. 
1. All railways. 
2. Glass I railways for 6 months. 
3. Six months only, 
4. Average obtained by dividing the revenue ton-miles by 
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the total loaded car-miles. ITie Dstter figure includes 
some curs loaded with non-rovenue freiglit. 
5. All railroads as a system. 
6. Average haul per road. 
Table V 
Operating Income Account of the Class I Railroads; 6 Months 
Ending in May for Each Year 1942 to 1946""* 
Account 1946 1945 1944 
(In millions) 
1943 1942 
Total operating 
revenues $2,966 ^^3,877 ;it:3,837 ii^3,599 ^ pe,657 
Freight 
All otherl 
2,170 
796 
2,938 
939 
2,858 
979 
2,756 
843 
2,171 
588 
Total operating 
e:^ensea 2,568 2,653 2,560 2,178 1,778 
Net operating 
revenue 398 1,224 1,277 1,420 878 
Taxes 222 700 743 739 378 
Operating income 175 524 534 681 500 
Net operating 
income 117 449 453 603 432 
Operating ratio 86. 6 68.4 66.7 60.5 66 
^'Source: Association of American Railroads, Bureau of Rail­
way Economics. Monthly Report Service No. 455. 
Washington, D. G~ May, 1047. 
1. Includes passenger, mail, express and all other revenues. 
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Tflblo VI 
Total Operating Revenues, Total Operntlng Expenses, and Net 
Railway Operating Income of Class I Railv/ays by Months, 
January to May 1946''"' 
Ac c ount January February March 
(In millions 
April May 
Total operating 
revenues $640,9 §579.1 $646,3 .^566,6 $532,6 
Total operating 
expenses 496,0 456,3 614,6 507,9 592,4 
Net railv/ay op-
oroting Income 66,6 50.5 5,7^ 10,7 4,5^ 
•i:-Source: Association of American Railroads, Bureau of 
Railv/ay Economics, MontMy Report Service Mo,455. 
Washington, D, C. May 1947. 
1. Deficit, 
The all-time peak in railroad physical performance was 
reached in the year 1944, Termination of the European war 
in April, 1945, and the Pacific war in August, 1945, resulted 
in a decline of every item of ra il performance during 1945 
as compared with 1944, Decreases ranged from 1,07 per cent 
in ton-miles of revenue freight per trs'in mile to 7.62 per . 
cent in revenue ton-miles carried. More significant losses 
were shovra. in the first six months of 1946 as compared with 
a aiitiilar pei-'iod in 1945. Vol\Hae of traffic as measured by 
revenue ton-miles foil nearly 26 per cent below that of year 
earlier, and revenue ton-miles pei" mile of road shov/ed an 
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equal decline. 'ITieaverage length of haul for revenue fi'oight 
foil by over six per oont during thia period. 
For five months ending in May 1946 the financial •j'ccord 
as presented in Tables III and IV showed similar trends. 
Freight revenues wore down hy $768 millions, some 36 per cent 
below the levels of the same period in 1945. Operating ex­
penses decreased only ;,|;84 million which amounted to 3.3 per 
cent mder those of 1945. It took more than 86 cents of each 
revenue dollar to cover opei'ating expenses in 1946 as against 
slightly over 68 cents in 1945, Tax accruals in the former 
years were approximately one-third of those of the latter. 
Operating income dropped by $349 million within the year v;hile 
net operating income declined by ^ ?432 million. As compared 
with 1945, the decline in 1946 represented nearly 200 per 
cent in operating income and over 300 pex-- cent in net operat­
ing Income. 
By months the trends wore oven more significant. V/ith 
the exception of March, total operating revenues declined 
steadily vjhile expenses after falling somewhat in February, 
increased tremendously in March. Two reasons explain this 
situation. First, defense project amortization was accelerated. 
Second, wage increases granted in May were charged back to 
March for the first quarter of 1946. Net operating income 
was in a deficit condition in both March and May for the first 
time since April, 1940. For the 12 months ending March 31, 
1946, the rate of return oa property investment averaged 
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2.56 per cent, as compared with 3.91 per cent for 12 months 
ending on the name date in 1945. Fifty-nine Class I rail­
roads fnilod to earn interest and rentals during the first 
quarter of 1946, of which tv.'onty-six wore in the Eastern 
District, ten in the Southern Region, and twenty-three in 
the vVeatern District.^^ 
Traffic World. May 11, 1946, pp. 1450-1451. 
Tlie iilx Parte 158 Petition and Cominission Action 
-Alarmed by the trends of declining income, the Class I 
rail carriers on Aptpil 15 requested permission to Increase 
their freight rates "by 25 per cent with exceptions on im­
portant commodities. Furthermore, thoy asked that the in­
creases become effective May 15 on one day's notice, without 
suspension. On April 26, the Commission asoignod the peti­
tion as Docket Ex Parte 152, opened hearings on that part 
of it v/hich x-equested the increases be granted on short 
notice, and simultaneously reopened Ex Parte 148 then in a 
12 
state of suspension for further hearings. The objective 
12. Ex Parte 162. Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and 
Charges, 1946. 264 l.G.C. 695. 194^0";; Ex Parte 148. 
Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and Charges, 1942. 
'S48 I.C.C. 545. 1^46. Analysis of the Ex Parte 148 
proceedings together- with tlie suspension orders of the 
Commission between the years 1942 and 1945 is found in 
Ghapt er , pp. 90-97. . 
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of the carriers was to securc rate increases v/hich v;ould add 
about ^51 billion to their operating revenues, and if appros'ed 
in full by the Commisaion would mean the largest single per­
centage increaoes in freight rates since 1920,^^ 
13. See Chapter II, p. 31. The complete list of the in­
creases as proposed on specific commodities will be found 
in Ex Parte 162, o^, clt., pp. 554-GOO^ T'cr n discussion 
of the decision as it affected broad classes of products, 
see Chapter VII, 
Discontinuance of land-grant rates introduced a factor 
not present in previous rate-level cases. Congress on Decem­
ber 12, 1945, had eliminated the land-grant roads from any 
further obligation to transport persons and property of 
military agencies at reduced rates,ITais development neces-
14, Public 
Iron Age, 
Law No. 256. 79th Congress, 1st Session, See 
15*7, January 17, 1946, pp. 108-110, 
sitated consideration of the legislation on future railroad 
revenues. Full rates were to be paid on Government traffic 
after October 1, 1946, and for the last quarter of the year 
the carriers estimated that added revenues from this source 
would amount only to qi)7 million. Most of the benefits would 
accrue to the V/estern roads, some v/ould be gained by carriers 
operating in the Southern Territory, but practically no ad­
vantage would be derived by Eastern railroads. The Commission 
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criticised the estimate as being too low, stating that; 
TIio Senate Comraittee'a report (79th Congress, 
1st Session. Report No. 552. p.5) shows a monthly 
rate of rate reduction up to June 30, 1943, of from 
iji;18,500,000 to $20,000,000, v/hlch continued and in­
creased up to the date of the report, Ju].y 28, 1945. 
While the Govei-'nment traffic since has decreased 
greatly, both in volame and relatively to other 
traffic, we are not able to acceot the statemoit 
that for the entire last quarter of -che current year-
the amount of the land-grant deductions waived will 
be only one-fourth of that estimated on a peacetime 
basis, or that the annual peacetime saving will be 
only about one-ninth of that which was contemplated 
by Congress v;hen it enacted the statute v/aivlng its 
ri^ts to land-grant deductions and instructed us 
to take the saving into account in making rates. For 
present purposes, all v/e can determine on the record 
before us is that the saving will be considerable 
and will exceed the relatively small amoimt shovm in 
the petitioners testimony.3-5 
15. Ex Parte 162, op. cit., p. 711. 
Supplemental petitions for rate increases were filed 
at the same time by water curriers operating in the inter-
coastal trade and on inland waterways, and by freiglit for­
warders subject to Cominisslon jurisdiction. Petitions for 
intervention but not rate increases were filed by motor 
carrier bureaus representing approximately 1000 trucking 
companies operating throughout the Western District. 
16. Water coTmnon carriers in intercoastal trade requested 
increases of 25 per cent in port-to-port rates and in 
joint rates with other coraraon carriers by i«il, barge, 
water, and hi^v;ay. The Inland V/aterways Corpor-a tlon, 
operating Federal Barge Lines on the Mississippi River 
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and cortnln of Its tributaries asked for increased to the 
same extent end on similai* notice as those virhich might be 
granted on all-rail and joint barge-rail rates. The 
Mic£:iKsippi Valley Barge line oporeting on the Ohio and 
Mississippi Rivers pdiltioned for rate advajices similar to 
those requested by the intercoostal carriers, i-'x-eigjat 
forv/tirders asked permission to incroasc their rates by 
the same percentages as granted to the rail carriers on 
traffic similar to that ti^ansportod by them. Motor car­
riers requested that railroads be compelled to raise 
less-carload rates by 20 cents per 100 pounds to cover 
the cost of a service which they alleged was being handled 
at a loss. Ibid.J pp. 711-715. 
Opposing the petition at the hearings were mimerous 
Federal and State agencies, and associations of shippers 
and producers. Y/ithout exception, their resistance was 
based principally upon tiie railroad's proposal to increase 
the rates witli only one day's notice. It v/as their conten­
tion also that increases should be permitted only after all 
concerned had had an opportixnity to present testimony in 
further hearings. Leading the opposition on the Federal 
level was the Director of Economic Stabilization who argued 
that price Increases in such an important industry would 
breed further price increases throui^out the economy. He 
maintaned that the Commission should not have been unduly 
impressed by the conditions which prevailed tliroughout the 
nation during the months immediately past, for these re­
sulted from an abnormal labor situation. Postponement of 
the proposed advances was requested until this agency could 
get a better perspective on future prices, costs, and margins 
114 
17 
available for the absorption of high freight rates. The 
17. Ibid., p. 716. Fevi would dispute the argument of the 
Director that railroad frei^t rate increases would be 
inflationary but his position appeared rather weak in 
li^t of the price increases granted to the automobile, 
steel, and coal industries. 
Price Administrator objected because new price ceilings would 
have to be established througliout the nation. Further pleas 
for extended hearings were made by the Secretary of Agri­
culture who not only opposed the increases suggested in Ex 
Parte 162 but also objected to a restoration of the Ex Parte 
148 suspensions. He based his opposition on the fact that 
no railroad financial emergency existed at this time. Ad­
ditional support for a delay came from the Secretary of Com­
merce and the Federal Housing Expediter. The former con­
tended that margins for production and manufacturing groups 
would be greatly disturbed by any sizeable increase in 
frei^t rates, while the latter shov/ed concern over the pro­
posed advances as they would affect the veteran's hotising 
program.^® 
18. Ibid., pp. 715-721. 
Three different sets of figures were used by the Com­
mission in estimating traffic and revenues expected for the 
balance of 1946. First to be considered v/as the estimate 
115 
of the carriers as sot forth in their petition. Without the 
increases, total operating revenues would be §6,800 million 
as compared with ij^8,902 million in 1945. Operating costs 
for 1946 v/ere expected to be $6,000 million; taxes, |"595 mil­
lion; and equipment and joint facility rentals, $165 million. 
Without relief, net operating Income would te fp75 million, 
and net income would shov/ a deficit of S345 inlllion. It was 
suggested by the railways that the proposed increases in 
the Fx Parte 162 case if effective July 1, 1946, would odd 
some iipSOO million to the revenues, and by restoring the sus­
pended Ex Parte 148 rates, revenues woiold be increased by 
some iji>112 mill ion. 
19. Ibid., p. 732. 
Traffic and revenue reports submitted by the carriers 
to the Comjiiission for the first three months of 1946 v/ere 
used as a second method. Included in these estimates was 
the 16 cent per hour wage increase. Not Included was the 
additional increase of 2.5 cents per hour awarded by the 
President, By multiplying these figures by four, the Com­
mission arrived at a revenue of si)7,464 million and a cost 
estimate of §6,273 million, leaving a net operating income 
o f  | 5 4 8 9  m i l l i o n  a n d  a  n e t  i n c o m e  o f  ^ 6 9  m i l l i o n , O f f -
20. "This does not take into account tvjo important facts. 
(1) Diiring the first quarter of 1946 there were numerous 
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and prolonged strikes in important tonnt2ge producing in­
dustries, which cannot be considered as recurring or 
normal. (2) Usvially less than half of the total annual 
freiglit revenue Is earned in the first half of the year," 
Ibid., T), 733. 
setting these computations was the fact that all carriers 
did not include all of the initial wage award during the 
quarter. If the April returns were added to those of the 
first three months and were multiplied by four there would 
have been a decrease of tjiee million in revenues and a 
decline of iij;45 million in operating costs. 
The third estimate was bnsed upon the freight commod.lty 
statistics for the year 1941, the last peacetime fiscal peri­
od, and 1945, the last war year, on the assumption that reve­
nue per ton for various classes of commodities would fall 
somewhere between the figures for the two years. Total reve­
nues for 1946 would approximate C^7,721 million, resulting 
in a net railway operating income of ^^555 million and a net 
income of 5^135 million. Using this estimate as a base, the 
proposed rate increases would bring ^ 500 million in net in­
come for the remaining six months of 1946 or i,i^865 million 
on a 12 month basis. This latter figure was only $37 million 
21 below the record earnings of 1942, 
21, For a complete summary of the different methods used 
in estimating the traffic and revenues for the balance 
of 1946, see Ibid., Appendix 2, pp. 750-751, 
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In cotmtaring the railroad claims that substantial 
deficits would not be prevented throu^ the restoration of 
the Ex Parte 148 increases alone, the Commission pointed 
out that the anticipated losses were based on the assumption 
that revenues for the balance of the year would be much lov7er 
than those earned during the first quarter, and that such 
assumption would have to include a continuation of the ln-» 
dustrial and labor difficulties, or other transitional 
conditions v/hich resulted in traffic losses. In its opinion, 
evidence to support such a position had not been presented. 
Pointing to the favorable net working capital of the rail­
ways, the Commission Indicated that the railroad ind-ustry 
was in a better condition to meet declining traffic and 
revenues than it had been in any other period. Referring 
again to its estimates, the Commission saw no reason why 
the rail carriers would not earn a substantial net income 
regardless of which figures v/ere used, and providing no 
further disturbances took place in the economy. 
22. Ibid.. pp. 735-737. 
Discussion of the railroad testimony was concluded with 
reference to the effect of a rising price level upon operating 
costs. Particular emphasis was given to the influence of 
v/age increases and increased prices of materials, supplies. 
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and. fuel on future costs of operation. Pollov/lng, the peti­
tion of the water carriers was analyzed briefly, ending with 
the observation that water carriers while requesting similar 
increases as those of the railroads had no objection to the 
restoration of the suspended Ex Parte 148 rate advances. 
In answer to the Price Administrator, v;ho urged no increases 
be granted imtil the case could be discussed more thoroughly 
by nil parties, the CoTjimission stated; 
He emphasizes the unsettling effect of two suc­
cessive freight-rate increases at short intervals. 
Avoidance of this would be desirable if circumstances 
permitted. As the frei^it-rate level has been con­
trolled and kept on a stable or even declining level 
during the war period, industry has been shielded 
from the shock of increased freight rates for several 
years, although the general trend of materials and 
labor prices has been upward. So far as the principle 
of increasing utility has permitted the railroads to 
maintain a stable price level because their traffic 
expanded as it has approached the saturation point. 
Now, with the trend reversed, with general sharp in­
creases of the wages of labor and the prices of mate­
rials, we must consider the effects of these reversals 
in trends as promptly as possible as due care to as­
certain the necessary facts and wei{^ them permits, 
even if further adjustments may be required upon later 
full investigation. 
23. Ibid., pp. 742-743. 
In consideration of the complete record in the proceed­
ings, the case was concluded as follows: No emergency was 
found existing to the extent that the increases as proposed 
in Ex Parte 162 were justified at this time for common car­
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riers "by rail, water, or freight forwarders. Because of the 
increased v/age costs and rising prices of materials and sup­
plies, and the declining vol-ume of traffic and revenues, some 
increases in freight rates were justif-ied solely as a tempo­
rary measure i3ending fdi'ther hearings. Greater rate advances 
were to he given to carriers operating in the Eastern Ter­
ritory. Common carriers by v/ater and fi?eight forv;nrders were 
authorized to make the same increases in their rates as those 
granted the railroadwS, llie i^ate increases were to he made 
effective within the' period, July 1 to July 31, on not less 
than 3 days' notice.®^ Concurring in part were Commissioners 
24. Ibid., pp. 743--745. 
Patterson and Johnson, the former criticizing the additional 
awards given to the carriers operating in Official Territory 
as unwarranted by their revenue needs, v/hile the latter be­
lieved that temporary increases were insufficient to.meet 
the railroad's financial requirements. Dissenting in part 
was Commissioner Miller, who held that the authctrized in­
creases were belov/ those justified by the evidence.^® 
25. Ibid., pp. 745-746. 
By the decision frei^t rates were increased generally 
120 
about six per cent throughout the nation. Elxceptions were 
made for commodities classified as Products of Agriculture, 
Animals and Products, and Products of Mines. On these, the 
advances amounted to approximntely three per cent. Eastern 
railroads were authorized to increase their rates by five 
per cent above those of other territories in order tobring 
their earnings to the levels of railways oi)erating in other 
areas of the country. 
Hie most difficult part of the decision to understand 
v/as the reasoning which decided that an estimated increase 
of .^p390 million in annual revenues was adequate to offset 
higlier annual operating costs.'ihe Commission labored 
26« As against the rate increases, it was estimated that 
increased wages and payroll taxes would amomit to §725 
million for 1946. Interstate Commerce Coinmiasion, Bureau 
of 'I'ransport Economics and Statistics, Monthly Comment 
on Transportation Statistics. June 10, 1946, p, 2. 
mistily to convince the public that carrier estimates of 
increasing costs and declining traffic and revenues v/ere 
hi^ly exorbitant. They endeavored to justify the alleged 
adequacy of the Interim awards so well that it apt^eared the 
railroads would have difficulty in proving their case in 
further hearings. 
However, it was difficult to see how the Gorimission 
could have given greater assistance to the carriers at this 
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time, except posnibly by granting the full iD per cent re­
quested in the original Ex Parte 148 petition* 'Iho decision 
reflected the uncertainties which gripped the nation in the 
early summer of 1946, end the conservative award was an ef­
fort to postpone further coiiirfiitments until a definite economic 
trend could be seen. Not only did the magnitixde of the pro­
posed Ex Parte 162 increases pose a difficult problem but 
their effect upon the nntional economy was a question which 
required more time and effort to analy?2e. In further hear­
ings the railroads had to offer more substantial proof of 
their original claiias and change the conviction of the Com-
lalsaion that the emergency advances were sufficient to provide 
the services demanded by the public. 
Ihe Interim Period 
Following the proceedings. Ex Parte 148 was closed. 
Regional hearings in the Ex Parte 162 case v/ere opened during 
the summer in Chicago, Atlanta, Houston, and Salt Lake City. 
Pinal hearings wore held in Washington, D. G. in the fall 
of 1946. Almost six months elapsed before the testimony of 
all parties to the case was acted upon by the Commission, 
yet from the railroad viewpoiivb, economic conditions steadily 
declined. Sharp Increases were occurring in the general 
price level of the nation partly from the elimination of 
price controls and partly because higher wages were granted 
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in the coal industry. As a result, costs of materials and 
supplies to the railways were substantially higher than 
those of early 194G. The vrage increases awarded by the 
President were estimated to cost $99 million more than had 
been anticipated. In addition, $p90 inlllion was added to 
annual operating expenditures through enactment of the new 
railroad social security blll.^''' To further complicate the 
27. H.R. 1362 known as the Grosser Act v/as passed by 
Congress in July and v/as to be effective January 1, 1947. 
It amended the Railroad Rotirement and Ralli»oad Unemploy­
ment Acts by raising the payroll tax on both employees 
and employers. See Traffic World, June 29, 1946. p.1967; 
also July 6, 1946, p. 36. 
situation, excess profits tax credits approximating iSl70 
million In 1946 were due to expire by the end of the year. 
It was estimated that early 1947 operating costs would have 
increased by .f351 million since April, 1946.^® 
28. American Association of Railroads. A Reviev/ of Rail~ 
way Operations in 1946. Washington, D. C. 1947. p. 4. 
While the carriers struggled to remain out of financial 
distress, the hearings before the Comiaission continued with­
out interruption. As the testimony and evidence was weired, 
balance sheets of individual railroads shov/ed the trend of 
29 
earnings. The entire philosophy of regulation appeared 
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29. For the first time in 100 years the Pennsylvania Rail-
x*oad reported a prospective deficit for 1946. New York 
Central estimated a loss of '^12 million as compared with 
a profit of !;ii24 million in 1945. Without the proposed 
Increases, the latter road anticipated a loss of i-JGQ 
million in 1947, The net Income of Chicago and North­
western v/as down :;'p9 million from 1945. A survey of 30 
major roads indicated that only 12 expected a not income 
ill 1947 if rate increases v/ere not granted. For a complete 
summary of the financial situation "by individual carriers, 
see United States Hews. October 4, 1946. p. 13, 
to he on trial during this period. Tlie long series of events 
which had placed the railways in the precarious financial 
condition unfortunately came at a time when tlie nation could 
ill afford to allow natural economic forces to settle the 
matter. New equipment v/as needed hut there was little reason 
for the railroad indiistry to place future orders unless some 
assurance of future earnings could be given. This was not 
Immediately forthcoming. Other industries which sold sub­
stantial amounts of materials and supplies were also af­
fected by the rate decision delay.Even the diarp market 
30. "Poor financial statements from the year's operations 
may mean decreased expenditures in 1947. Rails buy 20 
per cent of the output of the coal, fuel, and lumber in­
dustries, a little less from the steel industry." Iron 
Age. January 2, 1947. pp. 140-147. 
decline of railrojid aec\irlties in September, 1946 was at­
tributed to the failure of the Commission to arrive at an 
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•zn 
iimriodiate decision. It appeared that trends of earnings 
31. An average of 20 rail stocks compiled by the Dov>'-.Tones 
index showed a loss of 23 points from the high, levels of 
June. Barrons. January 2, 1947. p. 9. "Market prices 
of stocks of railroads represent the capitalized earnings. 
Pailixre of the Commission bo grant the rate increases to 
pay for wages caused the decline in securities. Rails 
wish to make expenditures but will require continued 
definite earning power not a mere tax carry-back. By de­
laying the rate Increases, the Interstate Comraer-ce Com-
tnission has already reduced the purchases and moderniza­
tion plans of the railroads." Comjaercial and Financial 
ChroniP-ln. September 26, 1946. p. 1530. 
during this period would eliminate the possibility of attractr 
Ing large amounts of new permanent capital to the industry 
in the near future. Expenditures generally would have to 
come from the lean earnings of 1946, which would have been 
much worse hod it not been for the tax carry-backs. 
In further support of the above statements. Table VII 
is presented below. It compares certain items of railroad 
performance in 1946 with those of the years 194-5 and 1941. 
The data indicate that 1946 proved a year of record 
peacetime traffic yet net earnings were only slight higher 
than those of depression periods. Revenue ton-miles carried 
were 14 per cent below those of 1945 but were greater by 
20 per cent than the levels of 1941. Total operating reve­
nues dijiring 1946 declined by ^ pl,275 million from those of 
1945. This represented a drop of 14.3 per cent but compared 
with 1941 revenues, a gain of 20 per cent. Total operating 
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TalDle VII 
11:10 Status of Claas I Railroads in 1946 as Comp'^red with 
1945 and 1941* 
Fircent Percent 
chfinge chnntre 
1946 1946^' 
compared compared 
Item 1946 1945 to 1945 1941 to 1941 
(In millions) 
Revenue ton-mi3.es 591.9 631 d 14 475 20.0 
Total operating 
revenues ijj ^ 7627 118902 d 14.3 15347 20,9 
Total operating 
expenses 6558 7052 d 9.8 3664 42,5 
Wet railway op­
erating Income 619^ 852 d 27.3 998 d 38.0 
Net income 289^ 450 d 35.8 500 d 42.2 
Average nutn'ber 
of employees 1358 1420 d 4.5 1140 19.0 
Total payr-oll 4170 3862 7.4 2332 44.0 
Annual compens a-
tion per employee 
(Actual) S069 2721 11.3 2045 30.0 
Average straight 
time 1)6r hour 
(Cents) 111.7 93 .3 16.5 76 .9 31.0 
Operating ratio 83.4 79 .2 3.8 68 .5 14.9 
Rate of return 
Total investment 
After depreci­
ation 
2.09^ 3 
2.742 3 
.01 
.77 
d 
d 
.92 
1.03 
3 
4 
.75 
.78 
d 1.66 
d 2.04 
"source: Interstate Commerce Commission. Statistics of the 
Railways of the United State.n. 1941, 1945^^ American 
Tssociation of Railroads. Bureau of Railv/ay Economics, 
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Table VII (Footnotes continued) 
Special Series No. 76. 1947. 
d. Decrease. 
1. Includes ttix corry-teck of $170 million, 
2. Based on property Investment as of December 31, 1945. 
expenses fell some 9,8 per cent v/ithin the year Irut increesed 
over 40 per cent from the totals of 1941. The decline was 
IDartly due to the smaller charges in 1946 for amoi tizati on 
of defense projects. If oper«tlng expenditures had been ad­
justed 4;o eliminate such charges over the two jeav period, 
they would have shown a slight increase in 1946 as compared 
with those of 1945, 
Appi'oximately 60,667 fewer persons were employed by the 
carriers in 1946 than in 1G45, yet the total payroll v/as the 
hl^est in railroad history, up 7.5 per cent from 1945 and 
over 44 per cent from the 1941 figure. Average straii^it 
time on an hourly basis crossed the dollar mark for the first 
time, and annual earnings for employees reached nev/ peaks. 
Excluding the tax credits, net railv.'ay operating income 
in 1946 was ifi)449 million which was actually less than that 
3S 
received In the year 1933. Computed on the same basis, 
32. Interstate Cornrnerce Cominlsslon, Statistics of the 
Railways of the United States, 1933. iTsTSiiivcton, 1), C., 
Govt, 'frlnt. Off. 1934. 
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net Income for 1946 would have been $119 million. The 
decline in the latter item betv/een the years 1945 and 1946 
amounted to 35.8 per cent, and when the 1946 totals are 
compared with, those of 1941, the decrease amounted to 42.2 
per cent. Of every dollar of operating revenue received in 
1946, 83,4 cents was used to pay operating expenses. With 
the exception of the years 1919 and 1920, when the carriers 
were londer Federal operation, this ratio v/as the highest in 
the history of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The rate 
of return on property investment average 2.19 per cent in 
1946. This represented only three-fourths of one per cent 
above the average of 1938, and if tax credits had been de­
ducted, it would have been reduced to 1.69 per cent. After 
accrued depreciation the rate was approximately the same as 
the average for the five year period, 1936-1940. By eliminat­
ing the tax credits, it would have equalled the average for 
the period 1931-1935, the worse, incidentally, in railroad 
history. 
A study of the comparisons points to only one conclu­
sion. If the railroads were to perform the services demanded 
of them by the public, substantial rate increases would have 
to be granted by the Commission, Otherwise it seemed ap­
parent that the financial emergency would continue v/ith ad­
verse effects upon the entire economy. After five months 
and 16 days of hearings and deliberations the decision was 
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finally made. Its analysis will conclude the discussion of 
this chapter. 
The Decision in the Ex Parte 162 Rate Level Case 
On December 6, 1947, rail and water common carriers v/ere 
authorified to increase their rates and charges effective 
January 1, 1947, on five days' notice. It was estimated 
that the advances would aggregate nearly i#l billion annually, 
and represented an over-all Increase of about 17,6 per cent 
over the existing "basic frei^t rates and charges."®® Freight 
33. Ex Parte 162. Increased Railway Rates, Fares, and 
Charges, 1946. 266 i.C.G. 537^ 19467" basic freij^t 
rates and charges are meant those now in effect, whether 
established by order of the Commission or voiiintary act 
of the petitioning carriers — excluding, however, from 
such freight rates and charges as now in effect such 
portion thereof as represents the interim increases author­
ized by the report and order entered into on June 20, 
1946." Ibid., p. 614. 
forwarders were permitted to raise their rates in direct 
proportion to the increases made in the rates and charges 
of the comjnon carriers whose facilities and transportation 
services they used. 
The report on the extended hearings opened with a ref­
erence to the prior case, 264, I.C.C. 695, decided on 
June 20, and reviewed the origin and history of the pro­
ceedings and the position of the parties in the case. The 
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Commission stated, that op ortunitlcs had been given for the 
presentation of complete evidence "by shippers and State and 
Federal agencies who had demanded further hearings, and at 
the same time for the railroads to suTanlt more recent data 
on trends in truffle, wages, and prices. The case rested 
"fundamentally ... as before on the basic conditions of 
declining traffic, increased wage rates and rising prices 
of materials and supplies. 
34, Ibid., p. 544. 
In the later hearings rail carriers revised upward their 
estimates of total operating revenues and expenses for the 
year 1946. I'he $6,919 million revenue figure pretiented in 
the Ex Parte 146-162 testiraony was ixicreased to :ip7,555 million. 
Total operating expenses were increased by iljioSQ million over 
the CM?iglnal estimate.For 1947, on the basis of the emer-
35. 264 I.C.C. 695. 1946. Appendix 2. 
gency increases and excluding the tax credits, the railroads 
estimated that total operating I'evenues would be ,|p7,347 
million; total operating expenses, ;»)6,501 million; taxes, 
!i?661 million; net railway operating income, $30 million; 
with a deficit in net income of ^312 million. On the basis 
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of the full amount of the proposed increases, the 1947 ostl 
mates were as follows; Total operating revenues, $8,090 
million; total operating expenses, ^ 6,501 million; taxes, 
;ip661 million; net railway operating income, $592 million; 
26 
and net income, $247 million. 
36. Ex Parte 162, pit., p. 545. If the estimates were 
reasonably correct, the net Income plus tax credits v/ould 
be 37.1 per cent of the average net income of the five 
years, 1941-1945; 34.1 per cent of the period, 1925-1930; 
50.4 per cent of the average for the period 1921-1925; 
and 53.7 per cent of the seven years, 1911-1917. It was 
about 33.4 per cent higher than thenet income for the 
year 1940, which in tiarn we s the ?ii^est of the decade, 
1931-1940. Ibid., p. 545. 
Prime importance was attached to the trends of v/ages 
and the prices of materials and supplies as they affected 
the future operating expenses. The Commission i^viewed the 
wage increases and additional payroll taxes for the years 
1941, 1943, and 1946, gave some attention to the increased 
costs resulting from enactment of the Grosser bill, and 
pointed to the upward sweep of the prices of materials and 
supplies. It was expected that these developments would 
raise operating expenses in 1947 by about ^p2,176 million 
37 
over those Inciirred in the year of 1939. 
37. Ibid., p. 546. 
131 
In its prior report the Cmnniiasion stated that none of 
its estimatos had included the additional revenues accruing 
to the carriers as a renult of discontinuance of land-grant 
rates. Carriers anticipated some 527.5 railllon from tills 
source over a full 7/-ear of peacetime operation. Ihis figui'e 
was criticized as top low for 1947 by the Goramxssion, Testi­
mony of military groups before the appropriations comrnitteo 
of the House of Representatives revealed that land-grant 
deductions could be reasonably estirru^ted at i|i:33 million from 
October 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947. However, it was not ex­
pected that this amount would be maintained in subsequent 
years, for any futvire retrenchment in military expenditures 
would naturally cause a decline in the land-grant revenues 
from organized troop movements. 
As in previous rate level cases, the exterided hearings 
brought out the familiar controversy between the short and 
long haul producers and shippers over the effect of the in­
creased rates than in the amount of the advances, per ae» 
The hearings also presented fev/er objections to the proposed 
IncrBases, althougli substantial numbers of those proteatii:^ 
still regarded the interim advances to be sufficient for 
38 the carriers' needs. 
38. These observations have resulted from a study of the 
detailed testimony of all parties during the regional 
hearings throiagjiout the nation, and the final hearing in 
'Vashington, D. C. The complete report may be found in 
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'traffic World, August 3, 1946, pp. 315-320; August 17, 
1946, pp. 475-4ti9; August 24, 1946, pp. 577-589; August 31, 
1946, p. 625; October 5, 1946, pn. 905-913; and November 2, 
1946, pp. 1151-1155. 
Much of the report summarized the testimony and the 
arguments of the parties in regfird to the rate relationships 
of commodity classes or groups of products, particularly 
those of agriculture, coal, lumber, petroleum, and iron and 
steel. In concluding, the Commission observed that the 
decision would directly affect "production and distribution 
in the industries of the nation and the welfare of its 
various regions, as well as the transportation lnc3ustry . . . 
by affecting the forces tending to economic stabilization 
or the reverse,ITiere v/ere further comments upon the 
39. Ibid., p. 613. 
similarities of the present proceedings to those of the year 
1920, following the period of Federal control.^® 
40. Ibid., pp. 613-614. 
The decision may be condensed as follows: 
In order to carry out the objectives of the national 
transportation policy and to develop a sound and adequate 
national system of transportation, it is necessary that 
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sulDstantial rate increases be granted to the petitioning 
carriers. .Such I'ates and charges as Increased are to bo 
considered as just and reasonable, but the full amount of 
the increases as proposed under the Fx Parte 162 petition 
aro not foiind to bo just and reasonable. 
Except as otherwise indicated, all basic frei[;ht rates 
of the rail and vvatei' comraon carriers may be increased by 
20 per cent, inclusive of the interim increases granted 
July 1, 1946, to become effective on January 1, 1947 T7.pon 
five days' notice. 
Unless otlierwise excepted, rates on covfETiodities grouped 
under the classification of Manufactures and Miscellaneous, 
class rates, and rotes on less-than-carload traffic may be 
increased by R5 per cent in Official Territory; 20 per cent 
within and between other frei^t rate territories; and 22.5 
per cent between Official Territory and points in other 
territories. 
Throuj^ rates inSiich are made by combining separate two-
factor or multiple factor rates will take a single increase 
on the coinbined rate. Joint rates with motor carriers v/ero 
increased to the ntune extent and in the same manner as pro­
posed for all-rail rates. 
Freight forwarders were allowed to increase their rates 
and charges in direct proportion to those of the common 
carriers v/hose facilities and services they used.^^ 
1J54: 
41. Ibid., pp. 614-618. 
As in all rato oases where substantial changes are made, 
the awards v/eve enormously complicated. They applied to 
common carriers Toy rail and water, to frei^t forwarders, 
and covered a large variety of services. In general, rate 
increases amounted to 2U per cent on non-agric\3ltural com­
modities, subject to numerous exceptions covering coal, iron 
ore, lumber, petroleum and products, sugai', iron and steel 
products, aluminujn, canned foods, and building materials. 
For these groups, either a flat increase or a percentage 
advance with a maximum limit expressed in cents per 100 
pounds was permitted. Most, if not all, of the excepted com­
modities moved in low-rated traffic, and it was presumed 
that their rates were so incretised in order to prevent di­
version from rail to other transpcrtation agencies, and also 
to maintain wherever possible existing marketing relation­
ship s. 
/igricultural comniodities in general carried a 15 pei-* 
cent increase in their rates. Exceptions were made on 
fruits and vegetables, cotton in bales, citrus fruit, and 
wool. In addition to the increases in line-haul charges, 
advances were authorized to the extent of 25 per cent in 
switching chai'ges and in such accessorial services as 
lo5 
stores©, handling, loading nnd vinloading, reconsignment, 
AO 
diversion In transit, fabrication, and v/oighin,g. 
42. For a complete list of the individufll and graip in-
cr ases, see ibid., Appendix 1. pp. 618-624, 
The awards in the final decision averaged about two per 
cent below those initially sou^t. "nVhereas the increases 
first requested would have been about 19,6 per cent over the 
previous level of rates, the authorized nationwide advances 
as noted above averaged approximately 17.6 per cent. In 
the report, more space than appears necessary wn s devoted 
to various appraisals of railroad earnings for 1946, The 
Commission first created the impression that the carrier 
estimates were too lov/, and then admitted during the sub­
sequent hearings that the railroads had not significantly 
underestimated their revenues for the year, Actually, the 
revenue estimates of the carriers proved to be remarkably 
accurate. 
'XV/o important problems faced the Commission in deciding 
the case. One reqxiired an evaluation of the immediate facts 
as presented by the parties to the proceeding. The other 
involved a consideration of the effect of continued infla­
tion on future economic trends. On the basis of the testi­
mony, it is almost Imposaible to explain why the full amount 
of the proposed increases ^vas adjudged as being unjust end 
136 
unreasonable. It Is also difficult to understand the reason­
ing which suggested that an addition of $1 billion to exist­
ing revenues was sufficient to cover increased annual ex­
penditures of more than twice that amount. 
Despite the fact that evidence pointing to a continued 
future period of inflation had. steadily accumulated during 
the latter half of 1946, the CoTrwiission ap'^nrently chope to 
ignore the trends. Possibly the uncertainties of the com­
petitive situation within the transportation Industry ac­
counted for theii' hesitancy. It is also possible that the 
rate level adjustments experienced between the years 1920 
and 1953?, remained vivid. 'Xhe financial daroge to the rail 
carriers by the delay in the decision cannot be estimated, 
but in terms of the equipment, materials, and supplies 
which could have been purchased if the rates were raised 
earlier, it was undoubtedly substantial. Even v/ith the new 
rate advances, the railroads could not keep pace with the 
upvjard splraling costs of 1947, and six months after the 
Ex Parte 162 decision, they again asked for increases in 
frei^t rates. 
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THE EFFECT OP' THE 1946 RATE LEVEL DECISION 
ON RAILROAD EI NANCES 
Determination of revenues adequate to provide proper 
service may be considered as the heart of the railway problem; 
its solution is important not only to the carriers and their 
investors but to the nation at large. Good service at reason­
able cost can be supplied the public only if the railroads 
have sufficient capital to maintain and Improve facilities. 
Since the bulk of the funds needed for this puipose will 
probably come from private sources, at least as long as the 
present system of private ownership and operation continues, 
sustained future earning power is the criterion of the car­
rier's ability to attract capital in competition with other 
forma of transportation and with oiiier industries and enter­
prises. 
This chapter, the first of three which will analyze the 
effects of the rate level decision,Is concerned with the 1946 
case as it pertained to railway finances. By way of introduc­
tion, the first part is devoted to a brief discussion of the 
significance and characteristics of railroad financial prob­
lems. Subsequent sections consider the decision in terms of 
the question of adequate revenues; valuation of railway 
property as a rate base; the rate of return; and railroad 
credit. 
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Significance and Characteristics of Railroad Finance 
Despite a long-run trend toward perrnanont irnpalrraent, 
railroad finance Ira stlH of vital iraportanc© to tlie nation. 
Historically, many of the early techniques used by rail 
carriers in raising capital wore adopted by other indvisti'iea. 
Statistically, the amount of gross Investment in road, plant, 
and equipment is large, totaling .'oSljSOV million in 1945» 
Against this sura, securities held by the public amounted to 
$13,682 million. Tliese consisted of ;!;;9,286 million of un­
matured funded debt, #1,840 million in preferred stock, and 
1 
^6,169 million of common stock. Almost half of the funded 
1, Interstate Commerce Commission, Statistics of Railways 
in the United States, 1945. iVashirigt'on, JJ. C., Govt, 
Print. Off. TableTm, pp. 116-117. 1947. 
debt was held by Insurance companies, banks, and endowed 
institutions, so that millions of policy holders, depositors, 
etc., indirectly have a stake in the welfare of the industry. 
Ownership of stock in 1945 v/as divided among 864,036 persona.^ 
2. Ibid., Table 150, p. 147. 
In addition, almost one and a half million employees of the 
industry, millions of its users, and the enterprises pi'ovid-
Ing its materials, supplies, and equipment constitute a vast 
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hcterogoneoun group dii-octly concerned with finurcial prob­
lems of the carrioi-'B. 
A characteristic of rnJ.lroed finance is the heavy con-
% 
ccntration of property control by relatively few cowpaniea. 
3. At the end of 1945, 492 line haul railrondn ovmcd 
185,679 miles of road, and 293,752 milos of track. Of 
this total, 131 Clasn I rail carr^ierB owned 175,300 miles 
of road and 280,971 miles of track; Class II carriers 
ovmed 7,873 miles of road and 9,922 "miles of trackj while 
Glass III carriers owned 2,441 miles of road and 2,859 
miles of track. The 30 largest Class I railroads owned 
and operated over 60 per cent of the total railroad mileage 
of the nation. Ibid., Table 2, p. 4. 
Such control is marked by a centralisation of financial 
decisions which at prrsent are concerned more with raising 
fv\ndf3 for eq\iipment, additions and betterments, and refund­
ing outstanding securities than in financing future mileage 
growth. Other Important characteristics relate to the vari­
ety of securities used to obtain capital and the fact that 
when compared to utility and industrial groups, railroads 
show a larger ratio of long-term debt to total capitaliza­
tion.^ 
4. Glass I carriers in 1945 had a ratio of 53.8 per cent. 
Ibid., Table 128, p. 117. The large amount of funded 
debt carried may be explained by the past need for fiinds 
to carry out programs of plant expansion, rjp to 1930, 
the rail traffic of the nation doubled in volume every 
15 years on the average and the capacity of the plant 
had to bo similarly increased. The only method of ob-
.talning the capital in many cases and the cheapest in 
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, practically all v,/u3 through the sale of bonvis. Since 
1932, v;hon competition uecai-io incroasinf^ly eifective, 
rallv/ay financial policies have been directed toward ex­
tensive debt reduction and .'greater x^elianco upon internal 
funds for improvement of property. 'Tlie trend tov/ard debt 
reduction has been aided by the ro£;ul&tory authority, 
particularly tliroiigh reoi-ganisation techniques made pos­
sible by anioiidnients to the Bankruptcy Act of 1890, and 
also by additional resources through wartime earnings. 
It has been stiraulated, too, by recognition of the fact 
that the indiistry has passed throu^J-i its expansion phases 
and that iuture development will consist primarily in pro­
viding-, more efficient means of siovinr, traffic, For dis­
cussion on these points, see Stevens, V;, ii. 3. "Kailroad 
Finance, 1B90-1940" in national •'"esources Plannin(^ Board 
Report. Transportation and Public Folic:/-. Viashington, 
D. G., Govt. Print. Off. 1942. pp. 170-182. See also 
toic-rican Association of Railroads. Kailroad Comittee 
foi' the Study of Transportation. Railroad Finanoo. 
Washington,!:'. C., 1947, pp. 25-26. 
In financing, first and second mortgage bonds constitute 
by far the jnajor claijs of senior securities. In 1945, these 
amounted to 84 por cent of the total outstanding lon£r-terrj 
debt. About 3,8 per cent of the total represented col­
lateral trust certificates but the use of this type of 
security has been declining over the past 25 years. They 
are In the form of a nortgage obligation, with the lien on 
securities which represent an equity in railroad property. 
Eqviipment obligations, amounting to approximately 7.6 per 
cent of the total represent a special forxii of relatively 
short-term debt. Their importance shrlnlcs or expands as 
the carriers make fevier or larger additions to rolling stock. 
5. Por a further description of these different securities, 
see Guthrnan, H. G. and Dougall, 11. E. Corporate Finan­
cial Policy. Hew York, Prontico-Hall, Inc. 1946, 
pp. 141-159. 
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The roTTiainde'i-' of the debt st?;'ui.!tuTe conoists of income "bonds 
and iniscollaneous securities, Ttie forrier originated princi­
pally through T'e organiriatioiip and are often secured by n junior 
rar^rtgagG. 'Iheir ^rroatest dis'idvantage to the investor lies 
in the f,'-. ct that n hond-holde?:" doeR not receive any interest 
unleno it has heon eariied during tho fifjcal period. In many 
cases, thlB has led to tine practice of attaching h i^rovision 
callin/T for the accumulation of intere^iit not oarnod in any 
7/"ear, b\it thirs feature has had the effect of injuring the 
market value of previotis isnxxes aiid has destroyed tiieir use­
fulness for further financing, MiEcollaneous sceiirities are 
chiefly classed as debentures which becaufse cf if-:3U'jnce cn 
heavily uiortgaged propertiea are often made convertible to 
provide speculative appeal. 
6- Lack of flexibility has been an important feature of 
the debt structure, primarily because of the relatively 
large proportion of debt which cannot be redeemed until 
maturity. 'Xhis weakness, hov/evei', has been partially 
corrected in recent reorganization plans. Dr. Stevens 
is of the opinion that because of the possibility of 
future traffic losses, the investment position of the 
carriers should be strengthened by revisions in the terms 
and conditions of the debt structu.re so as to make in­
terest cliarges react more automatically to changing 
economic conditions. To provide the needed elasticity, 
he suggests a novel combination of a noncumulative income 
bond ^vith a par bicipa ting feature to be applied only via en 
Interest has been unearned and unpaid in prior years. 
Stevens, W, n, on. cit,, p. 195. 
Certain problems for maniigement and investors arise 
out of the complicated debt structure. Separate propertiea 
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carry separate mortgages, a fact which makes difficult the 
clear-cut status of bonds until reorganization occurs. 
Because of the specialized nature of the property, threats 
of foreclosure and acquisition are rarely carried out, for 
it is iinposBible to operate individual units with any great 
advantage except as part of the entire plant. Right of 
foreclosiire has as its main purpose bargaining power in re­
organization proceedings, dependent upon the importance of 
the property upon •which the petitioner has a lien. Debt 
arrangement under reorganization presents the problem of 
working out the best possible combination of liens on real 
property, collateral trust securities, and dabentizres, to 
effect the lowest possible interest rates. There seems to 
be a definite trend toward sinplification as bonds gradually 
mature, but progress in this direction is bound to be slow 
because of the long-tem nature of rail securities, and 
because prior to 1933 very few companies had made provision 
7 for their retirement. Minor equities have been retired by 
7, "Indebtedness evidenced ... is ordinarily regarded 
as perpetual and no provision is made for its ultimate 
liquidation. 'Ihe result is that the funded debt of the 
railway companies is constantly increasing .... V/e 
believe that the desired results can be obtained, in 
part, at least, througji the provision of sinking funds 
to be set up by the railway companies out of net income 
for tJ-ie purpose of retiring a part of their funded debt 
before maturity. ' If such funds are not voluntarily 
established ... their establishment may be required 
as a condition to our authorization of further bond 
issues under the provisions of section 20a of the Inter­
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state Commerce J\ct," 46th Annual Report of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission, 1933. vi/ashington, i'. G., Crovt, •t'rin'fc. 
WFl 1934. pp. 25-26, 
some of the major carriers throughout the war period. 
Almost 10 per cent of the capitalization of Class I 
railroads consists of preferred stock. Both cumulative and 
noncumulative issues are used, the latter originating in 
reorganization proceedings through replacement of bonds, 
thus decreasing the Interest burden. Financing through 
preferred stock partially avoids the problem of fixed charges 
and increaser; the proprietorship. Common stock represents 
a smaller percentage than is found in private industries 
since the enqjhasis is on senior securities and also because 
a smaller proportion of common stock in a capital structure 
affords a concentration of control and permits trading on 
8 
the equity. The !ii:6,l69 million of common stock represented 
8. "This principle assumes that there is an equity in the 
corporation which will serve as protection for a lerder. 
With the equity in evidence, the lender is supposedly 
willing to advance a loan at relatively low interest 
compared with anticipated returns on stock. Borrowing 
may be used as a device to increase earnings on stock 
whenever the cost of the loan is less than the amount 
it earns for a borroiver. Railroads and public utilities 
make more use of the principle than industrial corpora­
tions. Holders of railroad bonds have frequently learned 
to their financial sorrow that equities provided by 
stockholders may fade away in the face of declining 
profits in the railroad business . . . The presence of 
heavy investments in fixed assets is not enough to 
justify large bond Issues. Ihere must be, in addition, 
assurance of continued net earnings sufficient to meet 
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all ol)ligatlons to creditors." Hoagland, H. E. Corpora­
tion Finance. New York, McGraw-ITlll Pub. Co. 19'4V. 
p. iVo. 
approximately 30 per cent of total capitalization In 1945. 
A composite "balance sheet of the industry reveals in-
9 teres ting information. The hulk of the assets are almost 
9. See Table VI, Appendix B. 
entirely fl:<ed and consist chiefly of specialized property 
and securities. The nature of the fixed assets explains 
the use of long-term debt and proprietorship obligations as 
the main sources of funds, and the relative unimportance of 
current financing. Current assets play only a minor role. 
Cash and temporary cash investments at present are large as 
a result of swollen war revenues. Receivables are negligible 
since operations are conducted on a cash basis. Ko inventories 
in the ordinary sense are used as the carriers sell service. 
The heavy investment in fixed assets which cannot be turned 
to alternative uses leads to increasing returns in periods 
of rising traffic but causes serious financial distress 
when traffic falls. Tlie large proportion of long-term debt 
to total capitalization means heavy annual fixed chai'ges to 
be covered throu/^ income. 
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Tlie Problem of Adequate Revenues 
iVfter the period of high wartime earnings, the swiftly-
changing pattern of economic events since 1945 has again 
raised the question of whether the rail carriers will be 
able to support their present debt and attract new invest­
ment capital, or \fl3iether they have passed tlirou^ their cycle 
of matojrity and should be considered as entering upon a period 
of senility. The fact that earnings are declining at a time 
when the nation is enjoying an era of prosperity gives rise 
to the question. 
To command new capital and support existing debt re­
quires at least enough revenues to cover operating expenses, 
taxes, rentals, and interest profits. If common stock is 
to be sold to further balance the capital structure, there 
must be an additional return aarned for stocl^holders. How 
to increase revenues thus becomes the perennial piroblem 
facing the carriers. In the raa,-jo3flty of instances, it is 
partially resolved throu^ direct Commission action in rate 
level oases, but over long periods some of the distress could 
be eased thrcu^ introduction by railroad management of 
programs designed to reduce expenses and fixed charges. 
The need for direct Commission action on the revenue 
problem was apparent during the year of 1946. Both gross 
operating revenues and net income had fallen sui^stantially 
from the levels of 1945. Industrial reconversion was ex~ 
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pected to result in lowered volumes of troffic, yet traffic 
losses alone were not large enough wholly to explain declin­
ing net income. The difficul'^ lay in the fact that operat­
ing expenses reraaind at a rigid level or increased, thus 
tending to narrow earnings to a point v/here a serious finan­
cial crisis developed. Rate increases as a result of the 
Ex Parte 162 case were calculated to add approximately $1 
"billion. Subsequent advances in passenger and express 
charges were expected to add $279 million to this amount. 
On the expense side, v/ages increosed annually by $1,406 
million between the years, 1941 and 1947. Rising costs of 
materials and supplies over 6 years resulted in !i?740 million 
more. Payroll taxes and vacation allowances added $249 
million per year. As of January 1, 1947, it was anticipated 
that increased annual expenditures v/ould total aboiit !,$2,395 
million, 1947 as compared v/ith 1941 j increased annual reve­
nues v/ere expected to bring i?l,279 million; expenditures 
not covered by income were approximately !ipl,116 million.^® 
10. See Table VII, Appendix B. 
Increasing costs of the natui^e described above were 
generally beyond control of the carriers. In this respect 
the position of the railroads was no different from that of 
private industry, except that the latter could rocovex' its 
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hl^Gr expenditures through linmediate price increases while 
the railwaya were forced to av/ait the decision on their re­
quests for rate advances. In an inflationary period such 
as was evident at the end of 1946, railroads as heavy con­
sumers of industrial products are among the first to be af­
fected by rising prices, and are usually hard pressed to 
meet obligations when expenditures overtake revenues. IBtiile 
the carriers in the initial stage of inflation tend to. have 
high volmes of traffic and hi^ earnings, eventually ex­
penditures rise to a level v/here they cannot be covered ex­
cept through increased rates. Apparently it is impossible 
for the public authority to act irnmediately upon petitions 
for advances in frei^t charges even though the financial 
position of railroads deteriorates v/hile hearings are continued. 
In view of the sharply increasing general price level on one 
hand, and the fact that over five months were necessary to 
arrive at a decision on the other, the wisdom of the Commis­
sion in paring down the proposed rate increases may be seri­
ously questioned. 
Analysis of the financial position of the railroads for 
the first six months of 1947 would seem to bear oiit the above 
conclusions. Total net income after charges amotxnted to ^p204 
million as compared to a deficit of $21 million for a similar 
period in the year 1946, and to a net income of ^iil73 million 
in a corresponding period of the year 1941. Operating reve­
nues increased 71 per cent betv/een the years 1941 and 1947, 
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but operating costs (expenses, rentals, payroll and other 
taxes excluding Federal Income tuxes) Increased approximately 
89 per cent.^^ The railroad industry was in the unenviable 
11. Interstate Gomnerce Commission. Bureau of 'J?ransport 
'fransport Economics and Statistics. Monthly Comment on 
Transportation Statistics. August 13,1947, p. 2. 
position of carrying the greatest volume of freight In its 
history, receiving gross revenues of over fl.S billion more 
than in 1941, yet earning only an additional 1:31 million. 
18. Ibid., p. 3. 
Under the circumstances it was not surprising to find the 
carriers petitioning for further rate increases in July, 
1947.^® 
13. Ex Parte 166. Increased Railway Rates, Fares« and 
Charges, 1947. 269 X.C.G. 13. 1947. The railroads re-
quested increases of 38 per cent in Official Territory; 
28 per cent v/ithin Southern and Western Districts; 38 
per cent between Southern and Official, and Western and 
Official territories; and 28 per cent between Southern 
and Western territories. Traffic World, September 30, 
1947, pp. 1140-1147. 
As mentioned previously, efforts to decrease expenses 
and reduce debt will also result in increased net income. 
VJhile the railroads stress the need for increased rates 
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on one hand and empliasize progress in debt reduction on the 
other, there- appears to be little concerted effort to reduce 
uneconomical expend!tiires on an industry-wide basis. Waste­
ful duplication of railroad services has long been the rule 
rather than the exception, and attempts to coordinate various 
services have met with little cooperation from either manage­
ment or laborThere was a surprising lack of attention 
14. 'Hie Federal Coordinator in 1934 estimated that upv/ards 
of ^'p350 million annually could be saved if railroads 
v/ould consolidate various services. See Federal Coordi­
nator of Transportation. Regulation of RallroadB. Senate 
Document No. 119, 73d Congress, Sessibri. ld34, 
pp. 21-29, 84-148. Excellent summaries of the subject of 
railroad consolidation will be found in Dewey, R. L. 
"Transportation Coordination," and Behling, B. N. 
"Economies from Railroad Consolidation and Coordination," 
in the National Resources Planning Board Report, clt. 
pp. 140-160, 161-170. The railroad point of view Ts 
presented In American Association of Railroads. Trans -
portatlon in America. liVashin/3:ton, D. C., 1947, pp. 297-
2^, ^ 
given to this possibility in the 1946 decision. Hie past 
record of the railronds on posr>ibilitiGs of coordination and 
unification Is not too favorable. Much more to their credit 
has been the recent drive toward debt reduction. This matter 
will be discussed in a subsequent section of the chapter. 
150 
The Prol3lem of Valuation 
In the celebrated case of Smyth v Ames, the Supreme 
Court stated: "We hold that the basis of all calculation 
as to the reasonableness of rates to be charged by a corpora­
tion maintaining a highway under legislative sanction must 
be the fair value of the property being used by it for the 
convenience of the public « . . 'riie fair value prin­
ciple established by this decision has been interpreted as 
15. 169 U.S. 466, 377. 1898. 
a base upon which to allow rates iifeich v/ere reasonable; 
rates v/hich v/ould protect the carriers against confiscation. 
No other problem in the sphere of regulation has received 
as much attention, has beeti subject to as much s"j:)irited 
controversy, has commanded the time of commissions, courts, 
and carriers, and none has been as inconclusive as that of 
property valuation for rate-making pvirposes. 
It should b© clearly underEtocd tiiiit tho concept of 
"fair value" as used in the court decision does notSnean 
value in the economic sense. As interpreted by the economist 
value means exchange or market value, thus appraisal of 
property providing an income depends upon the amount of its 
earnings. Property is usually exchanged on the basis of tho 
discounted earnings which it is expected to produce. Railroad 
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income, however, in the result of rates charged its risers, 
and rt'tes cannot properly "be baaed upon a value which in 
turn is dependent on rates. The use of market value as a 
rate base v/oald mean legalizing existing rote levels whether 
high or low.^® 
16, For a further discussion of these concepts, see Bon-
brlght, J. C. The Valuation of Property. McGrav/-Hill 
Book Co., New York. lOSV. vol. 1, part II. 
Because of the circular reasoning involved, the J'upreme 
Court early rejected the earnings' approach as a standard 
17 
of measurement in valuation proceedings. Rejected also 
17. "The value of the use, as measured by the return, can­
not bo msde the criterion when the return itself is in 
qucDtion." Mini'veaota Rate Cases, 250 U.S. 352, 461. 
1913. . . v/hen rates themselves are in dispute, earn­
ings produced by rates do not afford a standard for 
decision." Los Anpieles Gaa Co, v R.R, Commission of 
California. 289 U.S. 287, 3()^ 1^33, 
were such intangible items as good will and franchise value 
18 dependent upon earnings. By excluding the earnings' 
18. See V/illcox v Consolidated Gas Co. 212 T7.S, 19, 52. 
1909J also Pes Moines Gas Co. v Pes Moines. 238 U.S. 153, 
1915; and Cedar Rapids Gas Light Go, v Cedar Rapids, 223 
U.S. 665, 1^12, 
standard, the Court had no alternative but to use original 
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cost and reproduction cost as elements of value, althou.j^ 
neither is appropriate if ecoaomic value is sou^t, Pinal 
recognition that value for rate-making cannot "be value in 
no 
a market sense v/as given by the Supreme Court in 1944. 
19. "'Iho fixing of prices, like other applications of the 
police power, may reduce the value of the property which 
is being regulated. But the fact that value is reduced 
does not mean that the regulation is invalid. It does, 
hov/ever, indicate that fair value is the end product of 
the process of rote-making, not the starting point . . . . 
The heart of the matter is that rates cann.ot be mude to 
depend upon fair value when the value of the going enter­
prise depends upon earnings under whatever rates may be 
anticipated." Federal Power Commission v Hope Natriral 
Gas Co. 520 U.S. 591, 601. 1^44. 
Earlier support to this theory came when the Court distinguished 
value in reorganization cases from value in rate-mukingj 
'"Thus the question in a valuation for rate-makiug is hov/ 
much the utility will be allowed to earn. The basic question 
in valuation in reorganization purposes is how much the en-
20 terprise in all probability can earn." Professor LocldLin 
20. Institutional Investors v Chicago, ?tfilwaukee, St. Paul 
and Pacific R.R. Clo^ 218 U.S. 523, MO. 1943. 
differentiates the two theories in the following manner: 
The Supreme Court finally came to recognize 
that in a valuation proceeding for rate making pur­
poses a Commission or Court is not finding value; 
it is deciding what the value ought to be. Insofar 
as rates can be adjusted to yield a fair return on 
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such value, the Conmlsaion or Court is making 
value, not findinp; it.^l 
21. Locklin, D. P. Economics of Transportation. Chicago, 
Richard D. Irwin. 1947. p. sVS. 3d Ed. 
After establishing the fair value principle, the Supreme 
Court listed a number of elements to be considered in reach­
ing a conclusion as to property valuation. Those mentioned 
included: original cost of construction and amount spent 
in permanent improvements; amount and value of stocks and 
bonds; present as compared to original cost of construction; 
probable earning capacity of the property; and sum required 
to meet operating e^q^enses. Then because of the possibility 
that something may have been omitted, the Court added: "We 
do not say that there may not be other matters to be regarded 
in estimating the value of the property.Over the years 
22. Smyth v Ames, og. cit., p. 547. 
value of stocks and bonds, probable earning capacity of 
property, and the sura required to meet operating expenses 
have generally been dismissed as elements to which serious 
consideration may be given. Accrued depreciation and going 
value have been added to original cost including additions 
and betterments, and to reproduction cost, as factors to 
which most of the wei^t is attached. 
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Inconclusiveness of the judicial guide for determina­
tion of value is the cause of most of the controversy which 
has raged in public utility regulation. The chief problem 
is a choice of a method of tangible property valuation, for 
Commissions looking toward the lowest consunier price and 
wonting a convenient method to expedite regulatory work 
prefer original cost, vfliile the companies seeking a hl^er 
value to protect their earnings argue for reproduction cost 
in a period of inflation. Original value means the aggregate 
investment in the existing plant, ttie original cost when 
each property item was first devoted to public service. It 
is sometimes called prudent Investment which means the sum 
an ordinary investor exercising reasonable judgment Is wil­
ling to spend on the existing plant. Reproduction cost can 
23 bo given any number of meanings. Its definition depends 
23, For an. analysis of advantages and disadvantages of 
these two methods of valuation see the following: Lock-
lln, D. P., op, cit., pp. 374-383, Blghem, T. Transpor­
tation, Prln^plea and Protoleme, New York, McGraw-Hill ' 
Jfufe. Co, 1946, pp. 253-2^5, Troxel, E, Economics of 
Public Utilities, New York, Rlnehart & Co'I 1947, pp. 
^58-284. Traschel, H, H, Public utility Re/z:ulatlon, 
Chicago, Richard D, Irwin. 1947, Chapters 12, 13, 14. 
upon the type of plant to be reproduced, the choice of prices, 
and the time of reproduction. At one extreme It is measured 
in terms of anticipated cost of replacement, but since future 
equipment and materials prices and future construction costs 
155 
are unknown, this ideal cannot "be used for practical valu­
ations in the field of public utilities. 
Usually greater preference is given for reprodtiction 
cost at current prices but even so choices must be made 
between reproduceable prices. A plant may be replaced either 
on the basis of current costs or on the average over five to 
ten years. There must also bo a choice between reproducing 
the existing plant or the existing service capacity. The 
replacement cost of a public utility is commonly defined 
as the reproduction cost of the existing plant measured usually 
24 by average prices of several recent years, 
24. Troxel, E., og, cit., p. 293. 
Fair or reasonable value is more difficult to define 
than either original or reproduction cost. It is primarily 
an authoritative standard established by the courts, com­
missions, or legislatures, with little or no explanation, 
given as to the wei^t accorded the different elements com­
posing it. Courts have insisted that reproduction cost be 
considered in a number of decisions between the years 1898 
and 1933, and in some it was regarded as the controlling 
factor. Leas emphasis on it and more on original cost was 
found in valuation cases decided during the depression 
period and subsequent years.^® 
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25. The Importance of reproduction cost was stressed in 
early valuation cafses because of the difficulty of find­
ing original cost figures; also because in many instances 
original costs were inflated and vrere the result of un­
economical expenditures. Also responsible was the rising 
price level from 1898 to the depression years. The 
strongest language probably ever used in behalf of re­
production costs as a measure of fair value was foxmd in 
McCardle V Indianapolis Water Co. 272 U.S. 625, 629-630, 
1923; and to a lesser extent in~St. Louis & 0^Fallon R.R. 
Co. V U.S. 279 U.S. 461. 1929. 
A change in attitude toward fair value occurred in 
1942. In Federal Fov/er Commission v Natural Gas Pipeline 
Company,the Supreme Court opened a path for regiolatory 
26. 315 U.S. 575. 1942. "'Phe Constitution does not bind 
rate-making bodies to the service of any single formiila 
or combination of formulas .... Once a fair hearing 
has been given, proper findings made, and other statutory 
requirements satisfied, the Courts cannot Intervene in 
the absence cf a clear showing that the limits of due 
process have been overstepped." Ibid., at p. 586. 
bodies to disregard cost of reproduction as an element of 
value and to adopt, if they chose, the original cost or 
prudent investment factor. ITeither original cost nor pru­
dent Investment was specifically indicated as the proper 
rate base, but by Implication the road was cleared for use 
of this standard. Again, in Federal Power Commission v Hope 
Natural Gas Co., a valuation made upon original cost was 
upheld by the Court.Pair value may now be based on actual 
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27. 320 U.S. 591, 1944. "It is not the theory but the 
impact of the rate order which cotints. If the total ef­
fect of the rate order cannot be said to be unjust and 
unreasonable, judicial inquiry . . . ia at an end. The 
fact that the method employed to roach that result may 
contain infirmities is not then important." Ibid., at 
p. 602. 
prudent cost, and may be fixed and definite. With the valua 
tion problem clarified some attention can be directed to the 
establishment of a fair rate of return. 
Valuation and the Rate of Return 
Pair orieasonable return on investment is an amount 
earned above all reasonable operating expenses including 
depreciation and taxes. According to the legal pattern of 
earnings regulation, it is determined by multiplying a fair 
property valuation by a reasonable rate of return} and is 
an overall amount computed without direct reference to the 
capital structure of an individual carrier. Meither the 
rate of return nor the property valuation taken alone is 
significant, rather it is the earnings which result throu/^ 
the combination with are important. Because of the inter­
relationship, a corporation does not get larger earnings 
simply by increasing its valuation for a commission can 
depress the rate of return to offset the Increased rate 
base. 
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Quantitatively, the percentage earned is as important 
as the valuation hase for the return performs the function 
of paying the current cost of services, and also determines 
the conditions under which the regulated industry will be 
able to attract capital. What constitutes a fair return 
2B 
will vary with time, place, and circumstances, i^lso the 
28. "A rate of return may be reasonable at one time and 
become too h:l^ or too low by changes affecting oppor­
tunities for investment, the money market, and "buisiness 
conditions generally." Bluefleld Water Works fcltrprove-
ment Co. v Public Service Gomraission of 'A'est Virginia. 
262 ir.3. 679, 6^3. 
rate of earnings considered fair in one industry may not 
necessarily be fair in another because of differ'ences in 
risk. Althou^ it was recognized that a return may differ 
in varioiia sreaa of the nation, the Transportation Act of 
1920 required that the fair rate of return be uniform 
29 throughout the country. 
29. See Chapter II, pp. 32-33. 
In testing a fair return, two methods are commonly 
used. One is the rate necessary to attract capital but 
this test in the case of a particular carrier depends upon 
it s  f i n a n c i a l  s t r u c t u r e .  I f  t h e  c a p i t a l  t e s t  i s  t o  b e  a p ­
plied, it should be done on the basis of a total return 
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necessary to draw capital to the entire industry, otherv/icse 
it becomes an attempt to establish a credit standard based 
upon requirements of interest and dividend payments. It is 
difficult of application oinco funds are normally attracted 
not so much in terms of total return but rather on the ex­
pected earnings of several types of securitievs offered for 
sale by individual roads. However, the rate of return 
thought necessary to attract capital should be determined 
independently of the particular financial stincture or the 
doctrine of a fair return on fair value becomcs nothing more 
than a rate floor for overcapitalized companies and a rate 
ceiling for undercapitalized roads. 
Hie second method is known as the comparative industry 
test.^® 'JSie difficulty of application lies in finding in-
30. "A public utility is eiitltled to such rates as will 
permit it to earn a return on the value of the property 
. . .equal to that generally being made at the same time 
and in the same general part of the country on invest­
ments in other business undertaking which are attended 
by corresponding risks and uncertainties." Bluefleld 
Water Works & Improvement Co, v Public Service Commission 
of \^est Virginia. 262 U.S. 679, 693. 1923. 
dustries which have the same degree of risk. Comparisons 
between regulated utilities and private industrial enter­
prises are of little value since regulation itself affords 
protection against some of the uncertainties inherent in 
private enterprise. Railroads are protected from rate 
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cutting by rival roads, from construction of competing lines, 
and to some extent from agency competition. HOT/ever, all 
risks are not eliminated. Shifts in population and "biisi-
ness, depletion of natural resources, new intense competi­
tion, and invention of new eqixipment and operating techniques, 
all must be reflected in the rute of return. 
To support their position in the Ex Parte 162 proceed­
ings, the carriers submitted statistics shov/ing their rate 
of earnings on depreciated property investment to be 3.76 
per cent for the year 1945. Tliis v/as coraputod on the rail 
rate base of ;|22,600 million. By comparison, the valuation 
established by the Commission amounted to million, 
on Tfl^iich the return would have been 5,16 per cent. Objec­
tions were raised by each party as to the valuation figures 
presented by the other.^^ 
31. Ex Parte 162. Increased Railway Rates, Pares, and 
Char/a:es, 1946. 264 l.C.C. 695, 722. r946. 
ITie Comr::ission pointed out that the return as shown by 
the railroads included a concentration of amortized defense 
projects vaiich had been charged to operating expenses during 
the period Septembei^ to December. They maintained tliat if 
the account wns restated "... to eliminate the effect of 
these charges ... the net operating income . . . would 
have been increased by |!160 million, thus the return on in­
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vestment after depreciation would have been 4.47 per cent 
instead of 3.71 per cent,"^^ Criticissed also was the method 
32. IMd., p. 722 
used by the carriers in stating depreciation. "The recorded 
depreciation by no means approaches the total amount vtiich 
has taken place as observed by ua and found in our numerous 
valuation proceedings under nection 19a of the Act." 
33. Ibid., p. 727 
At the same time, the railv/ays argued that the Commis­
sion had given equal weight to actual cost less depreciation 
and cost of reproduction new less depreciation, plus the 
value of lands, v/orking capital, and an allov/ance for going 
value, in establishing its valuation estimate. They further 
stated that the 1946 rate base included cost of reproduction 
nev/ between the years 1938 and 1936, and failed to consider 
subsequent price increases since then. Also, they,felt that 
the Commission's estimate of working capital was too low, 
and that amortization through the war years was not actual 
depreciation but a tax credit allowed by Federal law. If 
ad j u s t m e n t s  v/ e r e  m a d e  i n  t h e s e  m a t t e r s ,  t h e  c a r r i e r s  a s ­
serted that the valuation figures of both parties v/ould be 
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almost equal, 
34. American Association of Railroads. Railroad Finance. 
Wasiiington, D» C. 1947. p. 39. 
Hov; much, weij^t was given by the Commission to original 
or reproduction cost cannot be accurately detennined, since 
methods of computing valuation are not made public. If re­
production cost was used in part, as olaimcd by the rail­
roads, then the rising price level between the years 193G 
to 1946 should have been reflected in hi^er valuations. 
In view of the reluctance of the Comrnlasion to answer the 
charges of the cai'riers on this point, it might be inferred 
that stich criticisms contained a measure of triith. 
By writing off unwai'rented depreciation against reve­
nues, regulated industries could easily depress what mi^t 
be considered as a reasonable rate of return. It thus 
becomes necessary for Commissions to control depreciation 
accounting. 'Hie controversy over this item in the rate 
case was the result of legislation enacted by Gongi'ess in 
35 1940. Business enterprises who devoted their facilities 
35, Public Law No. 801. 76th Congress, 3d Session. The 
Act amended Sections No. 21 and 124 of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and v/as Icnov/n as the Second Reveme Act of 
1940. For a sumsnary, see Commercial and Financial 
Chronicle. October 19, 1940, p. 2251. 
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to dofonse or wur production v/ere given the privilege of 
depreciating their plant and equipment over a period of 
five years insteod of the usual 15 to 20 years. Linr entia],ly 
the legislation was designed to permit a highei' level of 
operating expenses to he charged against income d'aring the 
v/ar period because of a more intensive use of productive 
facllitiea. In that sense, concentrated amortization of 
plant and equipment as claimed bj' the carriers was actually 
an income tax credit. However, their statement that such 
procedure should not be considered as depreciation seemed 
to Indicate a lack of accounting intelligence. It is under­
standable that the Cormjiission v/as concerned over the amount 
of depreciation estimated by the railroads, yet the carriers 
had the same legal right as that of any other corporation, 
regulated or otherwise, to amortize wartime depreciation 
within the period allowed. 
Appraisal of the decision in terms of the rate of 
return requires certain assumptions. First, because of the 
confusion v/hich wovild result through the use of two valua­
tion estimates, it is suggested that an arbitrary figure 
be used as the rate base. For this purpose, ;j^21 billion 
will be used, fflie amount is selected partly because it is 
impossible to determine with reasonable accuracy the true 
amount of the valuation, and partly because it is assumed 
that there is some merit in the valuation criticisms of 
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each party. 
ITio second Qsaumption concerntj carrier earnings for 
194V. Net rallv;ay operating income for eight niontlis end 
ing in August, total ;;|;510 million, which will be con-
'-^'raffle World, October 11, 1947, p. 1029. 
sidered as SO per cent of the estimated yearly total. 
37. It generally considered that the hipher proportion 
of railroad operating Income is earned during the latter 
half of a year because of the peak seasonal demand for 
transportation, particularly in such industries as agri­
culture, lumbering, and mining. See Ex Parte 162, op. 
ci. t., p. 7.''33, 
If the conclusion la roaaoaably accurate, the net railvrey 
operating income for 1947 should have approxiinuted ^310 
Tivillion, after taxes but before rentals and interent deduc­
tions. Tliin amount does not allow for further increases in 
oporatin/5 expenses nor for additional revenues from rate 
advances. On the assumod rate base of $21 billion, the 
rate of roturn would average 4.05 per cent Industrywide, 
sll^tly below the 4.14 per cent held by the Supreme Court 
38 
to be confiscatory in the Minnesota Rate Cases of 1913, 
38. 230 U.S. 352, 471. 1913 
16S 
and ou'bctantlally belovv the 6 per cent indirectly approved 
by the Court in the Dayton Goose Creek Case of 1924.®^ 
39. 2G3 U..'3. 456. 19&'4. 
VJhcther or not the estimntod rate of return for the 
rnllrot.ds as & v/hole in 1947 could be cot\:rlde«;d "fair" is 
extretuely difficult to dotorrnine. Tl-ie return v/oul,d hove to 
be measured ngninat such factoi-a aa the prevailing interest 
rate, risk, roanagonient efficiency, losses end aurpliis earn­
ings, changes J.n the purchasing power of money, and the 
capital sti'ucture. In addition, there remains the further 
qxiQstion of the wei^^t to bo accorded eech of the above 
factors in arriving at a standard fair return. 
For some time the carriers have pressed for rotea which, 
would give an aggregate return of six per cent over a long-
run period, '.they point to the 3.5 per cent earned over the 
p>:4Gt 25 years as a major cause of their past financial dis­
tress.'^® However, the reader should be war.ned against 
40. Between the years 1922 and 1933, the return never 
reached the 5.75 per cent established by the Commission. 
It climbed to 5 per cent or over in 1925 (5.15)} 1926 
(5.45); 1928 (5.07); and 1929 (5.31 )• Complbd from data 
in Interstate Commerce Commission. Statiatlcs of the 
Railways In the United States, 1945. liable 155, p. 152. 
See also Lbc'lclin, D, P.",' op'. cft7, p. 365. 
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wholehoared support of this proposal for at least two reasons. 
In the first place, does six per cent actually represent a 
"fair return" under all economic conditioiis? 'ilie railroada 
defend thispoint of vlow l)y comparing their earninr,3 to the 
return deeined"falr" in regulated public utilities. Recent 
cases have established 5.5 to 6,5 per cent as a standard, 
41. An allowance of 5.5 per cent has been made for elec­
tric companies selling power under long-terra guaranteed 
earnings contracts, to 6.5 per cent for some natural gas 
companies. In recent gas cases, the Commission fixed 
6 per cent, recognizing that a fair return is not a 
static quantity. 26th Annual Report of the Federal Power 
. Commission, June 3?), 1946. Washington, D. (J., Govt. 
'Print. Off. 1947." pp. 51-52. 
but theoe percentages usually apply to individual companies, 
not to the entire industry. Second, to arrive at an average 
of six per cent over a long period Vifould mean possibly a 
10 per cent industry return in periods of prosperity to 
counter lowered earnings during depression years. An ave­
rage of 10 per cent for the industry in good times would 
result in a much higher percentage individually to the 
stronger roads and less relatively for v/eaker lines. The 
latter would then be in an imtenable position as compared 
v/ith the former when competing for funds on the basis of 
earnings. If railroads were operated under conditions of 
relatively free enterprise, the problem would be resolved 
through natural economic laws. ITie weak lines would either 
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meet competition or cease to operate. But since the phi­
losophy of regulation Is designed to serve economic and 
social objectives, the application of economic principles 
alone v;ill not solve the strong and weak road problem. Ap­
parently weak lines are essential to society, otherwise they 
would long since have been abandoned, 'ilien if the social 
objective is equally as Important as the economic problem 
involved, it is suggested that an adequate return be estab­
lished for strong roads and the weaker lines be subsidized. 
Determination of earnings amounting to six per cent or 
any other figure over a long-run period is essentially a 
problem dependent upon economic conditions. As long as 
private funds must be used to assure adequate railroad 
facilities to the public there must be a return sufficient 
to attract capital, 'llrils is the economic basis for the 
practice of adjusting rates to give the regulated indus­
tries sufficient earnings on property value, and to deny 
the return needed means a loss of important services to the 
public. For the nation to expect good service withoiit ade­
quate Income to the carriers Is fallacious economic reason­
ing. 
In view of the inflation of 1947, it seems reasonable 
that rate advances affording a return higher than the esti­
mated 4.05 per cent but not above the triiditlonal six per 
cent would have been fair, notwithstanding the fact that 
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changing economic conditions over a long run period v/oiild 
make necessary a later adjustment in earnings. Hov/ever, 
let it "be asstimed that a maximum of six per cent la con­
sidered a fair return, ViTiat amount of net rai3.\vay operating 
income would it produce on the rate bases used in the l;ix 
Parte 162 case? On the undepreciated investment of §27,8.93 
million, six per cent would produce -1.1,674 million. On the 
railroad estimate, it vrould amount to ^jsl,388 million. By 
using the assumed rate base of $21 billion, there would 
hnve been a return of i|l,260 raillion, and if the Commission's 
figiires wex'e used, it would be ail,174 million. On the lowest 
estimate, to have earned six per cent the railroads would 
have needed some $300 million more than was anticipated for 
1947, 
Could the national economy in 1947 have afforded the 
rate increases necessary to raise the industry return to 
six pel,-' cent on the lowest valuation base? Relative to the 
year 1929, total operating revenues of Class I railroads in 
1946 increased by 21.4 per cent, while net income after 
taxes declined almost 68 per cent. Using the year 1929 as 
a base, the 1946 net income of all incorporated businesses 
after taxes had increased almost 67 per cent while net 
income of agriculture before taxes shov/ed a gain of 146 
per cent. If compared with the year 1941, railroad operat­
ing revenues in 1946 increased by 42,6 per cent and net 
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income after taxes declined by 42.2 per cent. At the s£irne 
time net corporate income increased by 40.9 per cent and 
4P 
agricultural net income showed a gain of loO per cent. 
42. Revenues and net income of railways, corporations, and 
a/rricultural groups by years, 1929 through 1947, will be 
found in Table Vlil, Appendix B. 
The not income of corporations in 1947 was expected to 
be some '^5 billion higher than that of 1946. IVitliin a year 
this amoTJUit would represent an increase of about 40 per cent. 
It was anticipated that agricultural net income in 1947 
would be some 24 per cent higher than that earned in 1946. 
Enough evidence seems to be available to indicate that the 
nation could have borne the hi^er rate incroases without 
difficulty. 
Railroad Credit 
The credit of any enterprise is its reputation for pro­
viding commodities or services at prices which cover produc­
tion costs and leave an adequate margin for return on in­
vested capital. Its importance lies in the corporate 
record of sustained earning power sufficient to encourage 
investors to contribute capital, with confidence that they 
will be able to withdraw it when desired, and in the hope 
of receiving a satisfactory return in the meantime. 
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As a roBTilt of the business depression and rising compe­
tition of transportation agencies, rail credit sank to a 
critical point during the thirties. Earnings were low or 
non-existent because of traffic and revenue losses. Faced 
v/ith a heavy burden of fixed charges at the same time, most 
of tho carriers could not remain solvent. Financial distress 
seemed to have become a permtuicnt problem until alleviated 
by the national defense program and the Second ViJorld 
The tempo-'-'ury prosperity enjoyed tl-u'ou/^hout the early nine­
teen forties enabled the carriers to present a credit posi­
tion eqiial to or greater than that of the last five years 
43 in the twenties. 
43. Analysis of the thirties v/ill be found in ;rtevens, 
Vi, H. S., op. cit., p. 181. For a complete summary of 
railroad finances, see Dewey, R. L. "The Maintenance of 
Railroad Credit." American PJconomic Rev lev/. Vol, 36, 
No. 2. May, 1946, pp. 461-463. 
Bet\7een the years, 1940 to 1945, net earnings per ."jiilGG 
of capital stock increased fourfold, while rail stocks 
dou.bled in value and tlie appreciation of rail bonds In-
44 cre.ased by approxiicutely 36 per cent. Prewar insolvencies 
44 Ibid. 
numbering 109 fell to 72 at the end of 1945. New capital 
IVl 
InvoBtment v/as more than "billion in the years 1941 and 
4.R 1945, and further Increased "by vf550 rnillion in 1946. Roil 
45. Interstate CoimTierce Coimnisaion. Bureau of Transport 
Ecoaoraics and Statistics. Monthly Comment on Transpor­
tation Statistics, oeptemhei'. 15, 1947, p. 5, 
way net v/.Ticing capital (current assets minus current liabili-
tios)reached a high of ^^S.l "billion on April iSO, 1946, and 
declined 5o vl.B "billion on April 30, 1947. Excluding ina te-
rials and supplies, t?ae 1947 figure was four tiinea that of 
the level of 1941. Incl-'.'.ding thene items iU vms throe times 
4. 46 as great. 
46. I.C.C. Monthly Coinmenton Transportation Statistics. 
July 14, 1947, p. 8. 
During the war period, total debt decreased by mi1,262 
million, in turn reducing total fixed charges "by S85.6 
million RTinually. A further reduction of vGl.O million in 
intei'ost v/ns made during 1946, bringing the over-all annual 
reduction in fixed expenses to l';"146.4 million for the six 
4-7 years. llovrever, in spite of this favorable record, long-
47. yVmerican Association of Railroads, 0£. cit., p. 25. 
term debt as of l^ecember 31, 194(3, still amounted to $9,093 
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million or apx^roxiinately 50per cent of an ';;'18,129 million 
48 total capitalization. 
48. I.C.C. Monthly Comment on Transportation Statistics, 
/aigust "i;-3, 1947, p. 7. 
Railroads v;ill undoubtedly find it necessary to spend 
large sums for plant and equipment improvements in the future. 
Some capital will be needed to cover maintenance deferred 
during the war years while other funds will h-^ve to be used 
to finance additions and bettei'menta, =»hile exact determina­
tion of the total amount cannot be foreseen at present, it 
appears certain that it will amount to hundreds of 7nillions 
of new investment for some years ahead. Financing may prove 
difficult. Because of their strong liquid asset position 
at this time, the carriers probably can provide some of the 
capital, but eventually they will have to resort to public 
money markets or to Government agencies. 
The trend of Increasing operating expenses during 1946 
threatened the credit position of the railroads, but this 
trend was partly offset by the rate increases. Tlie Ex Parte 
162 decision v/as important because it maintained industry 
credit rather than by expanding credit throuf^ increased 
earnings available for newinvestment. Certainly without 
the rate advancer, rail crodit would have sl^imped, and in 
that respect their significance cannot be minimized. As of 
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mid-1947 the credit position of the carriers appeared favor­
able , as did its Immediate outlook. Earnings were covering 
fixed charges 1,6 times, stock and bond values continued to 
shovf strength, and the net working capital appeared strong. 
49. Staiidard & Poor. Industry Surveys. July 5, 1947, 
p. 257. 
Yfjt, v.'hllc fir.('"d charge;?, had been reduced, operating o.^penses 
were still climbing and the redvictinn in fixed expenses was 
cancelled by increases in variable costc. Rising expenses 
combined v/ith dov/n ard prestn.i.res on rates throu^a competition 
forced the industry break-even point to a much higher level 
than formerly. As a result, the railroads today are more 
dependent upon huge voltunes of traffic to maintain their 
credit position. Continued rising costs under a rigidly con­
trolled rate le-*'el can result only in a decline in profit 
per ton-mile. Unless increased rates v/ere /-ranted to com­
pensate for increased costs, it appeared doubtful that earn­
ings in ttie postwar boom years v/ould be much more than those 
of the immediate prev'or period. ''Tiat the outlook for rail 
credit v;ill be in the future is not clear. It v/ill depeiad 
upon such variable factors as the national economic situa­
tion} public policy relating to aid given competing agencies 
of transportation and the diversion of traffic as a result; 
the level of rates deemed adequate; trends in operating 
1V4 
expenses, particularly tlie attitude of labor toward wages 
end working rulo^s; tax programs; ability of the industry 
to further reduce debt and fixed charges; and the policies 
of railway managoment in pioniotinfr operating economies 
v/ifivin and between tra/ispor'tatIon enterprises. 
Summftry 
Adequate transportation service cannot be provided 
unless the railroads are allowed earnings sufficient to 
support their debt str',jctiur-e and to attract a constant flov/ 
of capital. As measured by the rate of return on depreci­
ated investment, the amount considered fair for this purpose 
will vary with changing economic circunistanccs. 
Declining traf.'ic and revenues and increasing operating 
expenses made necessary an evaluation of the railroad rate 
level in 1946. The net income position of the carriers as 
a result of transitional economic changes sliowed a sub­
stantial deterioration v/hen compered with that of tlie previ­
ous year and was slightly lawer than that earned in the 
immediate prewar years. The rate advances granted by the 
Commission were intended to give carriers substantial in­
creases in revenues, but measuro^d against the postwar infla­
tion they seemed Inadequate. V^'hether the rate of re turn 
follov/lng the Fx Parte 162 advances could be'adjudged reason­
able was difficult to determine, and was made more so by 
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the controv^^rT'.y between cGrrlers and coiTimicr.ion over the 
rate base, llie increases tended to support rail credit 
w?ilch had been strengthened diiring the war years. 
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CHAPTER VI 
EX PARTE 162 AI® THE INTERTERKITORIAL 
FREIGHT RATE PROBLEM 
Significant differences in rates not justified by costs 
are a striking charucterlstlc of the rail frei^t rate struc­
ture of the United States, Charges for moving traffic 
throiighout the nation vary considerably between classes of 
freight, commodities, hauls, and regions. This lack of uni­
formity persists despite the efforts of regulatory agencies 
to place rate structures, which grew up in a haphazard man­
ner, on a more scientific basis. Since generally accepted 
criteria for measuring the correctness of rate differences 
do not exist, disagreements between carriers and shippers 
as to methods of rate construction are quite common. This 
is-particularly true in the case of interterrltorlal rate 
differences, which have-probably caused more public contro-
versy than any other problem arising from differences In 
rates. 
The interterrltorlal issues result primarily from the 
traditional geographic division of the nation into three 
general frei^t classification zones, and five major class 
freight-rate territories. Methods of classifying freiglat 
for shipment vary between each of the classification districts, 
while a lack of uniformity has been found in both rate struc-
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turos and rnte levela prevnllinp; in ench of the ter.rltori(;s . 
Because of the territorial differences, it is most difficult 
to construct interterritorlal rate schedules v/hich do not 
favor shippers and receivers of freight in one region over 
those of other areas,^ 
1. Eastern or Official, Souther// and Vi'estern areas of the 
nation have heen recognized as the Glass ifIcation dis­
tricts. Freight-Rate territories are as follov;s; Eastern 
or Official, governed by Official Clans ification; Southern, 
governed by Southern Classificationj VJestern Trunk-Line, 
Southwestern, and Mountain-Pacific Territories, governed 
by A'estern Classification. Geographical descriptions of 
the Classification Districts and the Rate Territories 
are found in Charts 1 and 2, Appendix A, A full sum-nary 
of the Interterritorial Frei^^it Rate Problem of the United 
States Is found in Appendix C. 
For some years Southern and Southwestern interests, led 
by the Southern governors and certain industrial groups, 
have expressed dissatisfaction ovei' territorial rate dif­
ferences and with the technical features of rate construc­
tion. Complaints y/ere especially numerous during the depres­
sion years, when rate level increases tended to make the 
transportation burden heavier in these areas. It vra s alleged 
that rate-making practices protected Eastern producers, 
shippers and markets, from the competition of other regions, 
thus retarding economic activity in the South and Southwest, 
while stimulating it in the East, Initial attempts to 
clarify the issues were made in tliree reports published by 
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the Tennessee VHlley Authority "between the years 19.37 and 
1943.^ In 1939, the Interstate Commerce Coinmisaion in 
2. See Tennessee Valley Authority. Ihe Interterritorial 
Preight Rate Prohlem of the United States, Hoixse Document 
No, 264, 75th Congress, 1st Session, 1937; also by the 
same agency, Supplemental Phases of the Interterritorial 
Freight Rgto Problem of the United State^, House Document 
No, 271, 76th Congress, 1st Session, iSsS; and Re^ional-
ized Freiglit Rates; Barrier to National Productiveness, 
House Document No, 137, 78th Congress, 1st Session^ 1^43. 
handing down its decision in the Southern Governors case 
questioned the bases upon which territorial rate variations 
had previously been justified. 
3. 235 I.C.G. 255. 1939. 
By the end of the thirties, the interterritorial rate 
problem had become a political issue. Hearings on the sub­
ject were held by the Congress; the Transportation Act of 
1940 proscribed undue preference and prejudice in frei^t 
rates as between territories; and the Board of Investiga­
tion and Research undertook an analysis of interterritorial 
rates. The report of this agency recom'-'iended legislation 
by Congress directing the Commission to establish a uniform 
classification of frei^t, and a uniform scale of class 
rates throughout the nation.^ 
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4, Board of Investigation and Research, Report on Inter­
territorial Preip;ht Rates, House Document No, 303, 78th 
Congress, 1st Session. 1943. 
Following the(fecislon in the southern Governors case, 
the Commission announced a general investigation of class 
rates throughout the nation. The decree and subsequent 
order looked forward to equalizing cla:;s rates within and 
betv;een rate territories, but its effectiveness was delayed 
almost two years by opposition of Eastern interests, who 
forced a .Supreme Coiu^'t ruling on the Commission's directive,® 
5, See Interstate Commerce Commission, Dockets No, 28,300 
and No, 28,310. See also Class Rate Investigation, 1939. 
262 I.C.C. 447. 1945. For a further summary of the in-
vestigation, order and litigation, see Appendix C. 
It is not the purpose of this chapter to examine the 
interterritorial problem per se, but rather to attempt to 
appraise Ex Parte 162 in relation to it. The discussion 
opens with an analysis of the revenue effects of the rate 
decision as applied to frei^t-rate territories . It v/ill 
continue with a brief treatment of basic economic changes 
which have occurred v/ithin each territory during and after 
the war, and with the v/artime and early postwar regional 
shifts in the volume of freight traffic. The discussion will 
close with an examination of the rate decision as it pertains 
to possible effects on the future movement of interterritorial 
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traffic. Throu^out the analysis of these topics, reference 
will be made to the Class Rate decision v/heiiever pertinent. 
Territorial Rate Level Increases Under The 
1946 Decision 
It will be recalled tihat nation-wide Interiin rate in­
creases averaging six per cent, with certain exceptions, were 
awarded the carriers in July, 1946, pending further hearlrgs 
on the proposed Ex Parte 162 advances. Under the decision. 
Eastern carriers were given an additional five per cent In 
order to bring their earnings to the levels of carriers op­
erating in other territories. To justify their action, the 
Commission presented financial data for 1945, shown in 
Table VIII. 
Table VIII 
Valuation and Rate of Return of Class I Railroads 
by Districts and Regions for the 
Year 1945 " 
Property ISfet railway Rate of 
valuation operating return 
in 1945 income 
(In millions ) 
District or region^ 
Eastern District 
Pocahontas Region 
Southern Region 
Western District 
$8,052 
943 
2,455 
8,121 
|346 
68 
132 
464 
4.30 
7.21 
5.38 
5.71 
'rfSourcel Ex Parte 162, Increased Rates, i^'ares and Charges, 1946 
264 I.C.C. 727, 728. 1^46: 
1. The v/ords "District or Region" are defined by the Com-
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mission for statistical and accounting purposes. Eastern 
district covers approximately Official Territory with the 
exception of parts of Virginia and West Virginia served 
"by the Cheapeake and Ohio, The Virginian, and the Norfolk 
and -Vestern Railroads. This area is known as Pocahontas 
Region. Southern Region corresponds to P.outhern Terx'itory, 
while iVestern District encompasses Western Classification 
Territory. Because of the interlacing of lines and the 
absence of data permitting apportionments, the Commission 
did not consider practical a division of the Western dis­
trict into the three Prelght-rate territories. 
It should be obscx'ved that the property valuations used 
to asce3;'tain the regional rates of return v/ore those esti­
mated by the Commission, and v/ere sonewhat lower than the 
values carried in the records of the carriers, Compoi'isons;^ 
of regional returns based on Commission estimates v/ith those 
based on carrier valuations are impossible since no terri­
torial valuation figures v/ere presented by the railroads. 
Analysis of the data in Table VIII reveals a lower 
relative rate of return for Eastern carriers than for those 
in the P-outh and V/est, It woitld have required an additional 
V^llV million, equal to 4.7 per cent additional revenue, from 
the same frel^t services performed in 1945, to have brought 
the net railway operating income of Eastern carriers to 
that earned by railroads operating in other areas. The 
percentage was almost Identical with the percentage increases 
allov;ed in the interim proceedings. If the Pocahontas Region 
was excluded from the estimate, some .;jJl08 million, or 4.3 
per cent of the total 1945 freight revenues of ICast ern carriers. 
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would have been required to equalize the level of regional 
earnin:;?s. Federal income taxes on the additional revenues 
have been disregarded. 
Some significance may be attached to the fact that the 
operating ratios of the cnrrier-s follov.'od, in inverse ratio, 
the general pattern of territorial returns. Operating ex­
penses took 70.8 cents of every dollar of operating revenues 
received in 1945 by Eastern carriers as compared with G6,9 
cents in the Pocahontas Region, 71.2 cents in the Southern 
Region, and 68.2 cents in the V/eotern District. 
6. ICx Parte 162. Increased Rates, Pares and Charges, 1946. 
264, I.C.C. 729. 1946, Operating rn'tios of the various 
regions in 1939 were as follows: Eastern, 73 per cent; 
Southern, 73.8 per cent; Western, 75.6 per cent. Inter­
state Commerce Commission. Statistics of the Railv/ays in 
the United States, 1959. Table 165, p. 185. 
At the request of the Commission for further considera­
tion of the proposed rate advances. Class I railroads sub­
mitted estimates of their net railvjay operating income for 
1946, on the basis of the interim increases from July 1 to 
December 31; and for 1947, including continuation of the 
emergency increases only, and also on the basis of the pro­
posed increases under the Ex Parte 162 potition. None of 
the estimates included tax credits. Kates of return were 
based on the valuation estimates used in the interim decision. 
By districts and region, the Income estimates are shovm 
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OQI OV, ' 
7. The actual operating income as reported by the carriers 
for 1946 v.'as us follows; Eastern District;, tGG.6 niilllon, 
v;ith a rate of return of ,33 per cent; Pocahontas •''^erjion, 
v60.2 nilllon, or a rato of return of 6.63 per cent; 
Southern itegion, ^174.3 million, and a rate of return of 
3.05 per cent; and Western District, i24.'7.7 million, with 
a rate of rctux'n of 3.92 per cent. Intel'state Coinmerce 
Coiii:rii33ion, Uurcuu of Transport Economics and ^^tatistics. 
Iilonthly Comment on Transportation Statistics. February 13, 
1^7. p. o~. 
Table IX 
Estimated Net Railway Operating Income and •'•"iate of Return 
for Class I Carriers for 1946 and 1947 by 
Districts and Regions® 
Including Includinf; Including 
interim interim proposed 
District or region increases increases incx-oaseK 
(In millions) 
Eastern District 42.7 Dof. $43.1 t'lS5.8 
Value—1^8.052 million 
Rato of return (per ct) .53 2.06 
Pocahontas Region 62.5 46.1 59.1 
Value--|;943 million 
Rate of return (per ct) 6.62 4.89 6.26 
Southern Region 7.12 22.3 98.5 
Value—'g2,4:5'o million 
Rate of return (per ct) 2.9 .91 4.01 
Western District 210.2 16.5 269.1 
Value--(|i8,121 million 
Rate of retui-n (per ct) 2.59 .20 3.31 
a 
Source; Ex Parte 162. Increased Rates, Faros and 
Charges. 1946. 266 I.C.G. 548. 13^6. 
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Estlmater, for the 7e:)r 194G, when based upon the interlra 
InoreapeR ordered July 1, ngain F.l'Owod the llRistorn rate of 
rotitrn to be lower than all other regions and districta, al-
thoiigh the additional five per cent previously authorized 
•\vcis In cffoot. Furthcr-^OT'O, tlio rlotii tended to saow that 
the dov;av;:!rd trend in Enfitcrn ^'-cvenues •.7ould not bo revorned 
in 194V, even though the car-pi err; rocolvcd tVie full nrao\.int 
of fcho proposed ndvoncer. It wa b obvio^is thnt the interim 
lncrca!;es r-, lone could, not stave off the financial dlriartcr 
facing the carriern in all regions for the year of 1947. 
Lnrgoly because of tho opti-mates, rateo on nrtiolos under 
the corr-i.odlty clnsaification of Manufo cturen and iilsscel-
laneous, e:<cept as othervd£3e specified; class rates, rntoK 
on less-carload, and any-quantity traffic v.-ere increased by 
25 per cent in Official Territory, 22,5 per cent between 
Official and other territories, and 20 per cent v/ithin and 
between other territories.^ Carriers operating in the 
Eastern area v/ere to have thei^:' aggregate rate levels in-
8, Ex Parte 162, £p, clt., p. G16. 
crenped on the average by opr.ir oximatol;/ 22 »4 pc-ir cent as 
compared with an aggregate average Increase of 17.4 per 
cent ttiroughout the remainder of the notion. Hie incrf ases 
granted under '.he "Rx Parte 162 decision were to supersede 
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and be In lieu of the increases awarded in the interim re­
port . 
Hov; effective V/:HS the decision in providing the needed 
finances to the carriers of the several territories? Statis­
tical data relative to the regional i'et\irns are severely 
limited. Havever, it is por.r.ible to point oiit certain trends 
through territorial comparisons of totsl oporating revenues, 
net rsrllwny operating income before Pedertnl taxes, net in­
come, and percentage of not Income by districts to total 
net income, 'Ihe data are presented in Table X and cover the 
first six months of 1947, as compared with siinilnr periods 
in the years 1941 and 1946* 
Iv'arked improvement in the levels of total operating 
revenues, net railway operating revenues before Federal taxes, 
and net income to total income, 1947 over 1946, is shown by 
those figures in the table. However, the perceiitages of 
regional net income to total net income in 1047 over 1941 
reveals astonishing territorial differentials, when the East 
is compared with the South and IVest. Railroads in the Eastern 
District and Pocahontas Region combined accounted for only 
35,3 per cent of the total net income for six months of 
1947, as compared v/ith 67,9 per cent of the total net for 
1941, vi'estern District roads, on the other hand. Increased 
their proportion of net income from 12.5 per cent in 1941 
to 49 per cent in 1947, while a decline from 19.6 per cent 
in 1941 to 15.7 per cent in 1947 was noted for the carriero. 
IBG 
Tolole X 
Pinaiicial Retiirns to Class I Railroads by Diotriota and 
Regions First 6 Months of 1947 as Compared v/lth 6 Months of 
the Years 1946 and 1941^ "" 
District 
or 
region 
Total 
operat­
ing 
revenue 
I5et roil-
v/ay oper-
otlng in­
come 
before 
taxes-^ 
Per cent 
col. 2 
of 
col, 1 
:iet Incomo^ 
Amotint 
(In Till 11 ions ) 
Per cent 
of 
total 
(In millions) 
EaBtorn district 
and Pocahontas 
Rcglon^ 
1941 ^^1,220.3 ^i;271.8 
1946 1,564.8 20.4 
1947 1,919.2 210.6 
Southern Region 
1941 328.2 76.0 
1946 536.6 37.1 
1947 598,8 78.2 
22.3 
1.3 
11.0 
23.2 
6.9 
13.1 
117.7 
d 54.0 
72.0 
33.9 
1.6 
32.0 
67.9 
35.3 
19.6 
15.7 
.'/estern District 
1941 875.9 153.8 
1946 1,476.2 109.6 
1947 1,631.9 223.5 
United States 
1941 2,424.4 501.6 
1946 3,577.6 167.1 
1947 4,149.9 512.3 
17.6 
7.4 
13.7 
20.7 
4.7 
12.3 
21.6 
35.0 
100.0 
173.2 
d 20.6 
204.0 
12.5 
49.0 
100.0 
100.0 
'""Source: Interstate Goimnerce Comiiiission, Bureau of Trans­
port Economics and .Statistics, i.tonthly Coimaent 
on Transportation Statistics. August 13, 1947. 
p. 2 
d. Deficit 
1. Before B'edoral Income Taxes only, » 
2. After Federal Income Taxes and all charges. 
3. Because of the merger of the Chesapeake and Ohio and 
Pore Marquette railroads, effective for accoantlrig purposes 
OS of June 1, 1947, the figures for the Pocahontas region 
and IDastern district wert-* combined In the table to 
preserve cornpai'isons. 
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In Southern region. Further support of these trencJs rnay be 
shown hy a regional analysis of Income available for fixed 
charges and the oi)erating ratios for the first five months 
of 1947, Ihe ratio of income available for fixed and con­
tingent charges to such ctiarges was 1.19 in the Eastern 
District as compai'ed with 8.82 in the Pocahontas Region, 
2.21 In the Southern Region, and 2.11 in the Western Dis­
trict. Tho operating ratio of 82 per cent for the Eastern 
District v/as the hi^^est of all areas, Pocahontas Region 
showed a ratio of 66.7 per cent. Southern Region, 77,6 per 
cent, while the ratio on the Western District v« s 78.1 per 
cent. The United States average wras 78.1 per cent.® 
9. Ibid., p. 6. 
It seems logical now to expand this investigation from 
six months to a full year, and the revenues for the first 
half of 1947 will be considered as 40 per cent of the yearly 
total. On that basis, a projection of the net railway op-
orating income for Eastern District and Pocahontas Region 
combined would amount to §526,5 million, wliich when measured 
against the valuation estimates of the Commission v/ould 
result in a rate of return of about 5.83 per cent. On the 
surface, this percentage seems highly satisfactory, but the 
inclusion of Pocahontas returns, which normally approximate 
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three times those of the Eastern Difitrict, would natixrally 
mean a somewhat higher overall percentage than would renult 
if the tv/o regions v;ere separated. Southern Region should 
have a yearly not operating Income of vBO million and a 
return of 3,26 per cent, while VJestern District ^ould shov/ 
',?585,5 million of net operating income with a return of 6,88 
per cent. These estimates are presented on the further as­
sumption of no increases in operating expenses during the 
latter half of 1947. 
What conclusions may be drawn from the analysis? All 
signs seem to point to a continued unfavorable trend in the 
financial position of the Eastern carriers when compared 
with those in the South and Viest, Even with the additional 
increases granted under Ex Parte 162, the relative level of 
return showed little if any Improvement whether measured 
under the actual operations for the first half of the year, 
or based upon the estimated income accruing ovea? the full 
year. A sligjit downward trend may bo noted in the estimated 
rate of return to the Southern carriers. It seems reasonable 
to conclude, therefore, that the Ex Parte 162 advances made 
little or no improvement in the rate of return to the 
Eastern carriers, althou;^ accurate measurement of the 
income levels is obsciired through the combination of Eastern 
Territory with the Pocahontas Region. Southern carriers 
have apparently maintiiined their financial position reason­
ably well, while the advances apnear to have increased the 
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relative financial position of the V/estern roads. 
Regional Shifts in Marketing Activity, 
1939-1946 
Territorial financial dovelopmentr. discussed in the 
preceding section are closely asrocifited with regional changes 
in marketing activity over a period of time. Pince the 
demand for railroad service is derived from the demand for 
producer and conpamer goodr;, it is logical at this point to 
investigate structural changes which have occurred during 
the past few years in the regional markets. P.hifting ac­
tivity in markets is of slQiiflcant importance to the car­
riers serving them, for the level of carrier finances depends 
largely upon expansion or contraction of the markets creat­
ing the demand for their services. 
The discussion to follow is in tlie nature of a broad 
survey rathexr than a detailed evaliiation of marketing trends. 
For that reason, only a minintum amount of statistical data 
will be included. It will attempt to measure the movement 
of economic activity throughout the various regions by com­
paring variations betv;een the years of 19o9 and 1946 in such 
economic factors as the flow of national income, copulation 
changes, shifts in manufacturing activity, factory employ­
ment, ai:id per capital income changes. 
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Regional changos In the f1ow of national income 
Probably the most fundamental chango in rhfirketlnE ac­
tivity during the period took place in bhe distribution of 
national income. On a relative basis, the Wer.t and r-'outh 
were accounting for larger shares of the total in 1946 than 
in 1939, while the New England and the Mid-Atlantic regions 
of Official Territory were holding smaller shares. ITie third 
important area of the East, that of the Great Lakes region, 
shov^ed no significant change. The exact change in the re­
gional proportions of national income is presentsd to Table XI. 
It 3ho\v s, first, how regional income gains differed on a 
percentage basis from 1939 to 194-6; then each region's share 
of the total income in 1939 and 1946; and finally the per­
centage change in the regional sliare of total income between 
the years 1939 and 1946. 
'Ilio data indicate that Mountain-Pacific territory ranked 
firr.t in the percentage increase in the distribution of 
national income, and in the percentage change in the regional 
share of total income. Routhorn, Southwestern, and Western 
Truiik-Line territories followed in that order, while Official 
Territory was last. It is important to note that the first 
four regions shaved percentage increases above the national 
average, while all three regions of Official Territory fell 
below the average. 
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Table XI 
Changes in the Distribution of National Income by Re 
gions - 1939 to 1946'''" 
Per cent 
increase 
1939-1946 
Per cent of Per cent 
U, S» total change 
1939 1946 1939-—194G 
Par -'est 
Mid-AtIan tic 
Groat Lakef5 
195 
110 
138 
156 
150 
178 
109 
140 
10.50 12.91 23.0 
31.26 27.38 d 12.4 
22.23 22.08 d 0.7 
6.85 7.32 6.9 
9.97 10.39 4.2 
11.08 12.84 15.9 
0.11 7.08 d 12.7 
Southv/oat 
Parp West 
Southeast 
Kew England 
United States 100.00 100.00 
'""Source; Business V>'eek. Decombor 20, 1947. p. 64. 
d. Decline 
1. The regions as shown in the table may be trnnnl-ntod 
into the five majoi' freight rate territories as follows; 
Par V'^est will approximate Mountain-Pacific territory; 
!New England, Mid-Atl?nitic, and Great Lakes regions com­
pose Eastern or Official Territory; Southeast Region ap­
proximates Southfirn Territory; Farm West is s Imilar to 
Western Trunk-Line Territory; while Southwestern Region 
approximates Southwestern Territory. 
Ihiree principal reasons might be suggested for regional 
shifts in Income. First, there was either a broad expansion 
or decline in all types of income sources; second, there 
v/ere extraordinary expansions or contractions of a particular 
income-producing field of activity; third, gains or losses 
res'ilted from a type of income which bulks large in the 
total income of the region. 'ilie Mountain-Pacific region is 
a prime example of the first typo of change. There, income 
expanded in every d-lrection and so did its diare of the 
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nstionfal iaoomo,^*^ u'eBtcrrL Trunk-Line territory, an example 
10. iiee Department of Commerce. Survey of Current jii'.iBi-
nfts£. April, 194.'5; December, 1943; April, 1944; I'toy, 
T^45j December, 1947. 
of the rsecond typo of incoruc change, won Kiost of its grains 
from agricultural activity, 'Che region had a large share of 
farm income in 1959, but since then, agricultural incomo 
roso more rapidly than from other soiirces, and thus its 
share expanded. The Southern and Southwestern regions il-
lixstar'ato the third type of incorae change. Both made sub­
stantial gains from Government income, nnd somewhat smallcir 
gains from factory payrolls. But both lost ground in farm 
rovenuon mainly because the national level of agricultural 
income rose much more thaa that from other soui-'ces. 'within 
Official Territory, the Great Lakes area lost some of its 
share of the national Income from factory payrolls. Govern­
ment wages, and miscellaneous income, Lorses in these sources 
were balanced by ipins in farm nnd property income. The 
highest percentage of its Income in both 1939 and 1946 was 
derived from Industry. Ne\7 England showed losses in income 
from all sources, v/hile the I,lid-Atlantic region hold its 
position in income from manufacturing, but lost ground in the 
other categories. 
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Popiilatlon Changes "by re^^ions 
For the pant century there hns boon a gradual westward 
raoveinent of population. This vvns somewhat (accelerated during 
find following the v/ar as new work opportunities opened the 
way for extensive migration of people. In addition, the 
nationnl populntion increased by 7.3 per cent over the period. 
The cYiiei' gainer of population from other areas between 1939 
and 1946 vjaa the Mouatain-Pacific Territory with an increase 
of o4 per cent. Soiithv/estcrn Territory ranked second with 
a gain of 4 per cent, and in third place was Southern TcitI-
tory ivith o per cent. The pooiilation of Official Territory 
remained relatively stable, v/hile the .^estorn Trunk-'Line Ter-
11 
ritory was the only region to shovi population losses. Much 
11. See Bureau of the Census. Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1944--194-5. Washington, D. C., Govt. Print. 
Off. 1946. p. "9. From the same agency. Special I-eport 
Service, p. 46, No. 3, 1940 throu^ 1940. 1946. See 
"nlso United States News. March 28, 1947. p. 62. 
of the'shifting of population occurred within frei^t-rate 
terriboriea, rather than b'^tween them, thus a territorial 
analysis tends to obscure marked intraterritorial changes. 
However, the availiable data show that Mountain-Pacific ter­
ritory had the greatest i-elative increase in population as 
a result of the migration from other areas, and in its per­
centage share of th;^ increased popixlation of the nation. 
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V/hother or not the giiins made will be permanent is im­
possible to doterralno at pT'enont. Future Icvclr. of national 
ecoaomic activity v/ill undoubtedly have nu important influ­
ence on the continued trend, of population movements. On 
this point, one atudy which attempted to measure the permanency 
of population moving from rural to urban areas shouD. d bo njsn-
tioned.^" 'I'he conclusions seo7ned to indicate that motst of 
12. Jiauser, Phillip M. Population Shifts and Income 
Ch a nr." en . IJarketing Series Jfo. 52, Ameriwm Managanent 
"Ars ociation, Wow ^ork, 19<5:5. 
the prosperous centers of war industries had a fair chanco 
of retaining a good poi-'tion of thoir immigrants. Inquii'ies 
among war workers showed that a large proportion intended 
to remain at the location of their war v;ork, or to look for 
jobs in the surrounding area rather than retUfn to native 
states. 0"n].ess these intentions are changed by a major de­
pression, it would appear that the temporary gains in popu­
lation iiiade tlaroughout the various regions, particularly 
those in the Mountain-Pacific Territory, have a reasonably 
good chance of becoming permanent. 
Regional shifts in. mam;tfacturing activity 
It is evident that the building of new enterprises or 
the expansion of old manufacturing plants in any frcigli'l^~ 
rate territory will tend to affect favorably the development 
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of traffic within that region. For thir, reason, railron.ds 
h.'Jve always been interonted in promoting industrial develop­
ment in the arejis throur^T Avhlch they operate-. Long-ter:.: 
trends in manufacturin^q; as mc:a raired hy the vulue of meinu-
factia'f'K, shovi' a gradual shiftiiag from the liocst to the 'Ost 
audSouth. For instance, betv/oen the years 1869 tmd 19L'j9, 
the portion of the nation's manufacturing outpiit in Official 
lerritory decreased from 82.8 per cent to 67.8 per cent. 
At the aume; time the share of Southern 'i'erritory increaBed 
from 5 to 10 per cent; '.'ieGtear'n Trunk-Line, from 8.8 to 9,9 
per cent; Southv/estcrn, from 1 to 4,5 per cent; and Moutain-
Pacific, f.rom 2.4 to 7,8 per cent.13 Over the name period. 
13. CJ.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Manufactures, 
1959. 'Washington, D. C., Govt. Print. Off. iMcT. p. 41. 
similar trends v;ere found in the proportion of wage earners 
in fiHch territory. 'Jim number in Official Territory declined 
from 82.2 per cent of the total in 1869 to 69 per cent of 
the total in 1939. Southern Territory showed increocDs from 
6.5 to 14 per cent; Sonthivostern, 2 to 3 per cent; while 
Mountain-Pacific had increases from 1.7 to G per cent. No 
appreciable change took place in V/estern Trunlc-Line Terri-
14 tory. 
14. "IMd., p. 45. 
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i'.xpaiiRion -and new constructlo!) of v/ar- facilities throuf^-
out the nrttion were ^jreatly accelcrated during the firr.t 
yoavs-i of the v.'ar. Approxiinatoly !39 lOfjr cent of all v/nr 
facilities uubhoriaed hetweon Jul;/ 1, 1940 and I.;ay .'51, 1944, 
were located in .-'estern Trunk-Line Territory, 11 per cent 
in S01.1 thv;e K torn, find 1'? per cent in i.loi.mtn in-Pac if ic 'i'crri-
1 n tory. i\iew plonts at nev/ locationf; wore e relatively low 
Ifi. Xnterntate Cormiierce Oominiasion. 13ixi'oai,i of Transport 
Eoofiomics and. Statistics. ROf-;ional Shifts in the foat-
war Traffic of Ola as I I-Iai Iwa ya. St a t emen t No. 46 22. 
-iashlngton, D. C. Sep'-felnbor, 1946. p. 31. 
percentage of total war facility invectmont in Official Ter­
ritory, slightly hipjior in Soa.thc;rn, and conniderably liigher 
in othor regions. On the other hand. Official Tcro'-itory had 
n relatively higher percentage of expansion of old plants 
as compared v/ith other areas. 
16. Ibid. See Table 10, p. 53. 
In terms of the 1939 distribution of capital investment, 
an investigption of the regional wartime percentage increase 
f investment in mamifacturing facilities reveals interest­
ing ti'^onds. Rankin^-js of the several territories when baaed 
on expenditnros for plant and equipment, and on the basis 
of value added by manufact\tres, from 1939 to 1943 are shown 
in Table XII . 
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Table XII 
Territorial KanklnQC! Acc.ordlnr;; to the V.'artlmo Percont Qfi;e In-
cj.-'ease of Investment In I'ianufacturlng Facilities 
1939-1943-^ 
Ten-1 tori ea 
Expenditures 
I'or plant & 
equipment 
(% p;ain) 
Soutlavjcatern 
Hoiint a in-Pa ci f i c 
Vies ter n i'runk-Jjine 
Official 
Southern 
75.9 
68.2 
54.1 
34.1 
34.0 
Territories 
V aliie 
added 
{% gain) 
a o u thwe s to r n 137.5 
i/i ount a i n - Pn c i f ic G 5.7 
Vies tern Truiilc-
Llne 46,5 
Sovithern 34,8 
Official 33.3 
"Source: Interstate Gonimoj-'ce Cojmnisaion. Bureau of Trans­
port Econotnica and Statistics. Regional .'Ihifts 
in the Postwar Tyaffio of Class I Railv.'aya. 
Statement i)o, 4622. H'a skiing ton, D. C. September 
1946. p, 50, 
Tne array shov/ing the percentage gain from vjar facilities 
gives the sane order for the first three territorieE. south­
ern territory ranica above Official v/hen value added, is the 
I; 'nia of distributing capital investment, but belov v/hen ex­
penditures fo.r plant and eqiilpment is used. Tiie percentage 
difference, hov;ever, is very slight. ''Vhiip. t' e f^ains for 
Southv/cstrr and I;;oiuit ain-Pac if ic territories v/ere ina I; rr ia l ly  
hifdier v/hen value added was used itistead of plant and equip­
ment expenditures as a basis of distributing facllitles, 
their order was unchanged. 
r.stirnatea have beon made v/hich show that conversion of 
wartime facilities to poacetiine purposes will leave Official 
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Territory at a disadvantage v/hen compared to its porcentage 
of manufacturing facilities in the prewar period.".Ttiile 
17. Ibid. See Table 22, p. 51. See also Tobies 10, 21, 
156, A-1 in Appendix A, and B-4 in Appendix B. 
the rate of conversion in Official Territory was expected 
to be higher than that of other regions, the sliare of Of­
ficial in total manufacturing facilities was estimated to 
be relatively lov/er as compared with its prewar position. 
The conclusions drawn from these estimates pointed to the 
probability that the territories v;est of the Mississippi 
River would stand to gain in conversion of v/ar plants at the 
expense of the Eastern area of the nation. 
Closely paralleling the trend of manufacturing was that 
of the distribution of manufacturing emplo;/ment, Ihe ter­
ritorial positions between the years 1959 and 1945 are pre­
sented in Table XIII. 
The sharpest percentage gain in factory employment 
dviring the war years came in Mountain-Pacific Territory. 
Southwestern Territory ranked second, and was follov/ed by 
V/estern Trunk-Line, Official, and Southern territories. 
Southwestern, v/hich ranlced first in percentage increases 
and probable peacetime utilization of manufacturing plants, 
v/as displaced by Mountain-Pacific Territory when percentage 
increases in employment were studied. This may be partly 
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Table XIII 
E'mployment in Hnnufacturlng Industries by Territories 
1939 - 1945'=' 
Year U.S. 
Western 
Offi- Trunk- South- Mountain 
cial Southern Line western Pacific 
(Per cent of United States totals) 
1939 100.0 70,5 11,5 8.0 3,6 6,4 
1940 100.0 70,8 11,1 7.9 3,6 6,6 
1941 100.0 71.0 10.9 7,7 3.4 7.0 
1942 100,0 68.6 10.7 8.2 3.7 8.8 
1943 100.0 66.7 10,1 8,9 4.2 10.1 
1944 100.0 66.4 10.2 9.0 4.5 9.9 
1945 100,0 67,0 10.4 9.4 4.3 8.9 
(Per cent increase 1945 over 1939) 
35.8 29,2 22.9 58.5 60.8 89.6 
'"•"Source; Bureau of Labor Statistics. Employees in Manu-
facturinK Industries. Moy 1, 1'946. 
explained by the small increase in employment necessary to 
operate the expanded chemical industries of the Southv/estern 
area. However, employment increased in this region by a 
larger percentage than in all territories other than that 
of Mountain-Pacific, 
Regional changes in per capita income 
Quantitatively, the markets of the nation grew substan­
tially between the years 1939 and 1946, due primarily to the 
increases in population and Income. However, markets differ 
in quality as well as quantity, and perhaps the best indicator 
of a quality market is the level of per capita income In that 
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market. Over the years of this century, the percentage 
spread among regions has been narrowing. In 1929, for 
insttmce, the range was from !|348 in the Southern '•i'ex-'rito]:y, 
to ,;;:954 in the Eastei'n region, v/hich represented a spread 
of 41 to 140 per cent of the national average that year. 
In 1946 the per capita incoino in the Southern region v/as 
$822 as compared with $1,369 in the East, or a variation 
18 
of 69 to 123 per cent of the national average. Between 
18. Business eek, op. clt., p. 69, 
the years 1939 and 1946, the national average rone from ap­
proximately !;j525 to ;;i;i,200, a gain of about 129 per cent. 
The relative rank of the territories in 1939 on the basis 
of per capita income was Official, Mountain-Pacific, Viestern 
Trunk-Line, Southwestern, and Southern. By 1946 the order 
remained unchanged.^® In terms of the percentage increase 
19, Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics, op.cit., 
p. 133. See also United States Hews, October 10, 1947, 
p. 19. 
in per capita income over the period the rankingE shown above 
v/ere almost reversed. Western Trunk-Line Territory v/ith a 
gain of 156 per cent stood first, followed by Southern, 149 
per cent; Southwestern, 131 per cent; Mountain-Pacific, 120 
,?01 
per cent; nnd Official, 91 per cent.^® There appears to bc3 
20. Ibid. 
little doubt that rogionQl differences in the trends of per 
capita income arc being narrowed considerably. 
Enouf^^i data has been presented to indicate the trend 
tovnsrd a broadening of the regional markets outside of those 
located in Official 'i'eri'ltory. Changes in tho distribution 
of the national income, nccGleration of the trend toward a 
more urban population, industrial decentralxKation, and nar­
rowing of the per capita regional Income levels all contributed 
tov/ard the movement. Official Territory v/ill undoubted remain 
as the most imiportant marketing area of the nation for many 
years to come, but in terms of future expansion it would seem 
that this region would no longer hold the tight economic grip 
on marksting activity that it did in prewar years. The 
future market is shaping up as a broader market, having lost 
many of its interloi' boundary lines. A continued period of 
relative national prosperity should give territories other 
than Official much more opportunity to exploit gains made 
throu^^i the war years. However, it should be emjiiasiaed that 
the increases in business activity made in the V'/eat and South 
were based on the relative positions held before tho v/ar, 
and such gains may be difficult to hold if a business reces­
sion materializes in the near future. 
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Trends in Territorial Prolght Traffic, 1939-1946 
Because of tlae close relationship between marketing ac­
tivity and rail transportation services, the shifting struc­
ture of regional markets should have brought about clanges 
in the regional distribution of froi^t traffic. In viev/ 
of the regional marketing trends already presented, it seems 
logical to direct some attention toward a study of the traf­
fic movement v/ithln and between freight-rate territories 
before the territorial effects of the Ex Parte 162 decision 
are antilyzed, 
A precise investigation of regional traffic flows re­
quired infoarmation givliX^ both origin and destination of 
shipments. The best soiirce of data for this purpose are 
vmybills, but these are beyond the reach of the average stu­
dent of transportation. Lack of available material has 
forced the v/riter to rely heavily upon a few waybill studies 
published by the Commission between the years, 1939 and 1947, 
21 
as a basis for the discussion to follow. 
21. Viaybill samples were taken for the years 1939, 1942, 
1944, 1946, and 1947. The most thorough of these was 
the first, since it represented terminated carload traf­
fic for one day of each month during the year. '.Che 1942 
sample Included all waybills for 2 days. May 27 and Sep­
tember 23. Thi^t taken in 1944 represented only 2 per 
cent of the traffic moving on January 12. In 1946, way­
bills for only the month of llovember were studied. The 
1947 sample represented a 1 per cent coverage of the 
traffic moving for the first quarter of the yonr. The 
first four studies gave information regarding the intra-
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territorial and Intorterritorlal moveinenta, but the last 
showed movements only by contnodity groups, with no break­
down of territorial traffic. Thus,it is impossible to 
use the 1947 sample for comparisons of territorial nature 
as against those made in the preceding years. V/ith the 
exception of the 1959 sample, a question could be raised 
concerning the extent to which the others adequately re­
presented the traffic moving for the full year. These 
limitations should be kept in mind throughout the dis-
cusnion. See Interstate Commerce Commission, Bureau of 
Transport Economics and Statistics. Rof;ional Shifts in 
Traffic of Class I Railv/aya. Statement "Ko. 
September 1946, Cha pt e r "13? j a nd by the same agency. 
Monthly Gomvfient on Transportation Statistics. March 11, 
1^^47J i)pn6-l^; and January'l4^""1948, pp. TO-12, 
A study of freif'Jat distribution by territories shows a 
much higher percentage terminated in the region originating 
it than is distributed to other terrlto3?ie t;. Because of the 
nature of the fx-elght carri::d during the war years, the per"-
centage moving intraterrltoriolly shov/ed a decided decline 
througliout all territories, v/ith a corresponding increase 
in the percentage which moved between territories. However, 
the 1946 sample, inadequate as it might have been, showed 
these ti-'onds to have reversed. Percentages giving the intru-
territorial distribution by regions are shown in Table XIV. 
An outstanding characteristic of the above data is the 
hi^i percentage of traffic termlmted in Official Territory 
throughout the four years. Even though war traffic bro\ight 
decreases in the intraterritorial movement between the yeair-s 
1939 and 1944, Official had a highex" percentage than did all 
:thor regions, 'The 1946 study revealed higher percentages 
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Table XI'v 
Percentage of Intraterrltorlal Carload Freight ^'^ovemont by 
Territories for the Yeors 1939, 1942, 1944, and 1946'"'' 
Territories 1939 1942 1944 1946 
Official 92.2 86.0 83.2 91.6 
Southern 64.3 56.0 60.2 68.5 
u'ectern Trunk-Line 69.6 73.3 58.1 75.3 
Southwe stern 66.9 49.6 42.1 73.9 
M 0 un t a in - Pa c i f i c 70.9 70.0 74.7 57.6 
""Source; Figures for the years 1939, 1942, and 1944 are 
taken from Bureati of Transport Economies and 
Statistics. Regional Shifts in the Post 'Var 
Traffic of Class I Railmiys, Statement Wo. 4622. 
September, 1046. Table 71, p. 143. The percent­
ages for 1946 were t£iken from Burouu of Transport 
Economics and Statistics. Monthly Comment on 
Transportation Statistics. March 11, 1947, 
pp. 16-18. 
of traffic moving within all regions than in 1939, v/lth the 
exception of the Mountain-Pacific Territory. The trend 
from 1939 to 1944 in this area suggested that a greater 
growth in its postwar economy could be expected following 
the war, but the percentage decline in the intraterritorial 
traffic shovm by the 1946 sample apparently reversed the 
trend, '."fliile it is aoraev/hat difficult to explain the declin­
ing percentage in this area between the years 1944 and 1946, 
the Increase in intertex'ritorial movement mi^^t posi ibly 
represent a hlf^i seasonal peak movement of manufactured 
articles into the region from other territories, \jithout 
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adequate inforinatlon on the subject, hov/evcr, it is danger­
ous to generalize further. 
In berms of the relative importonce of intratorritorial 
traffic in all territories, the 1947 sample can he uued to 
compare percentagos against those of 1959. In the latter 
year, 73 pel" cent of all ti-affic ii'ved throughout the nation 
v/aa intraterritorial, v/rile in 1947 this percentai^e had in-
op 
crearjed to 85 per cent. " Despite the fact tliat the 1947 
22. The 19o9 percentage represents an avej-age of the ter­
ritorial percentages as shovm in Table XIV, I'he percent­
ages for 1947 are taken from Bureau of T-annport ^'^conomics 
•"Mid Statistics. Monthly Comment on Tranaportntion Stat­
istics . January 14, 1948, pp. "T9-^2. 
study represented only a fraction of the traffic moving in 
the 3 month period, it does tend to support the conclusions 
made previously in regard to the regional expansion of mar­
keting activity. It seems apparent that the tei-ritories are 
utilizing theii'' expanded economic facilities in broader ter­
ritorial peacetime markets than had been possible in prewar 
yearn. 
Two additional approaches to the problem of traffic 
distribution remain for consideration. One analyzes the 
percentage increases and the distribution of percentage J.n--
creaaes of freight originating in the various regions or dis­
tricts b tv/een the years 1939 and 1943. 'ihese are condensed 
by region or district instead of freight-rate territory In 
Table XV. 
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Table XV 
Increases in Freight Tomi Orifyinated by Regions nnd. Dislricts 
for the Period between 1939 and 1946'"' 
Region Anim. Manu. All 
or and Por - and car­
district Agrlc, pr od. Mines ests mis c. load 
frt. 
(In percentages) 
Eastern District 45.0 33.3 41.2 94.2 46.6 32.5 
Pocahontas Region 39.3 29.2 104.0 76.6 32.0 
Southern Region 63.4 41.0 63.0 91.1 88.8 59.9 
IVestern District 70.1 48.4 50.8 52.8 66.9 45.8 
United States 
Totals 54.4 30.8 46.2 82.6 69.7 42.2 
Por cent Distribution of Total Increase 
1946 over 1939 
Eastern District 14.5 20.9 40.4 9.5 45.1 36.9 
Pocahontas Region 0.4 0.1 12.2 3.5 3.3 7.1 
Southern Region 11.0 8.0 18.4 42.1 16.3 13.5 
V/estern District 74.1 71.0 29.0 44.9 35.3 37.5 
U.S. Totals 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
•"'Source: Compiled from the xnterstate Commerce Commission, 
BuroBu of Statistics J Freight Commodity Stntia-
tics for Class I T?ailv;ny!3 of the United States. 
1939. Statement> 4br(Jb. 19467 Statement " 
Wo, 47100. 
The data shovj the geographical distribution of increases 
in railroad tons originated, carload freight only, 1946 as 
compared with 1959. 'ihe upper half of the table presents 
the percentage Increase in eachregion and district for each 
of the commodity groups. The lov/or half lodclices the 
changes by shov/ing hov; the increased tonnage of each com­
modity group was distributed among the varioiis regions and 
district. 
r-^ 07 
'ilie Southern Rerrlon showed the greatest relative tonnage 
incrntise with respect to oil freight over tlie period, but 
ranked first only in HanufnctM.res and Miscellaneous. /estern 
District \v£is second in total tonnage increase but rfinked 
first in Products of Agriculture, Animals and Products, and 
Products of Minos, v/hile the Pocahontas Region was first in 
ProdTicts of Porosts. Only Southern Region and '."estern Dis­
trict were above the United Ftates average increase in all 
carload freif^t tonnage, /is indicated in the lower half of 
the table, I'.'ertorn District accounted for 37.5 per cent of 
the total increase In all fx'oight. Eastern District was 
second with 36.9 per cent, followed by the Southern Region 
with 18.5 per cent. Hie Eastern !Oi;.'trlct f-howed the largest 
proportion of the total increase in Manufactures and in 
Products of Mines, v/hlle 'Vestf'rn District v/as first in all 
other groups. 
The second approach measures the traffic density by dis­
trict or region for the first 10 months of 1947 as compared 
with similar periods of 1946 and 1941. This infomatlon is 
presented in Table XVI, 
For the carriers as, a whole traffic density increased 
by 10.7 per cent in the year 1947 over 194G, and was higher 
by 39.8 per cent, 1947 over 1941. 'Ihe largest territorial 
increase v/as found in the 'Vestern Dlsti-3ct, w}iose 54«6 per 
Qent v/ns moro than twice as great as the percentage increase 
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'i'alDlo XVI 
Wot. Ton-Lliles Per i/iile of Rend per i'^ay by Disbrictr^ or Reg­
ions, for the B'lrst 10 Monthn of 1947 as Goinptired '.ith 
1946 and 1941-='^ 
^ of"increase 
Average nvirabor 1947 1947 
Region or over over 
district r9"4T~ 1946 1941 1946 1941 
Eastern "District 12,389 11,389 9,810 8.8 26.3 
Pocahontas Region 25,742 19,494 21,426 21.0 10.3 
ooi.) ti'iorn Region 0,903 6,541 4,771 5.5 44.7 
Vies tern DisLrict 6,307 5,646 4,079 11.7 54.6 
United, ^ -^tates 8,450 7,634 G,043 10.7 39«8 
Source; Bureau of Trancport rcononiicG and Statistics. 
Monthly CoiTL'Tient on Trannporta tion 8tn tl-ntica , 
'January 14, 1948", p. 6-7. 
in the Eastern District. However, traffic density v;as much 
greater in the East than in the South and l"est duria^ all 
three pe3;'iods, reaching its Jiighest level in the Pocahontas 
Region, due to the nature of the traffic of this area. Proh-
ably the most significant point to he noted from the data is 
the relative expanfiion which took place in both Southern 
Region and Western District In the period between 1941 and 
1947. 
It seejns apparent that the pattern of freight distri­
bution from 1939 to 1946 followed closely the terrltccflal 
expansion of business activity dnring these years. Hie 
relative increase in the porcontage of traffic moving within 
each of the territories diirlng t3io period seems to indicate 
a relatively higgler level of industrial activity v/lthin each 
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region in 1947 as coinpnrcil with 1959, An v/ss indicrj.tod in 
the (iisour'niori of regional marketing changes, the Eaat seems 
to have hnd a smaller incresso in the expander! traffic of 
the nutioii than cither the South or :?opt, 
Probahle Effects of the Rate Level Increases 
on the FtituT c I'loverrient of 
Regional Frei/j^t, Traffic 
Two different types of rate advances v/ere permitted 
under the Ex Parte 162 decision. One, in the nature of a 
uniform horizontal increase, raised the "basic level of rates 
Toy 25 per cent within Official Territory; hj 2?.5 per cent 
between Official and other territories; and by 20 per cent 
within and between other territories. It applied generally 
to all commodities which moved under the classification of 
Manufactures and Miscellaneous, to class rates, and to less-
carload traffic. Although granted primarily for the purpose 
of inc3:-easing carrier revenues, the percentage variations 
within and between regions tended to narrow territorial rate 
differences in both class and average rate levels. 
Tlio second type of advance permitted flat Increases re-
gGi'd3.esR of distance, or percentage increases limited to a 
maximum amount. These v/ere made for the purpose of maintain­
ing, insofar as possible, market relationships existing before 
the decision. Horizontal percentage increases on industrial 
f^io 
and cojiiinoditlos hnvo the effect, \7horo thoy nre 
apolJ-cable, of enhancing the compotitivQ position of indus­
tries and farm producers located closer to markets and rav/ 
raatf^rinls so.ircea. Thus, the producer or rhipper v/ho must 
meet competition offered hy rjirnilar frroupH loc.bod nerirer 
eatabliGhed markets suffer a disadvantage. However, hy grant­
ing flat increases on certain com iodities, it is possible to 
sustain t>ie nroduction and "larketinc: position of the corane-
titors, whether located far from or close to marketing centers. 
A few examples taken fro^n the Fx Parte 168 case inay illus-
trr.te the point. 
Grain v/a s Given a 15 per cent increase, but the ndva^ices 
were accorajoanied by a :iiandate from the Coinmissior! to restore 
rate relationships, market, gatewa;/- and 'lort oqualisntionr, 
existing before the decision. Increases on citrus fruits 
and fresh fruits and vegetables were limited to a maximum 
of 1'6 cents per 100 pounds in order to preserve the existing 
differontials bet\7een Florida, Texas, and the Pacific Coast 
products marketed in the northeastern states. On sugar, the 
Increase was limited to 10 cents per 100 pound maximum to 
pi'eservG existing relationships between southern cane and 
western beet sugar industries. Iron and steel took a s'iK.OO 
per ton maximum in the hope of protecting producers who 
normally supply distant markets. On canned foods a maximum 
of 13 cents per 100 pounds maintained the position Of the 
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western canners, just as the similar increase on fresh fruits 
preserved the position of the western grov;ers. 
Attempts were also made to protect the rela tiontiilps 
hetv/een different commodities which compete each v/ith the 
other. The outstanding example was the action taken on alumi­
num and steel, 'i'he rate on aluminum and hauxite ore tos in­
creased by 12 cents per ton, and a similar increase was al­
lowed on iron ore shipments, except for rates in the Lake 
Superior region on which no incre'ise was granted. Pig iron 
took a 20 per cent increase subject to a Troximtun of 10 cents 
per 100 pounds and an indential increase was permitted on 
pig aluminum. On finished products, the Commission departed 
from identity of treatment by allowing 20 per cent, or a 
maximum of 10 cents per 100 pounds on iron and steel, as 
against, an increase of 20 per cent, or a maximum of 12 cents 
per 100 pounds for aluminum sheet. The 20 per cent maximum 
Increase on wool maintained its competitive position with 
cotton. Identical increaties were allowed for both anthracite 
Oct 
and bituminous coal, which compete to some extent.^ 
23. Ex Parte 162, cit., Appendix 1. 
Most, if not all of the items mentioned in the foregoing 
discussion move on commodity rates. Since there is no ac­
curate basis for a territorial comparison of cominodity rate 
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levela, It is not posni'ble to measure the Increases for 
their effect on expansion or contraction of territorial 
commodity rate differences. It seems obvious that rate ad­
vances when made to preserve existing market re lo tionfhips 
\Y0uld tend at the same time to maintain territorial dif­
ferentials established previous to the decision. It is quite 
porjslble that the increases may have expanded or reduced 
co3:nmodlty freight rate differences within and between ter­
ritories, but without an adequate index of average commodity 
rate levels, it is impossible to make a reasonable appraisal 
of the effects of the decision as it applied to this tyjDe 
of traffic.^^ 
24. "It is practically impossible to determine average 
cominodity-rate levels, either within territories or be­
tween territories .... Coitunodity rates are special 
rates which apply on a designated commodity or group of 
comiaodities. llhey are lower than the class rates they 
supersede, and some commodity rates are lower than the 
lowest of class rates. Competition plays a larger role 
in determining commodity than class rates. Studies made 
by the i?oard of Investigation and Research shov; that, on 
many important commodities, the rates are higher in the 
South and iVost than in Official Territory. Examples 
are salt, planter, plasterboard, livestock, packinghaise 
products, cotton textiles, and cement. On some commodi­
ties, hov/ever, inclvidlng brick and clay products, ferti­
lizer materials, lime, logs, pulpv/ood, and scrap iron, 
the Board found the rate levels to be lower In the P-outh 
or Y/est, chiefly in the South, than in Official Terri­
tory. On coke and sugar, the rates in Official and 
Southern territories are approximately equal." See 
Dewey, R. L. "Interterritorial Prel,^t Rate Differences 
in Relation to the Regionallzation of Industry." Journal 
of Farm Economics. May, 1945, p. 439. 
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'ITie situ.ation, however, is somewhat different if the 
analysis in narrowed to those corn:-:oditiea which corried the 
strai^it horizontal percentage increases, particularly those 
of Manufactures and thoso moving on class rates. It v/as in 
the hope of reducing the territorial differences in theclass 
rate structure that the Corflmission undertook its inventiga-
tion in 1939, Ihe decision made in 1945 increased the class 
rate level within Official Territory by 10 pe3:> cent. Between 
Official md other territories, and v/ithin and between other 
territories, class rates wore to be reduced by 10 pei' cent. 
No class rate adjustment was made within Mountain-Pncific 
Territory, nor between it and other territories. 
Because of the widespread interest in the class rate 
proceedings, it is proposed to combine it with the uniform 
percentage increases under the Jix Parte 162 decision for a 
study of their effects on the future movement of regional 
frei^t traffic. It is conceded that the volume of traffic 
represented by these comjuodities amounts only to small portion 
of the total traffic volume of the nation, and furthermore 
than an appraisal of the decisions as tliey affect a relatively 
small number of articles will have limited application. 
Hov/ever, in spite of these qualifications, the proposed 
analysis should have value. Previous sections of this chap­
ter presented trends which showed a need for a greater devel­
opment of manufacturing enterprises in the South and 1^'est, 
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Since the products of this type of nctlvity generally fall 
within the class if icationr. suggested for analysis, the ef­
fects of the decisions on possible future development of 
regional traffic should be of significant interest. Each 
rate territory v/ill be considered separately in the discus­
sion which follows. 
Official '•i-'erritory 
Among all territorios, the East Is devoted far more 
than the others to industrial pursuits. It is an intensely 
developed area on any accoutit. In the year 1946 the region 
had 49.3 per cent of the national population and 52 per cent 
of the gainfully employed dv;elling in,' only 16 per cent of 
the land area of the nation. In the same year, the terri­
tory accounted for 56.4 per cent of the national incomc, and 
52.5 per cent of all retail sales.In 1939, 60 per cent 
25, Business IVeek, o?, cit., p. 68. 
of the total employment in manafacturlng Industries was con­
centrated in the region v/hile its industries accounted for 
76 per cent of the nation's manufacturing industry. In 
sharp contr!;st to its high por.ition In the proportiomte 
share of the national income, population, and oinplo-.'7ment, 
Official Territory in 1939 hud only 29 per cent of the total 
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uop'Tlation engaged in extractive occupations which produce 
26 foods and raw materials. 
26. Census of Manufacturer, 1939. op. cit. 
'iTie high level of ocononic activity experienced throu,3h-
out the. nation during tlio wr.r and early postwar years in­
creased the level of manufacturing in all territories. Ab­
solute amounts of materials moving to nil regions thus tended 
to increase, but the proportion of prodiicts made in Official 
Teri''itory and shipped to other territories depended pai^tly 
on the degree to v/hich products i.uanufactured in other regions 
Virere offered locally at lower pricea. 'Ilie F.aat, at present, 
has the highest degree of industrialization and the largest 
percentage of intraterritorlal traffic movement, bit it is 
probable that the percentage of intraterritorial traffic 
within other territories v/ill increase if the degree of in­
dustrialization approaches that of Official 'i'erritory. 
Both decisions had the effect of raising the bnsic levels 
of r rites within the Ka stern area. In the short-run, the;^ 
should probably rcduce the vnlurae of intraterritorial traffic 
in the East. Hoivever, in the long run, the reduction in 
class rates and the relative lower level of rates under 
Ex Parte 162 within other territories, and between Official 
and other territories, could offset a decline in the intra-
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territorial volume of traffic within Official Territory, hy 
stimulating traffic betv/een thin area and other territories. 
Of importance may be the competitive advantage gained 
by other regions In the markets within Official Territory as 
a result of the decisions. For instances, assume that Boston 
(Official) was competing with Mew Orleans (r.outhwestern) for 
a market in Chicago (Official). Rates from Boston to Chicago 
v/ould be Increased by 10 and 25 per cent respectively, while 
rates from i^ev/ Orleans to Chicago would be increased approxi-
P7 
mately by only 10 per cent, Ilov/ever, if both corninunities 
27, '.Hie example assumes little or no rate differences be­
tween territories, on the typo of traffic under considera­
tion. If the basic rate before the decision from both 
points of origin wns ;;;i5.00 to Chicago, the Boston rate 
would be increased to oG.Sl, while the Hew Orleans rate 
would bo increased to .„i5.40. 
competed for business in Omaha (-'estern Trunk-Line), the 
cibies originating the traffic v/ould have their rates re­
duced by 10 per cent \.mdcv the class rate decision, Tha 
Boston traffic vfould have its rates increased by 28,5 per 
cent, while that of >Jew Orleans would be raised by 20 per 
cent under the Fx Parte 162 decision. The net effect wo'ild 
be to give the traffic fr^om Southwestern a 2.5 per cent ad­
vantage over that originating in Official and destined to 
vVestorn-Trunk-Line Territory. 
The class rate reduction of 10 per cent between terri-
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topics and the relatively lov/er Intertojritorial level of 
rater, between terrltorieG other than Official could make 
poasihle the exploitiition of resources nt prenent dormant 
in other regions, llieno new developments could conceivably 
Involve resource^,! which would not coi^ipote r;ith thone of 
other areas. Llarlccts f ^r oonraimor r!tnp3.erj in tho ."^'oi-ith and 
South.v;ost, and for housing la the South, Southwest, and 
est, could bo developed v;lthout damage to existing produc­
tion in Official or nny other territory. In fact, it is 
pof3t5ible thnt the long-run effects of the decisions could 
result to the advantage of producers and raarkets in Official 
Territory. ]?uture developme;.!ts of this type would require 
sliipmont of coTirioditles now produced excliicivoly in the East 
to other regions, thuti stimulating interterritorial trrsffic 
between OfficiMl and othor territories, and resulting in a 
higher level of intra territorial traffic within Official 
Territory. 
Pran the point of vi. e\v of interterritorial ti-isffic, 
the decisions soem to indicate a short-run relative increase 
in the cost oT production in Official I'ex-ritory and a sli{^it 
shift of production from Official to other territories. 
Long-run effects, as poiiitod out above, which increase pro­
duction and marketing activity v/ithin other regions, could 
have tho effect of stimulating business activity within 
Official Territory. Thus the marketing lootential of othor 
territories could in the long-run reverse the short-run 
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of feet in Official Territory "by the future stimulation of 
botli territorial and intertcrritorial traffic movements. 
It Eeema reasonable to conclude that a future expansion 
of manufactiirinpj throughout the nation would lend to an in­
crease in the po]:'centngcs of prodvicts i^ovinfr on the rates 
under considoration. In the past. Official Territory has 
had favorable rates as compared with other territories, and 
it may be said that this advtmtnge has bren one factor con­
tributing to the industrial position held by this rep;ion. 
'Ihe granting of equ.-'lity of treatment throug^i the tv;o decis­
ions would tend to increase the number of tons of freight 
originating in territories other than Official. T]-ieso reg­
ions mlglat expect a higher level of activity not only in 
manufactui'ing but also in the service industries, tlie latter 
stimalatod throiigh the Increases in inaniifncturing em pi o men t. 
Filmier future levels of manufacturing activity throughout 
the other regions will not neceasai'lly mean a corresponding 
decrease in mamifaoturlng throughout Official Territory. 
Southern Territory 
The relatively high gains experienced by th.ia region 
in the distribution of national income and per capita income 
during the war should have the effect of increasing the 
genei-al level of consumption in the postw r period. Increas­
ing needs of the territory alone would probably result in 
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the development of larger nutm'bers of manufacturing enter­
prises than was possible in prev;ar years, A trend of this 
kind could readily be accelerated by the rate decisions 
since both, tended to decrease the rate levels as compared 
"vVlth those of Jfflcial '-i-'errit or.y. Insofar as the decisions 
make poanible an increase in manufacturing activity, they 
should also tend to increase both the intraterritorial aiid 
interterritorial traffic of the region. 
The rate levels in effect previous to ther.c rate pro­
ceedings favored the movement of traffic from North toSouth. 
A trend toward equalization of rate levels between terri­
tories would tend to caixse an increase in all ipments in the 
reverse direction, ^issuiiiing othei'- locational factors to be 
equal as between the South and i^orth, it is p- asible that 
products of liejivy industry origini^ting in the north vjo\ild 
probably move at a greater volume into the ;;iouth. Thus the 
short-run effect of the decision should tend to increase the 
interterritorial traffic of the region. At the sar.ie time 
high postwar consimption in ttie ;i0'ath would no doubt require 
capacity operations of the manufactviring industries in that 
area J roBuiting in higlier levels of intraterritor ial traffic. 
In the long-run, these conditions would tend to hold, Uiider 
rate level equalization surpliis inunufactured products v/ould 
find more favorable raurketa in the f'lovth, vjhile the continued 
demand for loca 11 y manufactiired goods v;ould keep Intraterri-
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torlal moveinonts at a relatively high peak. Hov/evcr, the 
magnitude of the xncreaBed traffic flow both within the 
territory and oetween it and other teri'ltorios would depend 
upon the future level of notional econoiTiic ootivity, partic­
ularly in the diatri'outItni of riiA bioaal income. On the other 
hand, contractlnG 'butsinetjs activity would tend to decrease 
traffic moving Interterritorlally nore than it vrould diminish 
lntrat(5r.cltorlal moveraentn. The reason Ilea in the len.' er 
number of nmall jvuinufocturin^i enberprises v/hich would prob­
ably locate ill this rtjglon, r. future doprosalon v/ould not 
tend to f?top their /-rov/tb, especially xmen their products 
could be dintributed to customers in nearby cornimnItles . 
'/ontern Trun':-Line Territory 
.ihile ^^fficial Tcrritoj-y may bo conaiderod the indus­
trial domain of the nation, this region occupies a siiailar 
position v/ibh respect to agricultural activity. liowevoi', 
it if. pofnlble that an iaca'oaae in inanufacturin/5 vd.ll take 
place in t!i.e future. This devolopraent would uepead Ito^gely 
upon the success in converting wartime facilities to peace­
time pui'si-iits. Since the region ranked first in ijercentage 
increase in per- capita Income during the v/ar yea r.'5, it seems 
that a larcei' market for manufactured products wovJ-d exist 
in the futiire. 
Both short-run a-id long-a:^i.n effects of the decisions 
look toward a lowering of class rates v/ithin '-'estern Trunk-
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Lino 'i'erritory, and between it and other territories, 'ilie 
avera[';0 level of rates between this region and Official 
Territory would al r'O tend to be lower. It seems reasonable 
to Infer th.'.!t traffic between V.'et-tern 'i'runlc-Llne and other 
territories should be stimulated by the decisions. As in 
the case of Southern Territory, any development tov/ard a high 
future level of industrialization would tend in both short-rim 
and long-run periods to increase the levels of interterri-
torial and intraterritorial traffic. This v/ould be particu­
larly true of nhipments of fully or semi-processed materials 
from Official Territory, and for agricultural products between 
this region and other territories. The market potential for 
goods manufactured within the territory v/ill probably be 
greater for some time than can be met by local industries. 
Any increase in manufactiiring then would seem to find a ready 
market within the region, thus tending in the long-run to 
increase I'-vels of intra territorial traffic. 
It is probable that a depression v/ould decrease the 
interterritorial traffic much more than that moving v/ithin 
the territory. Prices on ai^iricultural products tend to fall 
at a faster rate than those on manufactured articles du.ring 
a depression. The fact that levels on frei^^t rates do not 
fall as rapidly as prices would tend to decrease the inter­
territorial traffic of the region. In addition to rate 
rigidity, lower income from lov/er prices would depress the 
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demand for manufactijired pi^oducta moving from Officlul to 
Viostern 'i'runk-Line '-i'Drritory. "'.liilo both Icvoln of traffic 
would sliov/ r elntive docreasen, that moving intf)rtorritorially 
would probably decline at o faster rate than the traffic of 
an intruterritorial nature, 
SoTi.tln^vG ntorn Terri tory 
Perce-:tagevrlse, more capital wf.a iiivor-tod in indxiRtrios 
in thi.s terv-itory during the war than In anj other region. 
It led all oUiors) also in the estimatGd poacetime use of its 
war fncilitiop . In gainn in factory employment, t2ie terri -
tory ranted second, while it v/as tliird in increases in popu­
lation and per capita income. 
It 1E somewhat difficult to estimate the relative devel-
opinont of inti-'aterrltorial and Intertex'ritorial Lraffic In 
this territory as a result of the rate decisions, 'i'he reduc­
tion in class rates v;lthi;a th.e area as well as betweeiT it 
and other territories should help in retaining the gains made 
during the war years. For slmllai'' reasons to those presented 
for Southern aad •.-e.'stern Ti^unk-Llne territories, the short-
run effects should increase Intorterritorial traffic, but 
on a long-run basis, both interterritorial and intraterri-
torial traffic should tend to increase to hlglier levels than 
those or prewar years. It is possible that the moat important 
effect of the rate adjustmo-ata ill be their influence on 
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the decisions of induatrlen to locate in. the i.-^gion, other 
locational fnctorf? a ssiamod to bo equal. 
Became of their proximity, I.iountnin-Pacific and .'eotern 
Trunk-Line territories ai'e the hest cuntomt^s for the products 
of thin region. .''ny <Trov;th in inanufnctaring in any of the 
three territories would tend in the long-run to lncrca.';e the 
interterritorial traffic hotv/oen them, as v/ell as Increasing 
the valiie of Intraterritorial traffic V\rithin each region, 
A depression should decroane ijiterterritorial traffic more 
than intraterritorial traffic. 
idounta in-Pac ific 'I'erritor?,'" 
Generally, thin region gained more than any other ter­
ritory as a rejnj.lt of the vjtjr. It ranked first in popnl.'ition 
incrca.'^es, in percentage increases in the distribution of 
national income, and shared first place vi/lth the y.id-Atlantic 
area of Official Territory for the highest percentages of 
Income ^rroups. It was second to Southwestern Territory in 
the percentage increase in manufaoturing activity, and made 
the gr^atoat percentage gain in factory er:iplo;/ment. Un­
questionably the area represents one of the rlohei^t poten­
tial markets of the nation. 
In resjject to the class rate decision, the territory 
0 c c i.\p 1 e s • a ra the r i qu e po 11 i on. Rate a d j ust m on t s \ih i ch 
took place within and "between other regions did not apply 
to the ai^ea, Ha'/ever, the Ex Parte 163 decision resultofl 
in ii similftr "oerccratfigo incronre within the territory M?id 
beLv/een it and othor herritoriofs jut th.ar, of P-ovithern, '"^outh-
v/estern, a?\d V;''ei.-!torn-'i'rimk-Iiine territoirlos. The net ef fect 
of the 'locifions woiO d indic^^tn th;it the rate lovel of 
Mountp.in-Pacific Territory wo-'ld be increased ovr thone of 
the othor except Official, by approxiinntely 10 per cent. 
The lack of a uniform clj.isa-i.Tite structure in the territory 
maker? difficult on analysis of the possible fTi.tu.re direction 
of traffic. Putting into effect t>!e proposed nev/ clti.":fii-
ficationn v/ill undoubtedly affect the volume of traffic lietween 
Mounted in-Pacific Territory and other regions but there apoears 
to be no available datn upon which to bane estimates. 
Furthor expansion of rnarlceting activity should in the 
sliort-run stimulate both intra territorial and intei-'territorial 
traffic. From the point of view of production and marketing 
activities the area compared to othor regions reprepenta a 
relatively younger section of the nation. It v;ill need a 
r-.ubstantial period of tirne to develop ita full economic 
potential, ''.ven though the rate levels nre higher- than those 
of the surrounding territories, it is possible that hif^ 
marketing possibilities v/ould overcome this handicap. On 
the other hand, lower production costs as a result of lowered 
rate levels in nearby regions could cause a migration of cap­
ital and labor from this area. Under such circuMistances, 
the long-run ef.focts v/oiild tend to reduce the vo3.ume of in-
traterritorial traffic at a greater rate than that of inter-
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territorial traffic. A bus I net-, do.pre fusion v/oixLd !JOcr:i to 
have a similar effect. 
Summary 
By the end of 1945, the rate of return to Kactern rail­
roads hnd fallen "below the levels of thoao operating in the 
Co'ith and './est. For this reason in 1946 higher intrutorri-
torial nnd intertorritorial rate increases were nnthopiaed 
for the Eastern District thnn for other regions. Ihe advances, 
intejided to Increase railroad oarnin/?;s, when hori.'iontnl per­
centage increases, tended to narrov; territorial iilffcr^ences 
in class and average rate levels, f.ieosured against tlie fi­
nancial record of the first half of 1947, or ostlm.'itod earn­
ings for the entij?e year, the rate increase ,Tranted in Tx 
Parte 162 did not seem to improve tne Kn stern retu.rn as v;ell 
as that of other territories. 
A basic I'ause of the territorial financial developments 
during and tifter the war could be ascribed to siiLfting rer^-
ional marketing activity which arose through expansion of 
the national economy during the emergency. On a regional 
basis, the war increased manufacturing, accelerated the trends 
toward a westward movement of population nnd urbanization, 
increased total population, and tended to eciimLize better tlie 
national Income distribution. Intense postwar demand regis­
tering through regional markets was probably the inuTietiiahe 
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reatJO:'. Tor tlie voli.im.e of IrLtrc-terrltorltil tri;fflc 
v;ithln fiio sovnral terrltoj-'ics, ca regional nocdr; v/lirrevnr 
possiblo v;rr'0 filled by local production. llie trend tnv;f'rd 
a broad, nlng of national markets should moan futm'o expnii-
sion in tho volume of intorter ritorinl frei^ijit traffic. 
Both i'nrtc 162 and the Clanp! Kate dociplons v/ould neem 
to acoelerate thin tendoncy. 
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CHAPTER VII 
EX PARTE 162 AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON PRODUCERS, 
CONSUMERS, AND AGENCIES COMPETITIVE WITH THE RAILROADS 
This chapter presents some of the possible effects of 
the railroad rate level decision upon producers, consumers, 
and competitive transportation agencies. At the beginning 
it should be pointed out that sources of information upon 
these topics are extremely limited even though each is vi­
tally important in an investigation of this nature. One of 
the reasons for the paucity of data is the complicated struc­
ture of a modern industrial economy. To portray clearly the 
effects of railway rate changes \ipon the commerce of the 
nation, it would be necessary to trace the resulting changes 
in thousands of commodity prices, Piirthermore, it would be 
essential to evaluate the many different competitive ad­
justments which follow a changing price policy of so im­
portant an economic fmction as transportation. 
Another reason which makes difficult the task of tracing 
the effects of rail rate Increases lies in the complexities 
involved in the pricing problem of the railroads. Here will 
be found one of the most complex masses of economic data in 
existence. Rail carriers have in effect over half a million 
different rate tariffs, each containing from one to thousands 
of individual prices. The total number of pages in these 
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publications would probably rim into the millions while the 
number of individual rates would be well into the hundreds 
of inllllona. In view of these obstacles, it is perhaps un-
derstable why producers, shippers, and independent observers 
have had little success in analyzing the effects of rate 
changes upon individual marketing relationships. Possibly 
the trend toward rate stability will in the future partially 
ease the problem, but until such uniformity is achieved it 
appears xinlikely that rate level changes as they effect 
economic relationships can be measured with a substantial 
degree of conciseness. However, the planned chaos which 
seemingly describes the present railroad structure does not 
destroy the contention that the effects of changes in the 
prices of railroad service upon the flow of commerce are of 
far-reaching significance to all economic groups. 
It is for these reasons that the three topics outlined 
above have been combined, with a full realization that a 
general treatment of each leaves many more loose ends un­
treated than would be true if a more comprehensive investi­
gation was possible. In the space assigned only tentative 
limited conclusions can be drawn. 
The major part of the chapter will be devoted to a dis­
cussion of the Ex Parte 162 decision and its possible effects 
upon comiTiodlty production and distribution. Following an 
Introductory statement regarding the importance of freight 
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rates on agriculture aa compared with those on manufacturing, 
this section attempts to analyze the results of frei^t rate 
increases in four broad fields of interest. The first of 
these considers the general area of agricultural products. 
The second relates to products of forests, while the third 
applies to products of mines, with specific attention directed 
to the coal industry. Effects of rate advances upon the mar­
keting of steel is the last area examined. Possible con­
sumer reaction to increased freight cliarges, and the effect 
upon railroad ccnipetition will be discussed in the final 
sections of the chapter. 
The Importance of Prei^t Rates in 
AgricTiltural Industries as Compared with 
Those in Manufacturing Industries 
In the case of manufactured products, the expenses of 
transportation are normally recovered throu^ additions to 
fabrication costs and by passing them along to the consumap 
in the form of market prices. It is not difficult for 
manufacturers to follow this practice, for they can \isi«lly 
forecast their costs with some degree of accuracy and plan 
their production accordingly. But conditions in agriculture 
are different. Farmers seldom know their costs v/ith the 
precision found in manufacturing. Standardization of ex­
penses, possible in industry, is impossible on the farm. 
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Tlie industrial entrepreneur uses certain quantities of mate­
rial which when combined with the necessary amounts of capital 
and labor v/ill tend to produce under usual working conditions 
a determinate amount of tiie finished product. In agriculture, 
however, it is difficult to know just what constitutes normal 
or usual costs. Seasonal or yearly climatic changes, insects, 
and diseases among crops and cattle, make it impossible for 
the farmer to know vihat it costs to produce a bushel of wheat, 
or a steer, or hog. 
Thus the allocation of expenses in farm production can 
at best only be estimated. But even if costs were accurately 
determined, they do not furnish a basis upon which prices 
may be established. In the first place, production and dis­
tribution costs differ among different producers and often 
vary to a considerable degree among different regions. Second, 
there are few organi25ations among farmers comparable to those 
of industrial producers which enable them to fix a price for 
a commodity and adhere to it. Probably of more Importance 
is the fact that agricultural production is hi^ly seasonal 
while that of manufacturing is reasonably continuous. It is 
possible for industrial producers to curtail production vsben 
prices decline and In this manner exercise some control over 
supply until a more normal price is restored. But when pro­
duction on the farm is completed there is relatively little 
individual control over the supply of the commodity. Under 
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this condition, if a large supply is available at q given 
market so that under given demand conditions the price as 
a result is lowered, a high freig^tit rate leaves the farmer 
with a reduced income. Price in this respect is considered 
under short-run marketing conditions. Over a longer period, 
if one type of production gives ptr-omise of hi^er profits, 
the farmer would prohiibly shift from the less profitable 
crop to the products which bMng higher prices, upon which 
the transportation burden would normally be lower. 
Aa a producer, then, the farmer receives a market price 
from which transportation charges are deducted or ore paid 
separately. As a consumer, he buys his equipment and sup­
plies at a price which includes whatever transportation costs 
the manufacturer or dealer are able to pass along to him. 
In other words, he sells in a market t\hich is hi ^ ly conpe-
-titive at a price vihich is practically impossible to influ­
ence by his own actions, while he buys in a market subject 
to many of the forces of monopolistic competition. Under 
these circumstances it is not suprlsing to find that the 
level of frei^it rates governing the movanent of his commod­
ities is of vital concern to the farmer. Of course freight 
rates are important to the manufacturer in determining prices 
at which his products will be sold to the consumer, and on 
the average freight rates are considerably hi^er on manu­
factured goods than on farm products. But because it is 
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possible to add freight costs to expenses of processing, the 
transportation burden may be felt less by the manufacturer 
than the farm producer. 
This conclusion is based upon a study of the percentage 
of freight charges to market prices of farm products, and 
to the net sales of incorporated businesses from 1930 to 1945, 
as presented in Table XVII, Through the nineteen thirties, 
freight cbargea as a pea?centage of farm market prices were 
higher than those of incorporated businesses. Hov/ever, during 
the war years, the situation was reversed. Over the entire 
period the percentage of frei^t charges to farm market prices 
averaged .058 per cent, vaiile that to non-farm prices was .049 
per cent. 
The Ex Parte 162 Decision as it Affected Agriculture 
The rail carriers requested that rates be increased by 
25 per cent on agricultural commodities, except for cotton 
in bales, wool, fruits, and vegetables. Similar increases 
were proposed on the excepted products but these were to be 
subject to maxima of 10 cents per 100 pounds on cotton ship­
ments and 15 cents on fruits and vegetables. Such limita­
tions were designed to preserve commercial relationships and 
to secure the greatest possible volume of traffic in compe­
tition with other transportation agencies. To justify their 
requests, the railways asserted that products of agriculture 
as a whole were not bearing their full share of transportation 
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Table XVII 
Cash Farm Prices Received by Farmers, Net Sales of Tncorpor 
ated Business, Prel^t Charges on Farm and Non-Farm Ship­
ments, and Percentages of Freight Charges to Farm and Non-
Farm Market Prices for the Years, 1930-1945''^ 
PercenFage~of^ 
freight chgs. 
to 
Net Farm Non-
Farm . Frt. sales 2 Frei^t prices farm 
Year prices chf^s . business charges" price! 
(Millions) (Th ,ous) (Millions) 
1950 $9,021 .'1675 # 66,216 <13,307 .074 .050 
1951 6,371 600 57,316 2,538 .094 .044 
1952 4,743 480 46,041 1,864 .101 .045 
1953 5,314 450 43,517 1,942 .095 .045 
1954 6,334 448 48,938 2,079 .077 .042 
1935 7,086 430 53,141 2,301 .061 .044 
1936 8,367 472 59,105 2,786 .056 .048 
1937 8,850 484 63,350 2,874 .057 .045 
1938 7,686 527 60,967 2,286 .068 .038 
1939 7,877 517 63,816 2,693 .066 .042 
1940 8,343 510 68,275 2,996 .061 .044 
1941 11,157 587 78,271 3,851 .052 .049 
1942 15,316 709 86,713 5,242 .046 .060 
1943 19,342 903 97,102 5,993 .047 .061 
1944 20,238 913 105,054 6,125 .045 .059 
1945 20,781 985 115,799 5,685 .043 .051 
'"Source; U, S. Department of Agriculture, A^,ricultural 
Statistics, 1946. Washington, B.C., Govt. Print. 
6ff. 1947*. p, 552, U. S, Departmoit of Commerce, 
National Income Supplement toSurvey of Current 
^8inos"3^ ^uly, 1947. Washington, D, C., Govt. 
Print, Off. p. 21, Interstate Coimnerce Commis­
sion, Bureau of Transport Economics and Stntistics. 
Frei^t Comtno^ty Statistics for the Years Ending 
December 51, 1939 and December 51, 1946. Wash-
irigton, D. C., Statements No, 40,100 and 47,100. 
1. Does not include Government subsidy payments. 
2. Net sales to private consumers only. 
5. Includes frei^t revenues from Products of Mines, 
Products of Forests, Manufactures and Miscellaneous, 
and Less-carload Traffic. 
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charges, since the existing ratoj; had been established dur­
ing depression years and were on a lov/er level than they 
otherv/ise would have been. The Secretary of Agriculture 
opposed these arguments by emphasizing that the proposed 
advances were disproportionate to those requested on other 
coinrnodities, particularly iron, steel, and cocl.^ Shipping 
1, Ex Parte 162, Increased Railway Rates, Pares and 
Charges, 1946. 266 I.C.C. 537, 570,573,578. 1536. 
groups and numerous State authorities called for increases 
to amount to only 50 per cent of those granted on general 
traffic. They took issue with carrier contentions that the 
volume of agricultural traffic In 1947 would be lovssar than 
in 1946, and suggested that the Increases be limited to those 
2 
authorized in the interim report of July 1, 1946. 
2. Ibid., p. 555. Forecasts of the railroads as to prob-
able lowered levels of agricultural traffic in 1947 proved 
somewhat inaccurate. Measured by the weekly averages of 
oyrloadings reported by the Association of American Rail­
roads to the Commission, increases J,n grain and livestock 
traffic were noted in every month between January and 
October, with the exception of February. The gains made 
during 1947 over the levels of 1946 raxiged from a low of 
3.1 per cent during May, to a high of 12.6 per cent dur­
ing August. See Interstate Commerce Commission, Bm'eau 
of Transport Economics and Statistics. Monthl7r Comment 
on Transportation Statistics. August 137 1947, p. S"; 
November 14, l947,"p7T; 
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The carriers' statement that agricultural conraodities 
were not bearing their fair share of the transportation 
burden was also countered by the Coitmirlssion. It was shown 
that in the year 1940, products of agficulturo contributed 
about 28.3 per cent of the total revenues and 19.9per cent 
of the total tonnage to the carriers opele ting in the Western 
District; 12.2 per cent of revenues and 7.1 per cent of ton­
nage to Eastern railroadsj and 13.8 per cent of revenues and 
7,6 per cent of tonnage to Southern cai'riors. J3y way of 
conti^jst, Viestern carriers in the same year obtained 45 per 
cent of theii' toniaage and 15.8 per cent of their revenues 
from prodiicts of raines, while the carriers on the whole re­
ceived 57.3 per cent of tlieir tonnage and only 31.3 per cent 
of their revenues from this source. 
3. Jilx Parte 162, og. cit., p. 556. 
During 1946, the average revenue yields per ton in 
various commodity classes showed the following: Products 
of agriculture, $6.17; animals and products, $ll,77j products 
of mines, |)2.03j products of forests, §4.18; manufactures 
and miscellansous, ^"^8.485 all-revenue freiglat, ^4.88.^ The 
4. Ibid. 
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comparlsonn show that enimals and products produced about 
40 per cent rnore revenue per ton-mile oz'lglnated than raanu-
factures and miscellaneovis, more than twice as much an 
products of forests and all-revenue freight, and rrore than 
five times as much as products of mines. Agricultural products 
T/ere responsible for more Income than the other groiios with 
the exception of manufactures and miscellaneous, and animals 
and products. Combining the latter group vrlth products of 
agriculture shows the contribution of the agricultural in-
dxistry to revemxea of the rail carriei's to have "been hi^ly 
significant, 
Agricultural production during 1946 had increased over 
prowar years by approxirautely 33 per cent. On a relative 
basis, the industry was in a highly pi^ofitable condition, 
and baaed upon the 1910-1914 index, tlae farm parity ratio 
diirlng this year stood at 120. However, the index was not 
an adequate measure of the feimer's economic status since 
it did not incliide increases in wagos to farm labor. On the 
basis of the 1910-1914 index, the farm v/age~rate measured 
559 in 1945, and by July, 1947, had risen to 404.^ Moreover, 
5. Compiled from the testimony preseiat<3id in the x'.x Parte 
166 hearings. See Traffic World. September 30, 1947, 
pp. 1127-1128. 
the postwar prosperity in agricultural areas was general 
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throughout other sections of the nation. 
The Ex Parte 162 decision aiithorized rate increases of 
15 per cent on farm commoditios v/hether they were shipped 
on class or commodity rateo. With the exceptions made on 
cotton, cltrtxs fruits, vegetables and wool, the fidvonces 
were of « uniform horizontal percentage typo.® They v/ere 
6. The full increase of 15 per cent applied to the follow­
ing produc-ts: wheat, cor:', onts, harley, rye, rice, 
flour, meal, hay and alfalfa, straw, tobacco, cotton atid 
cottonseed, potatoes, cabbages, onions, tomatoes, beans, 
peas, peanuts in the shell, flaxseed, sugar beets, and 
products of agriculture not otherv;iso specified. The 
fiill increase was also autiiorlzed on cattle and cnlves, 
sheep and goats, hogs and live poultry. Cotton in bales 
took the full increase subject to a maximum of 10 cents 
per 100 pounds; citrus fruits and vegetables 13 cents 
per 100 pounds; and wool was subject to 20 cents per 100 
pounds. Ex Parte 162, 0£, cit., pp. 619-620, 
accompanied by a mandate from the Commission that carriers 
adjust resulting rates to restore rate relationships and 
market equpliaatlons, so that such adjustments v;ould repre­
sent as much as possible the equivalent of a 16 per cent 
increase in revenues, 
Ihe f:-;ct that all itiilroad rates v^ere raised propor­
tionately on the bulk of agricultural commodities was small 
comfort to the shipper located far from his market if he 
had competition closer to the market. The increases raised 
transportation costs of the distant producers much more than 
those to shippers near consuming points. This fact is il­
lustrated in Table XVIII, which presents information relative 
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Talrile XVIIT 
A Comparison of Carload Rpoight Ratee on V/hoet and Orange 
Shipments before and after the Ex ^arte 162 Rate Increases^-!' 
3fune~30 January 1 
1946 1947 
Rates in cents per 100 lbs 
From To 
Groat Bend, Kansas Clilcago, 111, 35 40.2 
Willlston, N. D. Chicago, 111, 42 47.3 
Pullman, Washington Chicago, 111, 71 81.7 
Difference; Great Bend & Williston 7 7.1 
Great Bend and Pullman 36 41.7 
B. Oraiige Rates in cents per 100 lbs 
Lake Viales, Florida New York City 65.7 75.6 
Los Angeles, California Mew York City 135.0 153,0 
Difference; Lake Wales and Los Angelea 69.3 78.0 
"Source: Bureau of /igriculturol "Economics. Marketing and 
Transportation Situation. VVashington, D, c7 
Januar^z-Pebruary, 1948, p. 7. Certain data 
furnished by the Pairoers Grain Cooperative, 
Des Moines, lovm . 
to the rate increases upon the ^ncvement of wheat and also 
indicates the method by which the maximum increases are used 
to soften a competitive situation as in the case of orange 
shipments. 
Farmers in Kansas, North Dolrota, and V.'asshington vdio 
desire to sell v»heat in tlie Chicago market absorb the frei^t 
costs. Prior to the decision a producer at Great Bend, 
Kansas, had a seven cent per 100 poixndsadvantage over the 
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producer at VJliiiston, North Dakota, and a 36 cents advantage 
over the farmer located at Pullman, Washington, Into the 
Chicago market. Because of the 15 per cent horizontal in­
crease, the farmer at Great Bend had a 7*1 cents advantage 
over his competitor at Williston, and a 41,7 cents advantage 
over the Pullman grower. Since the Increases in the differ­
entials between the rates after tlie decision could not be 
passed on to buyers, they represented a competitive disad­
vantage to Chicago for the higher rated area. 
In the case 'of oranges, the competition betvreen growers 
In Florida and California v/aa so Intense that a limit was 
placed upon the amount pf the increases. As shovm in the 
table, the rates between Lake Wales, Florida to the New York 
market were increased by the full 15 per cent, but the rates 
between Los Angeles and New York were limited to about 13 
per cent since the maximum of 13 cents per 100 pounds applied 
on shipments between these points. In other words, the ap­
plication of the full percentage increase on the movement 
of oranges between California and New York would have been 
over the maximum allowed in cents per 100 pounds. Conse­
quently, the advantage of Lake Wales over Los Angeles into 
New York increased by approximately 9 cents rather than 11 
cents per 100 pounds, v^hich would have been the case under 
the straigjit horizontal percentage increase. 
The total revenues received in 1945 by Class I carriers 
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for products of agriculture amounted to $985 million. Of 
this sum, ^707 million applied to commodltios for v/hich the 
15 per cent increase was specified. The remaining ^ ^278 
million were derived principally from fruits and vegetables, 
the bulk of which moves long distances so that the iraximum 
advances would be effective on a large share of the traffic. 
The rate increases for the entire group of items it»ving under 
the classification of products of agriculture would probably 
be less than 15 per cent. For all groups of farm products 
the advances were expected to result in revenues of$241 
million over the #1,512 million produced by farm products 
and derivatives in 1945. These figures assume volume and 
length of haul during 1947 to be maintained at 1945 levels. 
The estimated total of $241 million when compared to the 
1945 cash farm income of #21.5 billion amounted to slightly 
more than 1 per cent. But on the basis of the "1945 net 
realized income of !|pl2.5 billion, the increases amounted to 
rj 
slightly more than 2 per cent,' The initial impact in all 
7, Estimates used above were submitted to the writer by 
R. Vi. Hoecker of the Bureau of Agricviltural Economics 
at Wadaington, D. C., in a letter dated July 15, 1947. 
probability was on the flarmer but over long periods of ad­
justment the consumer could be expected to bear a portion 
of the Increases. 
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'Oio mujor coiicern of agricultural shippers at present 
does not center on the question of whether or not they could 
have afforded the 1946 r'ate increRses. Hather it is the 
long-run relationship between the railroad rate level and 
fann income that poses tlie problem. Past experience has 
shown that the level of frei^it rates remains relatively 
stable regardless of prevailing economic conditions. Recent 
economic history also shows that in periods of eirergency, 
agricultural prices generally rise before those of other 
products, and, conversely, fall first when the general price 
level declines. In spite of the future possibility of gov­
ernment support to the industry, if a recession develops in 
the years hence, agricultural prices will probably decline 
faster and farther than others simply because the farm busi­
ness is of a nature which makes it impossible to discontinue 
production. VJhile sporadic freight rate reductions may 
take place on individual commodities, it cannot be assumed 
that the level of rates would be reduced on a comparable 
basis. Farmers would thus be faced with a declining price 
level for their products while they would be forced to pay 
a frei^t rate maintained on a relatively hig)-) level. Such 
hardship could well result in farm pressures for legislation 
pertaining to rate-making practices similar to tiiat prescribed 
under the Hoch-Smith Resolution of 1925. 
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The Effect of the Decision on Forestry Products 
The two major lumber-producing areas in the nation are 
the Pacific Northwest and the South-Southwest. Railroads 
serving these regions are naturally the largest originators 
of lumber and products. In 1945, for example, total products 
of forests (excluding rosin, turpentine, and crude rubber) 
originated by rail carriers serving the Pacific Coast con­
stituted 13.5 per cent of total carload tonnage origincited, 
whereas the corresponding proportion originated on all 
Class I railroads in that year was only 5.6 per cent,® 
8. Association of American Railroads. Transportation in 
America. Washington, D. G., 1947, p. 160. 
Railroads which operate in the Western District, particularly 
those serving the states of Washington and Oregon, originate 
at least one-half of the nation's total lumber shipments. 
Lumber is easily transported. It is easy to handle, diffi­
cult to damage, and is usually moved in large quantities. 
These charactersitics make it a desirable freight commodity 
from the point of view of railways, motor trucks, and water 
carriers. Competition for the traffic results in low rates 
so that lumber is moved long distances to market. But 
because freight costs are hi^ in proportion to production 
costs, lumber shipments are usually sensitive to conditions 
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of transport and the frel^t rate to an unusual degree de­
termines not orfl.7 the agency employed to carry it from mill 
to market, but also the boundaries of the region in v/hich 
the product can be sold. 
Shipments of lumber into raid-western markets follow 
three major routes. One comprises the all-water route from 
the Pacific Coast throu^ the Panama Canal to Atlantic and 
Gxilf ports, thence v/est and northward by rail or truck; or 
tiu^ough the Wev/ York Barge Canal and over the Great Lakes; 
or from the Gulf ports up the MiHsissippi River by barge 
into the interior markets of Chicago, St. Louis, end Cin­
cinnati. The second is the all-rail route from tlie Pacific 
to interior and eastern distributing points. The third route 
is the all-rail movement from the South to markets in the 
Northeast and in the upper Mississippi Valley. 
Railway rates from producing areas into the major 
markets reflect the irxfluence of carrier and market compe­
tition, The rates are usually grouped on points of origin 
and destination. As a result, rigid distance relation^ips 
are not emphasized. Hov/ever, while competition makes diffi­
cult a strict observance to distance scales, it v/ill be 
found that the more distant market groups usually take 
higher rates than the less distant groups. 
VJorld V»ar II brought a marked change in the distribution 
of western forest products. Prior to the emergency, lumber 
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had been moving in heavy quantities by intercoastal carriers 
to the Faat, and to California by carriers in the coastwise 
trade. VJhen these servicea were suspended, the traffic fell 
to the railroads. In the period betv/een the years of 1959 
and 1943, v/ater-originated lumber traffic from Washington 
and Oregon declined some 68 per cent. "Hie result v/as to 
increase the revenues of railroads from all forest products 
by i|pl83 million during the period.® 
9. Revenues for the first 3 months of 1946 totaled ap­
proximately J^SOO million. By comparison, for the first 
3 months of 1947, total revenue was at an annual rate 
of $456 million. See Interstate Commerce Commission. 
Bureau of Transport Economics and Statistics. Monthl7jr 
Comment on Transportation Statistics. September 15, 
1947, p." 11 
On Iviraber products the Ex Parte 162 decision authorized 
flat rate increases which ranged from 8 to 10 cents rwximutn 
10 per 100 pounds. Since the rates were not advanced per-
10. Logs, wood (fuel), and pulpwood took the 8 cents maxi­
mum. Posts, poles, piling, ties, lumber and products, 
boxes, crates took the 10 cents maximum. Ex Parte 162, 
op.cit., p. 622. 
centagewise, distance relationships were largely disregarded. 
To i].lustrate the effect of the rate increases on lumber 
• 
products, freight rates prior to and following the decision 
from Spokane to selected market points in the Mld-V(fest, East, 
and South, are presented in Table XIX. 
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Table XIX 
Lumbei* Prel^t Rates from Spokane, Washington, to Selected 
Market Points Before and After the Ex Parte 162 Freight 
Rate Decision* 
In cents per IdO pounds 
to 
June 30, 
1946 
January 1, 
1947 
Kansas City, Missouri 
Chicago, Illinois 
St, Loll is, Missouri 
Detroit, Michiganl 
Buffalo, New York^ 
Nev/ York, Nev/ York! 
Atlanta, Georgia 
62 
72 
72 
86-82 
89-82 
91-82 
91^1 
72 
82 
82 
96-92 
99-92 
101-102 
99 
it 
Source: American Association of Railroads. 
Lumber of the T'rafflc Subcommittee 
Report on 
of tlie kail-
road Committee for the S itudy of Transfportation. 
Washington, 1). C., 194^, p. 6. 
1. To the East of Chicago in Official Territory lower 
rates apply to lumber not farther >iBmifactitr ed than 
passing iengthv/ise through a standard planing machine. 
Those rntec are the lower of the two shown in t>ie table. 
Plat increases applied to lumber shipments maintained 
the ccanpetitlvo markets of the western and southern pro­
ducers, A possible exception was the increase in rates 
from Spokane to Atlanta, \inille the advances generally raised 
the prevailing level of rates to all destInation^3 shown in 
the table, the increase in the Atlanta rate was under the 
maximum authorized. Undoubtedly the competitive influence 
of southern producers was reflected in this adjustment. On 
the basis of the limited data available there was little 
evidence that the tendency of the rail carriers to group 
points of origin and destination was affected through the 
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decision, Althou^ it is ImposGlblo to predict the future 
course of agency competition or the future trend of rate 
adjustments on lumber shipments, one fact seems certain. 
Gains made by the rail carriers during the v/ar period are 
important onou^ to hold in the peacetime economy, and it 
I 
may be expected that railroads will do everything in their 
power to retain the lumber business. On the other hand, 
water carriers and motor trucks will probably make a strong 
effort to regain lumber traffic thus lost during the war 
years, so that competition for the lumber traffic would 
tend to be more intense in the future. 
Effects of the Ex Parte 162 Decision 
on Products of Mines 
Prom the standpoint of tonnage and revenues, the ccrni-
modities embraced in this classification constitute the 
most important of all groups. Coal is at present and long 
has been in first place among commodities carried by the 
railroads. Wo other item approaches it in Importance as a 
source of railv/ay earnings and there is nothing in the fore­
seeable future to offset the losses that would follow a 
marked decline in coal shipments. Also, coal shipments 
have been less susceptible to business cycle fluctuations 
than have tlioso of any other product. As a result, during 
the thirties coal occupied a much more important place in 
247 
total railroad 'business than in the pre-depress ion twenties, 
or during the war-swollen traffic of the forties. Thus, it 
is in the poor years that COGI a::suraes its greatest value 
and thereby constitutes the strongest support upon which 
financially crippled cai'riers may lean. 
It! 1940, Class I railroads ori^nated 373 niillion tons 
of coal and coke on which revenues of ^792 million were re­
ceived. This amounted to approximately 37.5 per cent of 
total tonnage and 23.1 per cent of total revenues for that 
year. In contrast, diiring 1928, 432 million tons amounting 
to 34.6 per cent of the total tonnage v;as carried. 'Ilie 
revenues were ii|;932 million or 22.S peiv cent of the total. 
In tine dejjression year of 1932, 432 trillion tons represent­
ing 43.2 jDer cent of total tonnage were carried, on which 
!ij;602 millions were earned. Tlie revenue fi'om coal in this 
year approximated 26.4 per cent of the total operating 
11 revenue 
11. Compiled from statistics furnished by the Bituminous 
Goal Institute in a letter dated Au^ijust 25, 1947. 
The coal inAistry has long been clfflrficterized by over­
development of mines and extremely koen competition for 
markets. Becavise of the widely varying qua3.ities of the coal 
from different fields and the equally varying costs of pro­
duction, it is practically Impossible to completely analyze 
248 
fhe canpetltive phases of the industry. Railroads them­
selves have further increa sed c ompet iti on by constructing 
branch lines into nevi fields and establlahlng rates which 
put new fields into markets already served by older pro­
ducing points. Coal rates historically have been made 30 
as to group points of origin and destination. Competition 
betv,'een railroads and between mines became more Intense and 
tended to enlarge the original groups, Naturally, from a 
marketing standpoint each mine wanted freight rates to be 
as favorable as those granted its competitor, but there were 
limits beyond which the railv/ays could not go in equalizing 
rates from differently located mines since profits were 
likely to disappear if costs of hauling coal extra distances 
were not covered. However, the general groups continue in 
existence even though their boundaides are modified fran time 
to time. 
ITius the present rates from each field into different 
markets are generally not made in relation to distance, but 
are established through a system of "differentials" from 
competing groups.The r«tes to a large extent ai'o influ-
12, "As to the relation between the rates to given markets 
from different groups, the railroads have tried to estab­
lish differentials which would allow the mines each to 
get a fair ^are of their logical markets. In Illinois, 
for instance, there are numerous mine groups extending 
south from Chicago, beginning with the three northern 
groups, Wilminton, Third Vein, and Peoria; going to the 
Springfield group in the middle of the state and the 
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Danville group in. tho eastern part; on dovm to tho Belle­
ville group near St, Louis and the Centralis group; and 
finally to the Southern Illinois groiip in 'Villiarnson i-ind 
Franklin counties. Rate-s from these groups to points 
northv/ent of Chicago an far ao J.Unnesota v;ere quite eprly 
related to one another by differentials above what were 
called busic rates i^rom the three nox thom gr .nxps to tiiese 
points. The Springfield group was given a rate 40 cents 
per net ton higher than the bnse rnteHj Danville, {37 cents 
hif^ier; Belleville and Centralia along with the Brazil-
Cl-biton group in Indiam, 60 centsj and the Southern Illi­
nois group ... 70 cents." Healy, K. llie Economics of 
Transportstion in ^Americrt, Ronald Pross"^ NewTorlFI 1940. 
p. §4^. 
enced by the competition of oth(5r forms of transportation 
and by the competition of other fuels. Motor trucks cosipete 
for short runs and water carriers on a long distance basis. 
The volume carried by the railroads is sub,iect to the compe­
tition of natural gas and hydroelectric pov/er, and of fuel 
oil which moves principally by pipe line. The major compe­
titor of coal in the fixel and energy market is natural gas, 
the consumption of v/hich has increased by over 210 per cent 
between the years of 1928 and 1944. At the same time the 
consumption of fuel oil increased by about 85 per cent.^^ 
13. Table IX, Appendix B, presents statistics on the 
transportation of bituminous coal by Motor Carrier, 
Water Carrier, and Railroads between the years of 1933 
and 1945. Revenue losses to the bituminouc coal indus­
try and to the Class I railways throxigih the Increased 
consumption of coirpetitive fuels will be found in 
Table X, Appendix B. 
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Largely because of the intricate competitive situation, 
the coal interests in the Ex Parte 162 proceedings argued 
that increaaes in rates slaoulci be itifj.de in the form of flat 
advances per ton or by percentage increases subject to 
maxima considerably lower than that applied on traffic in 
genear-al. Railroads proposed rate increases on bituminais 
coal to the extent of 15 cents per ton within and to the 
territory east and south of a line along the v;e£;t bank of 
Lake Michigan and the v;est bank of the Miasiasippi River 
between Bi-vr'ling ton, lov/a, and the Gulf of Mexico; and on 
the thro-qgh all-rail rate from the Appalachian fields to all 
destinat ions. It was also sijiggestod that graded increases 
ranging from 15 to 40 cents per ton be made within and to 
the territory vfest and north of the line described above, 
with the exception of the rates proposed from the Appala­
chian fields. On anthracite coal and coke, graded increases 
from 15 to 40 cents per ton were requested. An increase of 
15 cents per ton would raise the level of rates about six 
per cent above those in effect on June 30, 1946. The graded 
increases ;vould approximate 15 per cent over the levels of 
14 the same date. 
14. Ex Parte 162, op. cit., pp. 570-571. 
Shippers generally conceded that some increases were 
justified in coal rates but they v;ere concerned over the 
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effect of the pi-»opoaQd advances on the rate rolationshlfis 
then currently in effect between producing fields and mar­
keting groups, and oetween iTltuminous and anthracite coal. 
Many of tlieir objections to the railroads' proposals con­
tained Q good deal of merit. For example, greater rate in­
creases were requested to Dubuque, Iowa, and to other west-
bank Mississippi crossings north of Burlliigton than to f-vt. 
Louis and other v^est-bank crossings in Missouri and Ima 
Bouth of Burlington, even tbou^^ both setr. of crossings v;ere 
in Official Territory. Greater increases were also proposed 
from mid-west(.-rn and southwestern producing fields to similar 
destinations fclian for the longer hauls from the Appalachian 
area. As to the greater advances on anthracite coal than 
on bitiimlnous, the railroads contended that it was necessary 
since the anthracite originating lines were in greater rieed 
of revenue than v/ere those roads originating bltruminous coal. 
However, the Goimnlsslon pointed out that 
. . , all the coal-hauling roads are adversely ef­
fected by increased costs, and while some of them 
are more seriously affected than others, this dif­
ference is not sufficient to warrant differences 
in treatment , . , . Moreover the different method 
and lower quantum of increases proposed on these 
commodities than on other commodities generally 
are not based on differences in costs of transj'or-
tatlon Oji' revenue needs as between the coal carry­
ing lines and other lines, but rster on competition 
with other forms of energy, and with transportation, 
and other matters having to do v/ith the value of 
the service in general are not less impelling for 
one haul of bituminous coal than for another or 
on anthracite . , , than on bituminous,15 
p. 52 
15. Ibid, p. 572. 
Rate incrGoses were authorized on nnthraclte and bi­
tuminous coal, and colce in the following menner; 15 cents 
per net ton or 17 cents per gross ton to be applied to all 
basic rates up to por ton as ratp-d; 85 cents per net 
ton or ^  cents per gross ton on basic rates over ;il,00 and 
not over ilp2-25 per ton as rated; 30 cents per net ton or 
34 cents per gross ton on basic rates over ^|!2.25 per ton as 
rated. WTiere coal v/as transported by viatev preceded and 
followed by rail transportation, or transported by rail at 
a combination of two separately established rates, the ag­
gregate amount of the two rail factors was to be considered 
as the rate to be increased. It is interesting to note 
16. Ibid., pp. 620-621. 
that the system of increases proposed by the railroads were 
rejected by the Commission and a new series of graded in­
creases v/ere granted vrith a view to maintaining as much as 
possible the existing marketing relationships. 
Act;u)l data showing the effect upon Individioal coal 
producing regions or upon certain markets of the rate ad­
vances are not available. Even thou^i the advances were 
255 
of the "flat" t^fpe, determinod by the prevQiling haalc re. te 
in existence before the decision, the groups located farthest 
from producing points tended to Rn.ffor a greater disodvcntage 
them thOBO nearer tl-ie mines. V;hei*e tii.e bsaic I'atc va a iljri.OO 
per net ton prior to the l-bc Parte 1G2 case, the inci/'cases 
added 15 cents, mnking the total vl»15. However, if the pre-
vuilin^ I'Mte befot-e the dec!sion wtts v2.25, the sdvtincea 
added 50 cents per net ton, or a total of l(ii2.55. Thus the 
differentlGl of s'^l.Sb betv/eon the higl>-and lo-jy-rated ^;roups 
"v/as advanced to ;j5;l,40. WhiJ.e the Intent of the CommlEslon 
may have been ma Inteiiance of competitive rela tiondiips, the 
effect on a distance baais WBS to grant increases of ti per­
centage type. There could be some validity in the csssertions 
of coal producers that rate increases of this kind v/ould 
tend to drive coal traffic from the rails to other agencies. 
From the point of view of a distant conaunier these fears 
miijht prove accurate in the future. 
The Decision a s it iiffected the Marketing of Steel 
Tile, basic raw materials of lira est on© iron ore and coal 
are required for the maiiufacture of steel. Not only are 
coal and limestone very abundant in certain areas of Penn­
sylvania and Illinois but they possess the necessary char­
acteristics for steel production. The bulk of the iron ore 
needed is rained near the shores of Lake Superior and the 
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natural waterv/ay offered by the Great Lakes supplies a route 
which brings the ore to processing points at a minimum of 
tranpportation e:xpense. 'Ihe movement of row material must 
mest at some intermedie te point v/here transportation costs 
are at a •ninimum, and this fact explains one of the tap.'irtant 
elements in the location of the industry. 
Most of the nation's steel production is centered in 
the states of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, v/ith 
lesser areounts manufactured in flew York, Maryland, 'Vest 
Virginia, and states in the South and VJest. The tv/o greatest 
centers are those of the Pittsburgh district and the Chicago 
region. Both obtain ore at a very moderate cost and both 
n rf 
have easy access to coal of Pennsylvtmia and Illinois. 
17. Vihile not specifically mentioned above, the Alabama 
mills supply a considerable amount of steel to meet a 
local demand, and some I'eachea Texas and even the Pacific 
coast. Hov/evor, this district does not meet the needs 
of its own area as shown by the fact that 43 per cent 
of the iron and steel items transported by souther rail­
ways originated outside of the southern states between 
the years 1928 and 1932. 201 I.C.C. 92. 1934. For a 
discussion of the geographical capacity of steel proces­
sing regions, see Dau/^tery, C. R., de Chuzeau, M. G. 
and Stratton, 3. S. I'he Economics of the Iron and Stool 
Industry. Vol. 1. Hew York, McGruw-liill Book Co,, 19.^. 
p. 30-"50. 
Steel is usually transported over diataiicen of modernte 
*1 Q 
length. Because its movement is heavy, concentrated, and 
18. An analysis of steel movements for 12 days of each 
month during the year of 1925 revealed the lorgest haul 
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to be 1,110 miles while the shortest averaged 174 miles. 
See Daggett, S., og. cit., p. 199. 
continuous, the traffic is advantageous to the railroads. 
Large quantities of steel can be carried in open cars. Ave­
rage loadings exceed those of any other commodity transported 
by rail carriers with the exception of products of mines. 
However, these same considerations make steel traffic at­
tractive to water carriers. Some competition is found on 
the Great Lakes as Vv'ell as on the Mississippi River, although 
the major marketing channels do not readily lend themselves 
to river hauls. To some extent, trucks are used to carry 
steel but highvay facilities have not yet been developed to 
the point viiiere long distance transportation is possible, 
except possibly in the shipment of relatively small units 
19. Prom a total annual average of 5,939 million tons of 
pig iron available for transportation between the years 
1928 and 1943, railroads carried 5,110 million tons, 
thereby accounting for approximately 86 per cent of the 
total, American Association of Railroads. Report on the 
Iron and Steel Industry. Traffic Subcoamnittee of the 
Railroad Committee for the Study of Transportation. 
Washington, D. C. April 1947, p. 180. 
In the period from 1916 to 1943, the mill price of 
steel varied from 1.5 to 3 cents per po\md, and since it is 
classified as a heavy, low-grade item, frei^t rates are an 
20 important factor in delivered prices.^ l^or some years 
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20. Converse, P, D, and Huegy, H. W, The Elements of 
MarketInj^, 3d ed. New York, Prentice-!Hall, inc. 1941. 
p. 462. 
prior to 1924, market prices of steel were customarily quoted 
on a Pittsburg base and the system became kiioMm as the 
"Pittsburgh plus" method of pricing. Briefly stated, this 
meant that mill prices were quoted to any market plus the 
freight charge from Pittsburg regardless of viiether or not 
the steel was actually flipped from that point. Certain 
plants collected more for frel^t than they actually paid 
to the carriers since steel was shipped from a plant enjoy­
ing a loT/er rate to destination point than -that on ^ipments 
from the Pittsburg mills. The system was attacked as dls-
criminatory against steel consuming Industries located in 
the Chicago area. It tended to maintain the Pittsburg markets 
by making steel as cheap to buyers as that obtained from any 
other mill, The practice v/as condemned by the Federal Trade 
Commission in 1924, and was replaced with a plan of multiple 
basing points. Different bases were establl^ed for dif­
ferent products but these new points usually Included the 
old bases of Pittsburgh, Chicago, and Birmingham, and the 
prices at the latter two points continued to be higher than 
those of Plttsburgih, In 1938, as a result of a general In­
vestigation made by the Government into monopolistic prac­
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tices of Industries, the pricing structure was revised by 
reducing or eliminating the price differentials between the 
principal basing points. New bases were added and this 
21 development tended to reduce the over-all price of steel. 
21. The economics of the "Pittsburgji plus" pricing system 
are presented in Boulding, K. Economic Analysis. New 
York, Prentice-Hall, Inc. 19411 pp. 6i26-630, Both 
single and multiple basing point plans are summarized in 
Clark, J. B. Social Control of Business. New York, 
McGraw-Hill Book Co. 1939. pp. 365-367*. See also 
Maynard, H. H. and Beckman, T. N. Principles of Market­
ing. New York, Ronald Press. 19461^ pp. 605-610. 
Taken collectively, iron and steel products represent 
the third most important group of commodities in point of 
tonnage and the second in revenues. In 1945, they furnished 
about 99 million tons of traffic which earned some $467 
million. The rail carriers requested 25 per cent increases 
on these products subject to a maximum of 4 cents per 100 
2P pounds or 80 cents per net or gross ton. ^  On some items. 
22. Ex Parte 162, c i t p .  5 8 8 .  
such as railway car wheels, axles, and trucks, when not 
/ 
included in the list of iron and steel products, scrap and 
scrap steel not taking commodity rates, they proposed a 25 
per cent increase without limitations. Their declared ob­
jective was to disturb as little as possible the existing 
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competitive relations among producers. The proposals were 
estimated at a 10 per cent increase in the basic level of 
steel rates,'i'he Increases authorized "by the Comi^iission 
23. Ibid. 
were 20 per cent subject to a maximum of 10 cents per 100 
pounds or $2.00 per net or gross ton. ViJhile the percentage 
increase granted wns lower than that proposed, the maximum 
per 100 pounds was higher by six cents per 100 pounds or 
:|i:l,,20 on a net or gross ton. Apparently the Commission was 
convinced that the steel companies could afford to pay even 
higher rates in some instances than those requested try the 
railways. Tlie advances generally covored a variety of iron 
24 
and nteel products. 
24. Included were pig iron, rails, fastenings, frogra, 
switches, cast iron pipe and fittings, iron and steel 
pipe and fittings, nails and wire, railv/ay car vdieels, 
axles, trucks, scrap iron and scrap steel. Ibid., p. 623. 
'i'he percentage Increases made necessary a higher mill 
freight absorption on shipments to distant points. As a 
result, markets close to the basing points probably received 
a greater share of the steel output. Since the demand for 
steel during 1947 far exceeded the supply,consumers located 
in the more i«mote markets were most affected by the advances. 
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Regardless of their willingness to pay the extra frei^t 
costs, it is probable that producers would be disposed to 
strengthen their marks ting position in areas close to their 
plants, where old customers were involved. 
Tables XI and XII in Appendix B reflect the competitive 
position of Pittsburg with other basing points on shipments 
of steel into selected markets under the new freight rate 
advances, Pittsbur^a mills found their carload rates in­
creased from 36 to 43 cents per 100 pounds into New York 
City, When competing with Bethlehem based products, Pitts­
burgh was forced to absorb an extra four cents, as the 
Bethlehem rates to the same destination advanced from 17 to 
20 cents. No handicap was suffered by Pittsbiir^ on Buffalo-
based products into New York City since the rates from both 
origin points were raised by the same amount. But into 
Boston, Pittsburglh was penalized two cents on the Buffalo 
base, and one cent on the Bethlehem base. In the Philadel­
phia market, Pittsburg producers were handicapped to the 
extent of 3.5 cents on steel from Bethlehem, while they suf­
fered a disadvantage of one cent at Reading and tv/o cents 
at Baltimore. 
To the West, Pittsburj^ and Detroit suffered a penalty 
of one cent on Cleveland-based products into Columbus, al­
though they held their own on shipments from Cleveland into 
Dayton, Chicago, Gary, and Pittsburg lost one cent on 
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Cleveland into Cincinnati, '-t'o Dubuque, Iowa, the Pittsbvirgh 
disadvantage was five cents on the Chicago base, and three 
and one cents respectively on the Detroit tmd Cleveland 
bases. Detroit lost two cents and Pittsburg four cent:? on 
the Chicago base into South Bend, Indiana. 
A more sigiificant picture of the comparative disad­
vantages of the Pittsburg base may be seen in the increased 
frei^t costs per net or gross ton. To reach the New York 
market, the shipper at Pittsburgh had to absorb #4.60 when 
competing against the Bethlehem base. This represented an 
increase of 80 cents per ton over the rate level prevailing 
before the decision. On shipments from Pittsburg to Mil­
waukee, producers v/ould have to absorb $6.40 per ton against 
the Chicago base, an increase of $1.00 over the previous 
scale. 
lEhe effect of the percentage increases in freight 3?ates 
on steel products on the Pittsburgh district may be of far-
reaching significance in the future. Previously it v/aa 
pointed out that producers in this area would find it neces­
sary to reduce the radius of their ^ipments. The area is 
one primarily devoted to tiie production and converting of 
metal. Its fabrication conversion is rather low, Womally 
the region would ship large voltunes of steel into the heavy 
manufactizring areas of the Eastern Seaboard, Ohio, Michigan, 
Indiana, and Illinois, but under the increased freight rates. 
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absorption of trejx'sportation coats is \andoubtedly reaching 
a point v/here distribution of steel at a profit is becoming 
incrsaRingly difficult. On tho other hand, mills located 
at Bethlehem, Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago, can reach 
major steel consuming areas without facing the Pittsbvir^ 
freight rate problem. 
In a more general manner, through the frei^t rate in­
creases of the type authorized under the Ex Parte 162 pro­
ceedings, it seems that the Interstate Commerce Commission 
is effectively accwnplishing v/hat the Justice Department and 
various other governmental agencies have for many years 
failed to do. That is, thoy appear to be forcing the eteel 
industry to price on an P.O.B. mill basis instead of selling 
steel on the multiple basing point system currently in ef­
fect. 
The Effect of the Decision upon Consumers 
The complexities faced in tracing freight rate level in­
creases upon producers are by no means lessened v/hen rate 
advances are discussed from the point of view of the ultimate 
consumer - when the analysis attempts to appraise possible 
consumer reaction to increased transportation costs. Much 
of the confusion stems from the attitude of the railways in 
rate level cases. When producers oppose increases they are 
of ton told that the consumer pays the freight charges. At 
262 
the same time, when conaumlng Interests protoct against rate 
advances they are infapmed that producers vri-ll absorb the 
increases, and even if freight costs are shifted to con­
sumers the amount will be a very insignificant part of the 
price. 
Transportation charges are an important part of the ex­
penses necessary to deliver products to the consumer. In 
the long-run, a rrajor portion of freight rate increases are 
probably borne by ultimate xisers of goods, since all coats 
of production and distribution must be coy^ered by market 
prices or the commodities would not be produced. If con­
sidered only in its long-range aspects, it could be said that 
the Ex Parte 162 incresses would be shifted almost entirely 
to the consumer. But the short-run effects may be different 
and for this discussion they are more 3,mportant than long-
run considerations. 
Although frei^t rates are included in the price of 
products, it does not necessarily f ollov; that prices v.'ill 
be raised by th.e full amount of the Increased rates, nor 
is there any guar&ntee that cons\imer prices may not be raised 
by more than the increases. V/here the final Incidence v/ill 
fall, and the extent of da ifting from producer to consumer, 
will depend largely upon the elasticity of demand and supply 
Og 
for the comnodities in question. It should be rem^nbered 
25. In numerical terms, the elasticity of demand or supply 
may be defined aa the percentage change in the quantity 
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oX' goods demaxided or supplied which vjould result fro;n a 
one per cent change in price. If the elasticity of demand 
is a minus .5, it means that a one per cent increase in 
price will eventually result in a .5 of a per cent de­
crease in the quantity desiianded. See 3ou3.ding, K,, op. 
cit., pp. 131-137. 
that the demand for transportation is a derived demand. 
Those who huy railroad service do not generally buy it for 
its own sake, but r-ather because with it they can produce 
or acquire some farther commodity for which ther-o exists a 
demand and \iflaich therefore can be sold at a price. Increased 
use of goods will tend to cause a rise in the demand for the 
means of transportation best utilized for its movement. 
Generally, the less elastic the demand for a commodity, 
the less consumption is affected by price changes and the 
greater will be tiie tendency for increased freight rates to 
raise its price. Conversely, the more elastic the demand 
the less prices will tend to advance as a result of freij^t 
rate Increases.The extent to which increases in freight 
PS, On the conventional demand and supply diagrams so 
familiar to students of economics, the less elastic demand 
situation may be ^own by drawing a relatively steep 
vertical demand curve, and a supply curve representing 
production costs including that of railroad service. A 
position of equilibrium between demand and supply is 
established at their points of intersection. If it is 
assumed tlist the freight rates are increased in such a 
manner that the advances apply equally to all units pro­
duced, the supply or coat curve is raised and results in 
a new equillbriijira point higjier and to the left of the 
original one. As compared with a more elastic donand 
situation, it is important to note that price is raised 
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more where donand Is less elastic and at the same time 
the quantity produced at the new price is cui'tailed 
lesB than would be true where demand is hijdily elastic. 
rates v;ill affect consumer prices also depends upon the 
elasticity of supply. Vv'here supply is highly elastic frei^it 
rate advances are likely to be shifted to a greater e;:tent 
017 
to the consumer than if lens elastic. ' it is possible feat 
27« For a detailed analysis on this point, see Locklin, 
D. P. Economics of Transportation. 3d Ed. Chicago, 
Richard D, Irwin, 1947. pp. 24—'^'5. 
traffic could be doatx'oyed by a freight rate Imroose vi'icre 
demand and uupply are both hi^ily elastic. Hoxvever, v.hei^ 
both t.re inelestic the iucreaises would probably havo little 
or no effect upon traffic volume. 
Another important factor to be considered in the lift­
ing and. incidence of a freight rate increase is whether or 
not production takes place under conditions of intense compe­
tition or monopoly. At first si^it, it might appear that 
a monopolist by controlling supply could increase prices of 
products by an amount equal to that of the rate increase. 
But it m.ust be remembered that monopolistic firms fix a 
price Yihich v.-lU yield the highest total profit rather than 
the highest profit per unit sold. The entrepreneur tlierefore 
must consider the volume of sales possible at each different 
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price and the cost of production at each separate quantity 
sold. If total maxlinura profits were earned before the rate 
increase, and assuming that the rate advances were additions 
to fixed costs, the increases could not be shifted to con-
sumors. On the other hand. If profits v/ere not maxiiniaed 
prior to the nev/ rate increases or the advances were con­
sidered as additions to variable costs, some siiifting wo\ild 
take place.Ihe effects of rate increases on particular 
28. Wio freij^t rate increases are here considered anal-
agous to the imposition and shifting of a tax. See 
Myers, A. L, Modern Economics, Principles and Problems. 
New York, Pren'tice-Hall, Inc. pfK526-535. 
Scihultz, W. J, American Public Finance. Hew York, 
Pr ent ic e-Hal 1, Inc. T94^, "pp, ~S59-2i4l'. 
ccwimodities produced under monopolistic conditions is quite 
unpredictable, but elasticity of demand and conditions of 
production would tend to condition the result. 
Even though shorb-run effects of rate Edvances may or 
may not mean higher prices to consumers, it is believed that 
the Ex Parte 162 Increases were passed along almost immedi­
ately following their authorization. Two reasons are pre­
sented for this conclusion. In the first place, the rail­
roads because of the relative ease of physical reconversion 
were in a much more favorable position to handle peacetime 
traffic than any of their competitors with the possible ex­
ception of pipe lines. Second, the combination of high 
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levels of pijrchasing power and the scarcity of peacetime 
commoditicB created a sellers market, in ^'shich intense 
demana for gooc3s and services forced sharp increases in 
prices. Demand, under this economic situation, tended to 
become relatively inelastic so that rising prices follov/ing 
the elimination of controls did not apnear to seriously 
curtail consumption. Depending upon the length of the mar­
keting channel, prices of products may have increased to a 
point higher than the percentages of the rate increapes. 
Moat corr;-oditics designed for consumer aise coirmonly pass 
throi'gh the hands of two or three middlemen. Each, by mark­
ing up his price on costs, including transportation, could 
have pyramided the rate increases to the ultimntc consumer 
under the above economic conditions. 
Tlius, the early postv/ar period v/as marked by the in­
elasticity of general demand and supply in the commodity 
markets so tQiat prices of products could be increased v/ith-
out the loss of sales. In addition, railroads possessed a 
virtual short-run monopoly on the transportation service of 
the nation. In view of these circumstances, it seems reason­
able to assume that most if not all of the increases granted 
in 1946 wore shifted through higher commodity prices to 
consiamers . 
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The Decision as it AX'X'ected -^'gencies 
Competitive with Railroads 
During the rato hearings ship:-era unanimously stressed 
the dangers of traffic diversion from railroads to other 
agencies if the requested rates v/ero Sxxllj ajproved. VJhether 
all farms of transportation wore included is not clear from 
the testimony, but it is believed that protesbants were re-
fei'rlng mainly to the posaible future comipetltion of motor 
trucks, i^'iis oonclusloa seems plausible since the rate ad­
vances gi''onted to the rtiilroads apj^lied equally to v/nter conanon 
29 
carriers and freight forv/arders. 
29. Kates applicable on import, export, coastwise, and 
intercoastal traffic could be increased to the same extent 
and in tho same manner as provided for domentic retes. 
The advances also epplied to joint rates between rail­
roads and ocean, lake. Inland water and motor carriers. 
In ail cases vAiere joint rates were involved, they were 
to be increased to the same extent and in the same 
manner as provided for all-rail rates. Ex Parte 162, 
op. cit., pp. 616-617. 
Of all transportation agencies, probably thone of pipe 
lines and air carriers benefited least from the decision. 
Tlie former appeared to bo at peak capacity during late 1946, 
and it was unlikely that advances in railv/ay rates would 
have any effect in diverting petrolevun traffic to thian, As 
for air lines, their percentage of tho annual volume of 
freif^t traffic remained on the same level for the years 
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1943 through 1946, and there was little evidence to support 
a hellef that substantial tonnage would be diverted to them 
by ruilv/ay frei^^it rate IncreaaeB.^® 
30. Airlines carried .01 per cent of the total freight 
traffic of tlie nation in these yeers. F.ee Interstate 
Commerce Coraniission. Bureau of Transport Economics and 
Statistics. Hontlily Comment on transportation Statistics. 
October 14, 1947, p. 11. 
VIat(3r coiriiiion carriers probably derived f aix'ly substan­
tial revenue benefits from the rail rate increases. Sine© 
v/ater rates could have been increased to the same extent 
and in the sarae manner as those of il carriers, the deci­
sion. would tend to divert little additional traffic except 
possibly on a few bulk commodities. However, the average 
rate increase to the water carriers was probably less than 
that afforded the railroads as much of the triiffic susceptible 
to water movement v/as subject to the "flat" incr-eases or 
limitations on percentage advances. Vjhereas the railroads 
received increases averaging 17.6 per cent, it is probable 
that the increases to the water carriers approximated only 
12 to 15 per cent.^3. 
31. Department of CoiumorcQ. Survey of Current BuBiness. 
VJashington, D. C. January, ii547, p. 8. 
In particular, barge operators on the Inland waterways 
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would tend to derive some benefits from the rail rate in­
creases on petroleum, coal, sulphur, sugar, grains, and 
iron ore, since th-ese comnodities normally move in rather 
heavy volume on the rivers. Coaotwise and intercoastal 
carriers probably benefited from the rail rate increases on 
lumber, canned foods, and iron and steel products. During 
the first six months of 1947 virtually all shipping in the 
intercoastal trades was operated by the Maritime Coimnission 
with heavy financial losses to the Government, Unless rates 
on this type of transportation were further increased or 
operating costs reduced, it would seem that the nfijor effect 
of the decision would be to reduce these operating losses. 
As in the case of other transportation agencies, motor 
common carriers experienced sharp increases in costs during 
the early postwar period. Accordingly, increases in the 
rates of their rail competitors afforded an excellent op­
portunity for the truckers to seek rate relief. Following 
the railway rate decision, rates of motor carriers of property 
were advanced in various rate territories during early 1947. 
In March and April, motor common carrier rates in Official 
Territory (except New England), and in the Southern and 
Western Trunk-Line Territories, were adjusted to bring them 
in closer relationship to changes in rail rates. The result­
ing increase in motor rates over 1942 levels ranged up to 
15 per cent.®^ 
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32. 61st Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Contmls-
slon, November 1, 1947^ 'v^/ashlngton, D. C. 1948. p. 3. 
For information on the actual increases by weight of 
shiiJment, see Midwestern Motor Freight Bureau Tariff 
No. 1230, and Master Tariff, No. 1040. 
Since the increases in motor carrier rates were designed 
to make their charges comparable to those of the railroads, 
the rail rate advances should have diverted relatively little 
traffic to motor common carriers. Some diversion xjndoubtedly 
occurred on a ^ort-run basis, particularly where the motor 
rates previously had exceeded rail rates. However, the rail­
ways could be expected to prevent serious diversion by in­
creasing their charges to less than the full extent author­
ized in situations where the full increase would tend to 
shift any large volume of their traffic to the trucks. 
The largest percentage of traffic diverted probably 
took place in the short hauls of cominodities grouped under 
the classification of Manufactures and Miscellaneous, on 
class ratetcaffic, and on less-carload traffic. The latter 
is particularly susceptible to motor carrier competition. 
In addition, motor trucks undoubtedly participated to an 
increasing extent in the movement of such products as fruits 
and vegetables, livestock, milk and cream, canned goods, and 
paper and pulp. While the total diversion from rail to 
motor common carriers probably amounted to a substantial 
volume of this short-haul- business, the trend did not seem 
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to seriously reduce the revenue ton-mileage of the railroads, 
as it v;as vualikely that much of the long-haul traffic v/ould 
be lost to the trucks as a result of the Ex Parte 162 decis­
ion. 
Prom the point of view of rail carriers, the most serious 
competitive problem arising out of the 1946 rate increases 
may be found in private transportation. Competition from 
this source on highways as well as waterways was substantial 
before the Ex Parte 162 decision and could conceivably become 
much more serious if the rates cf for-hire carriers were to 
diverge much from the costs of private transportation.^^ 
33. Althou^ there is no breakdovm of statistics as to the 
number of com-non-carrier trucks compared with private 
trucks, it is Interesting to note that total truck regis­
trations throughout the United States increased by 13,4 
per cent in 1947 over 1946; and increased by 33.6 per 
cent in 1947 over 1941. See Public Roads Administration. 
Federal Vu'orks Agency. Statement Mo. P-56a5. Washington, 
D. C. 1948. 
Pear of private carrier competition is probably a reason why 
common carriers campaign endlessly for the passage of re­
strictive legislation. The competitive position cf private 
trucks, for instance, could be weakened by unreasonable 
limits on truck weights and sizes, speed, and lights. 
Competition between private and regulated carriers is 
of special significance to business enterprises. When common 
carrier rates are forced upward by increasing costs, industries 
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tend to decentralize or relocate; to utilize substitute 
commodities and transportation facilities, wherever possible. 
These developments mean reduced freiglat tonnage and revenues 
for the regulated carriers. Increasing competition from 
private carriers may be expected to follow common carrier 
rate Inci-eases and its extent will be determined by the 
relative economies afforded through the use of private trans­
portation. In both economic and social aspects, the problem 
is important enough to warrant serious consideration in 
future studies relating to the role of transportation in the 
nation's economy. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
SUMMARY AND CO KCLUSIOIIS 
Pew problems of railroad regulation have offered so 
serious a challenge to economic stetesmansihip as tiie adiaini-
stration of the railroad rate level. Establishment of rates 
at a level which will provide revenues adequate to maintain 
service makes necessary a consideration of their reasonable­
ness. This involves not only the cardinal principle of 
rate-making - that all rates shall be just and reasonable 
per Eie, but also that rates on tranaportation between persona, 
places, commodities, and traffic shall be made to prevent 
discrlminato]:^- practices and maintain equitable rate rela­
tionships. ihese aspects of rate control are not uiu'elated 
since every particular price adjustment affects the flow of 
revenues in some manner, vfhile alterations in the level of 
rates requires further consideration of rate re]fltionahips. 
Property valuation, return on investment, and aggregate 
earnings of rail carriers all play an important part in the 
disposition of rat© level cases, but the problem of specific 
rate levels is one of apportioning the transportation Ixirden 
among a variety of services rendered under changing opera­
tional and competitive conditions. 
To fix railroad rates on a reasonable basis In a dynamic 
economy is au extremely difficult task, involving the problem 
of reconciling the opposing interests of shippers with those 
2V4 
of roll carriers. ViThlle the lowest possible charges are 
naturally sought by those demanding service, rates so lov/ 
as to jeopardize service are against public interest, just 
as rates so hi^ that thoy tend to destroy or divert econom­
ical traffic are against the best int<3rests of the railroads. 
Among all elements of reasonableness applied to the 
regulation of the general rate level, that of fairness of 
return occupies a central position. Kven tiiough a loading 
objective of regulation is prevention of monopoly profits 
to rail carriers, revenue needs as a basis for adequate so^v-
ice cannot be ignored. Value of service to a diipper or 
receiver of freight depends on the supply of such service, 
which in turn is conditioned by the retiirn enjoyed by those 
who risk capital in the Industry. For tliis reason, the 
Interstate Commerce Commission early in Its history determined 
rate level proceedings'" throu^ revenue considerations. The 
prominence attached to this reasoning was eniptiasized by the 
legislation of 1920, gi"\Mng legal support to the earnings 
approach. 
Some of the financial problems faced by the railroads 
may be traced to rate level rigidity. Since long periods 
of time usually elapse in major rate level cases, often 
before a carrier can shov/ a fair amount of earnings throu^ 
Increased rates, business conditions may have changed to the 
extent that revenues are insufficient to cover increased 
expenditures. Control of the rate level is made difficult 
275 
also by developments which occur v?lthin the transportation 
industry. Increased ageticy competition contributed to the 
financial distress suffered by the railvjays during tlie thir­
ties. Coming at a time of general business depression, this 
competition with the I'esultlng loss in revenues and traffic 
combined yfith hi^ fixed charges threw many of the major 
railroads into bankr-uptcy. Despite enormous financial as­
sistance by the Government, the carriers were in a critical 
position by 1939. 
In the second decade of the interim period demand for 
railroad service was declining. Even thoui^i this condition 
caused unused capacity In the industry, the Commission re­
fused to lower the general level of rates during the darkest 
financial pejriod of railroad operations. As in previous rate 
level cases, revenue considerations were permanent, and such 
important elements as value of service to shippers, and 
reasonableness of rates charged at this time did not seem 
to receive the attention they merited. Largely ignored also 
were the long range implications of a relatively rigid level 
of rates on carrier finances. It Is most difficult to defend 
the Commission's reasoning which suggested that railroad 
revenues would be increased by permitting rates at a level 
substantially higher than thab of the general price level 
of the nation. 
In the preliminary period of national defense activity. 
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railways were able to prepare their fscilitiea for the huge 
traffic movements which occuitred during the war emergency, 
althou^ from time to time, some doubt was raised concern­
ing their ability to fulfill the existing demand. It seems 
obvious that successful prosecution of the second World War 
would not hfive been poasible without the services contributed 
by than. At tlae same time, full capacity operations and 
high wartime earnings provided a means whereby prewar finan­
cial distress v/as greatly eased. 'Ilils fact was borne out 
Ijy suspension of the 1942 nate increases until the end of 
the v;ar. A good diare of the success achieved in transport­
ing Wartime traffic coiJld be attx-.lbuted to the adrtiiniatra-
tive policies established and followed by the Federal Govern­
ment, particularly the wise decision to allow private oper a-
tion of the railroads. Credit should also be given to the 
Office of Defense Transportation, which acted in an advisory 
capacity to the carriers, and to the cooperation of railv/ay 
management, .the majority of their employees, and the shipping 
public. 
Despite the fact that some maintenance of facilities 
had been deferred throughout the war period, railroads gen­
erally emerged in good physical condition. With few, if 
any, reconversion problems to face, they appeared In a much 
more favorable position than their competitors to handle the 
immediate postwar traffic of the nation. 
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Termination of tho European and Pacific wars in 1945 
released dangerous inflationary forces upon the nation as 
it shifted attention to postv/ar economic problems. Controls 
established by the Federal Government during wartime v/ere 
expected to soften the impact of the transition, Koisfever, 
as a result of pressxires generated by minority groups, wage 
and price regulations were considerably weakened and finally 
abolifiied. Ifetional labor organizations succeeded in achiev­
ing increased wages at a time v^on industrial pcrofits v/ere 
too low to absorb rising costo; and purchasing power held 
dormant throughout the war was released during a period when 
commodities v/ere generally in scarce supply. Both forces 
fvii'nished a stimulus for poctv/ar inflation, 
Oauglit in a vKge-prioo spiral at the time whe:a traffic 
and earnings Vvere declining, the railroads requested rate 
increases in the spring of 1946. Temporary advances v/ere 
granted throii^ dir^josition of the Ex Parte 148 case, previ­
ously suspended, until further liearing?; could be hold on 
the propriety of tho Ex Parte 162 petition. Interim increases 
proved inadequate to meet the upward sweep of carrier ex­
penditures, and the delay in the Parte 168 decision caused 
financial hardships during the latter half of the year. 
Herein lies one of the major weaknesses of regulation. Rail­
roads normally tho last of the nation's industires gl.ven an 
opportunity to raise prices in a period of prosperity, are 
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thus !3nl)ject to rising material ond, equipment costs posaed 
on to them by induntries privately ovmod and operated. In 
other words, transportation prices ore rigidly controlled 
by tiie public nuthorit7;- v/hich oppp.rontly irtust spend long 
months in decld.lng vdiether the rail car-rlers neC'd higher 
revenues to compeiiGate for increasing costs of a nature no 
different from those met by private enterprise, 
A large share of thn increased expenditu,res faced by 
the x'P.ilroiHds during 1946 arope from vvsge increases gj^antod 
to railway labor unions, llirough strike threats, the brother­
hoods v/ei"'e successful in persuaf31ng the G-overnment to in­
crease wages by an amount higher than that arrived at through 
the collective bargaining processes established in the Rail­
way Labor Act^ 
I-lfforts of the Chief E:xecutive to settle a threatened 
railroad strli^} should, be lauded by the public, However, 
whoa the President chooses to Increase wages on his ov/n 
initiative, this action represents a dangeo.''oua interference 
in !lcbor-ioantigement relations. In addition, it places a 
heavier biorden upon railvftiy finances, and does not ease the 
task of the Gonriission in adjusting the rate level. Strikes 
or threats of strikes by railway labor are Intolerable to 
a nation ao dependent upon transportation as is the United 
States, but as long as the railroad brotherhoods are protected, 
by Congress, it mjiy be expected tiiat labor crises will per­
iodically arise in the industry. 
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After nearly six months of deliberations, the Ex Parte 
162 decision was given. It provided the greatest gross 
revenues of any rate level ease since the i/ear 1921j yet 
in view of iho fi^iancinl dlBtrees suffered by the carriers 
since inicl-194G, they fell short of meeting anticipiitod 
future expenditures, 'i'he full amount propoKed by the rail­
ways was adjudged unreasonable, a fact difficvilt to explain. 
The increases were presumably inteixled to raise the aggre­
gate rate of return but whether or not they did jjo "vvas clotided 
by the controverry betv;een the Commission and carriers over 
the valuation figures to bo used as a rate base, 'Ihe dif­
ficulty lay in the methods used by each party to comxiute 
depreciation on wartime operations. }3y estimating valuation, 
the Goimiis!!ion is fcreed to take ovox* an important managerial 
function, and its determina bions are naturally of intorest 
to the carriei^a. But the assi-unption of a role- normally 
reserved for ninnt ganent was not so much the crux of the matter 
as was the method by which, valuations v^ere deteinnined by the 
Commission. It seems reasonable to suggest that such infor­
mation be published by the regulatory body, if for no other 
reason than to disijel the clouds of suspicion which gather 
in a valuation controversy of the type found in the Ex 
Parte 162 proceedings. To Ixive a regulatory authctrity esti­
mate depreciation or valviation of a privately owned esnter-
prlse v/ithout informing manngement and the public of the 
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procedures used in arriving at the result accms to violutc 
the same spirit of fuiinie.'is which is basic to the philoaopliy 
of regulation. 
Rail credit, atrengthened during war prosperity, seemed 
generally to be -maintained by the 1946 rate increases. Its 
future, however, will depend upon a number of vni-'iables. Im­
possible to determine at present. One of these v/ill relate 
to the level of future earnings, for as long as the tnailroads 
serve a vital economic function in productive activity and 
play an indispensible role in national defense, a v/ay should 
be OTJened to p-'ofitable operation. Continued progress in 
plant and facility improvement can be made only through 
continued new Investment, but railways as private enter­
prises cannot be assured of the needed funds unless allowed 
adequate earnings. Such ar.surance was not forthcoming by 
the Ex Parte 162 advances. 
In addition to direct Comfriisslon action, coordination 
of railroad facilities and services can result in increased 
revenues to rail carriers. Little attention was paid to 
this possibility in the 1946 decision. Notwithstanding the 
reluctance of the Conimlssion to discuss this matter. It 
might be suggested that the carriers, if as seriously con­
cerned over future competition as some of their publicity 
might indicate, would Inaugurate programs of unification 
to protect their interests. The ptist record on possibilities 
981 
of coor'dinobion has not been too favca^ablo. J.'aich rrore to 
their credit hcs been tho recent attempt to reduce fixed 
debt. 
Despite the difficulties of tracing the 1946 rt te ad­
vances on the rsilv/ay financial position, two ff.cts s<-om 
relatively clear. First, under honr-at ^snd efficient innm ge-
laent, earning power- is the key to the future welfare of 
the railroad indiistry, and this in turn is clonely linked 
to national security and proBperity. Second, miens reve­
nues are sufficient to meet fixed chargeo, pay £idequt:te 
dividends on invested capital, and place railroiida on k 
comparable baaia v/lth other Industries in securing capital 
in tho money tnax-ketr,, private opor^-ttion inust be abandoned. 
!irhe alternative of Grovernment controj. in an economic system 
baaed theoretically at least on free competition is not 
pleasant to contemplate. 
On B regional basis the inflationary lag v/liich oo-
curred in the 1946 rate level proceedings fell V7it]:) particu-
liar force on the earnings of cara^iera operating in the 
Eastern District. Here tVie rnoat e.xpcsnaive railroad opera­
tions talce place in the greatest concentretiun of traffic. 
B'reight hauls in the East are relatively shoi't, and the 
multiplicity of dsstim tloiia calls for much costly switch­
ing of cars and reassembly of trains. The five day v;ork 
v;6ok i)revailing along the lines of Eastern carriers increases 
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congestion by holding up car loading or unloading and leads 
to increased overtime payments hy the railroads, Also, in­
creased railroad rates make certain short-haul traffic 
susceptible to the competition of motor trucks who operate 
on what might be considered the finest highway net in the 
nation. 
To offset an extremely low rate of return. Eastern car­
riers were granted freight rate increases higher than those 
applying to railroads in other territories. At the same 
time, these adjustments between regions to a certain extent 
ensed the interterrltorlal rate discrimination which had 
prevailed prior to the decision. In other words. Southern 
and Western shipping interests found their competitive dis­
advantages to Eastern markets somewhat narrowed by the new 
advances made effective within and between the different 
territories of the nation. 
Regional economic changes occurring during the war and 
early postwar years hod a tendency to broaden territorial 
markets, and given a fairly stable period of prosperity, 
the economic ^ins made by the South and Vi/est stand a good 
chance of becoming permanent. In turn, regional frei^t 
traffic shov/ed shifting trends. The most significant devel­
opment of the past elgjit years In the railroad industry has 
bean the advance of the Western carriers at the expense of 
the Eastern roads. During 1946, Eastern railroads showed 
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a despite nubstantial trtx credltn, while thone oper-
etin^j .In the Western d3.strict had fti;lr iricorao. 
the years between 1939 and 1947, Vv'e.'Jtern r^-iodH pstrcentage-
wlse rcuui.ced long-term debt by five times as niich ns did 
jfnntern carriera, iaoreaacd cnah c.nd teraporury CUE e invcst-
ment bclnncon hnir mu much agnin, nnd added tv.'ico nn much 
to eainicd surpluae». 
It seems that the liiKtoric overbuilding of the I'ef'.tern 
rall'rayo is finally payini^ off. wesbw.'trd sh'lfta in popula­
tion tnid industrialization dui-in^ and since the vn i' have 
more than doubled th,e fi'eight traffic cnrried on tlielong 
h:.!ulB of ''^eatern ror,ds, while the Eastern ii^creiiient h.r.a been 
only about two-thix'Us thirl; of t]ie yeni' 19.39. v'estorn cnrrier'a 
had more and bottea" room i-.i their plant:.- for expansion ond 
efficient handling of the inci^'-saed traffic voliime, 
/;n nnalysis covering operations for six months follow­
ing the 1946 rate advances showed the Eastern incorae to be 
the liwoat of all regions, altliough tl\e rate adjustments in 
the decioion were desifjaod to eciualize the iti tc of return 
in all territories. Maintenance or acceleration of the 
economic trends growing out of the v/ar yeara vail continue 
to effect adversely Eai.:tern carriers, and in turn v/ill mean 
a losa of service to the general public and to the imrketj. 
served by ther.i. At ixresent, it seems thfit this region 
is la a ci'itical financial position relative to other areas. 
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and its futvire earnings should be given close attention. 
It is possible that continued financial distress (within 
the next few years) may force Eastern carriers to consider 
coordination and consolidation of facilities and services 
as a means of overcoming the dilemma. 
Both Ex Parte 162 and the Class Rate decisions in the 
^ort-run should make possible future levels of intrater-
ritorial traffic movements hi^ier than those of prewar 
years, depending upon the ease and rapidity of industrial 
reconversion in each region and ability to market regional 
production within the territories. Over longer periods, 
territorial rate adjustments could increase traffic between 
regions, and thus promote a more efficient use of the econ­
omic resources of the nation. However, a general conclusion 
as to the effects of both decisions on future traffic move­
ment is difficult because of lack of data pertaining to 
regional and national commodity rate structures and levels. 
Future rate adjustments of the type made in the 1946 case 
when combined with the plan of nationwide uniform frei^t 
classifications should gradually remove existing territorial 
rate differentials in class traffic. But further progress 
in this direction will come only •wiien it is possible to 
investigate more scientifically the nationwide commodity 
rate levels. 
Production and distribution of separate products of 
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commodity groups were probably affected differently by the 
rate increases, Strai^t uniform percentage advances vtoen 
applied to agricultural traffic tended to increase the dis­
advantages of long haul sliippers over those located shorter 
distances from common markets. At the same time, by allow­
ing percentage increases with specific maxima on certain 
products in this classification, an attempt was made to 
maintain existing market relation^ips. Historically, fluc­
tuating farm prices when measured against rate level stability 
have had an adverse effect upon fairo income in depression 
periods. However, legislation designed to support farm in­
come would relieve the burden of frei^t charges in a future 
period of declining prices. A reduction in the rate level 
on agricultural commodities may be necessary in the future, 
and government support programs do not necessarily preclude 
agitation for that purpose as in 1922 and 1926. 
Increases on lumber were intended to continue the com­
petitive relationships prevailing prior to the decision. 
Interagency competition probably will become more intense 
as more of the intercoastal carriers resume operations sus­
pended during the war emergency. 
The system of graduated rate increases as applied to 
coal shipments were designed to equalise marlrots. However, 
they seemed to have the same effect as if granted on a per­
centage basis. Long distance shippers or receivers of coal 
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wo^ild be at a disadvantaKe compared with those located closer 
to mines or markets. Some trtiffic diversion may have resulted 
as industries attempted to convert to substitute fuels as 
a result of the increased rates, but this probably would not 
affect coal production since other fuels are in extremely 
short supply at this time. 
Significant economic changes in the production and dis­
tribution of steel products could result from percentage 
increases in freight rates, Throu^ the Ex Parte 162 deci­
sion, markets tended to become narrower as the distant basing 
point procedure was compelled to absorb increased freight 
charges when competing in common markets with producers lo-
f 
cated closer to fabrication areas. It is not inconceivable 
that future increases of this type would in time destory iiie 
basing point system of pricing in the steel industry and 
force this commodity to be priced on an P.O.B. mill basis.' 
Of all steel producing regions, Pittsburg seemed to be af­
fected most adversely, since its output is carried farther 
than that of other mills to the concentrated manufacturing 
areas. While the present deimnd for steel remains high 
relative to the supply, Pittsburgh prices will probably 
cover the higher frei^t rates, but the most difficult 
economic period for this district will come when supply 
and demand for its output are more in equilibrium. 
Postwar economic conditions in the nature of hi^ general 
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demand, short supply, and the high short-run monopoly posi­
tion held by the railroads in the transportation field make 
it seem probable that the full amount of the increased 
frei^it rates were passed along to the ultimate consumer. 
In industries where prices are marked up on the basis of 
costs, and whore such commodities pass tlirough long market­
ing channels, it is possible that prices to consumers may 
have been increased by a percentage greater than that in­
volved in the increased rates. 
Of the agencies comprising the national transportation 
system, those of water and motor common carriers seeiiied to 
benefit most by the rail rate increases. Charges of the 
former were raised simultaneously with railways, and resulted 
in a percentage increase only slightly loss than that of 
rail carriers. For this reason it la unlikely that any sub­
stantial diversion of traffic from rail to water carriers 
resulted. Motor comi^ion carriers v/aited loiTger for increases 
which were designed to give them rate equality v;lth the 
railroads. As a result of the time lag, some traffic may 
have been diverted In short-haul movements. Ihe most serious 
competitive problem arising from the railroad rate advances 
appears to be in the area of private water and motor trans­
portation. While imposalble to determine at present, losses 
of traffic and revenues to the regulated carriers may have 
been substantial as it became more profitable for shippers 
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to increase tholr use of private facllitlec. The e f f e c t s  
of x'ollTiBy re te level advances upon private transportation 
needs Immediate research attention, for until such I n v e D t i -
gations are made there is no way of knov^ing the extont of 
losseti to coniraon carriers through diverted traffic, Ihese 
studies should be undertaken originally on a local tesis, 
expanded regionally, and finally made nationwide. 
The Ex Porte 162 rate increases may be considered as 
part of the first phane of the poastv;ar rate level adjust­
ment. Percentage increases authorized by the Commission 
were miJde as the most expeditious means of raising railroad 
revenues to offset rising costs, altliough at the time it 
was clearly recognized that advances of this nature create 
undesirable rate relationships and rate levels for some 
types of traffic. Railroads prefer horizontal percentage 
increases In the "standard" rates since this method peimits 
them to raise Individual rates as much or as little as suits 
their purpose. Consequently, In spite of attempts to "hold 
dov/n" the competitive differences, discriminations tend to 
become more pronounced in the wake of general percentage 
Increases. It is believed that the 1946 case created a 
number of unreasonable rate relationships and may have rafeed 
charges above the levels that some traffic can bear. For 
this reason, the second phase v;lll undoubtedly consist of 
selective adjustments on individual or groups of rates. Such 
adjustments may be expected to extend over many years. 
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TABLE I 
Item 
Miles of Track Operated*^ 
Locomotives Available'^ 
Freight Cars Available^ 
Number of Employees 
A COMPARISON OF THE aENERAL STATUS OP CLASS I RAI 
IN SES^EJOTED YEARS BETWEEN TWO GREAT WARS» 
1921 1926 
(IN Thousands) 
.2 39^.9 
.9 62.7 
2,315 2,3^ 
(In Millions) 
Tons Revenue Freight Carried- ^ 
. 1.6 l,6qo 
Tons Revenue Frei^t Originated-^ 9A0 
Railroad Operating Revenue\ ^5/516 
Railroad Operating Expensesjt 4,562 
Net Revenue from Operationg |5' 
Railway Operating inoome^^ ^ 
Net Railway Operating Income^ 
Net Income after Charges^ 
Funded Debt 
676 
601 
31'-!-
9,739 
Operating Ratio^ 
Rate of Return on Property® 
2M3 
6,382 
1,713 
1.323 
1,213 
g09 
10,572 
(In Percentages) 
22.7 73-1 
2.g 11-.9 
Railroads in Receivership' 6g ^5 
* Source: Interstedb e Commerce Oommisslon. Statistics of the Railways I 
1 .  
2. 
3. 
k. 
7. 
S. 
Includes duplications on account of trackage rights and other Join' 
All Railroads. 
Carload and Less-Carload traffic based on a 2,000 pound ton. As di 
assumes no previous line haul transportation by other rail carrie: 
Excluding Switching and Terminal Companies. 
Found by subtracting Tax Accruals and Uncollectible Revenues from ] 
Found by subtracting Equipment Rentals and Joint Facility Rentals 
Percent of Operating Revenues absorbed by Operating Expenses. 
Return on Investment before Depreciation. 

2SK 
TABLE I 
F THE GENERAL STATUS OP CLASS I RAILROADS 
TED YEARS BETWEEN TWO GREAT WARS» 
21 1926 1929 19110 
(IN Thouaands) 
39^.9 koSA 389.5 
62.7 57.5 >1.7 
2,3^ 2,277 1,653 
(In MllllonB) 
2,1^65'^ 
?'2S? 
^ ^,(73 1,207 
1,323 1,375 ?ll 
1,213 1,251 6^2 
g09 897 189 
10,572 10,638 9,601 
(In Percentages) 
73.1 71.1 71.9 
11-.9 ^.8 2.6 
68 ^3 29 103 
eioii. Statlstloe oi the Railways in the United States, 1921, 192b, 
of trackage rights and other Jointly operated mileage. 
based on a 2,000 pound ton. As defined by the Commission, this item 
ransportation by other rail carriers. 
Companies. 
8 and Unoolleotlble Revenues from Wet Revenues from Operations. 
ontals and Joint Facility Rentals from Railwsiy Operating Income, 
sorbed by Operating Expenses, 
eolation. 
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TABLE II 
FREI&HT TRAFFIC STATISTICS OF GLASS I RAILROADS, 1940 
Item 19^0 
Revenue Freight Tons Originated 1,009 
Index: 1935-39 - 100 114 
Revenue Ton-Miles 373>353 
Index; 1935-39 - 100 lib 
Locomotives in Service ^^1.7 
Freight Oars in Service 1,653 
Ton-Miles per Freight 
Train-Hour. (Q-ross) 33.0 
Ton-Miles per Freight 
Train-Hour. (Net) lli-
Daily Mileage of 
Locomotives 
Cars^ 
Average Haul per Ton in Miles 
Net Tons per Train 
Net Tons per Oar 
Average Freight Train in Oars 
Average Speed per Train (M.P.H.) 
19^1 
(In Millions) 
l,22g 
132 
19^2 
160 
637,9gi|-
199 
H-75,072 
140 
(In Thousands) 
4-1.7 ^2 
1,703 1.7^5 
3^.7 35.5 
111-.9 16.1 
107.5 
35s.9 
116.4 122.1^-
40.0 
202.5 200.3 220.1 
664 795 975 
049 915 1,035 
27.6 20.5 31.0 
^9.7 50.3 51.0 
16.7 16.5 15.0 
194^^ 1944, l9t^^. 
1. Includes Steam, Electric, Gasoline, and Diesel. 
2. Locomotive-Miles per Locomotive-Day. Oar-Miles per SerWceabl© Oa: 
i 
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TABT^E II 
iTISTIOS OF CLASS I RAILROADS, I9IK) - 191^5* 
k) 19^1-1 19^2 i9i!-3 194.5 
(In Millions) 
)09 l,22g l,l|-21 l,il^l 1,492 l,l»-25 
.14- 130 160 167 l6g 161 
153 ^75,072 637,9gi»- 727,026 737,246 6gi,ooo 
•iB IW 199 226 230 212 
(In Thousands) 
41.7 ^1.7 ^2 42.7 ^3.6 43.5 
>53 1,703 1,7^5 1,756 1,769 1,762 
33.s 3^.7 35.5 36.0 37.2 36.9 
14 14.9 16.1 16.9 17.6 I7,k 
107.5 
33.9 
116.4 
43.7 
122.4 
4g.g 
124.5 
51.0 
122.g 
51.9 
lis. 5 
^9.3 
202.5 20g.3 22g.l 241.7 245.3 239.4 
664 795 975 1 f092 1,113 i,o6g 
249 915 1,035 1,116 1,139 1,129 
27.6 265.5 31.g 33.3 32.7 32.2 
»l-9.7 50.3 51.g 52.1 53.0 52.2 
16.7 16.5 15.g 15.^ 15.7 15.7 
lion, statistlos of Railways in the United states, 194o, 1941^ 19^2, 
le, and Diesel. 
>ay. Oar-Miles per Serviceable Oar per Day. 
I 
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TAa.E III 
REVENUES AND INOOMS OP CLASS I RAILROADS, - IS 
Item 1940 19^1 19^2 1914-3 
(In Millions) 
Total Operating Revenues $^,297 15,3^7 $7,14-66 ^9,055 
Total Operating Expenses 3,0149 3,661^ ii-,6oi 5,658 
Taxes^ 396 5^7 1,199 
Operating Rentals 129 137 ISI Igg 
Net Railway Operating Income 6^2 998 l,l4^5 1,360 
Net Income after Charges 189 500 902 
Total Funded Debt^ 9,601 9,6ig 10,971 5,376 
(In Percentages) 
Operating Ratio 71.9 6315 61.6 62.5 
Rate of Return*^ 2.59 3.75 5.50 4,92 
Average Dividends Paid 2.0 2.3 2.5 2.7 
CfiO'riers in Receivership^ 103 91 87 g2 
*Souroe; Interstate Commerce CommlBSloir Statlstloe of the Hallways in 
19^. 19^2. 19^1. 19^44. 194--^ " 
1. All taxes. State an<3. Federal. Foreign taxes include those of Mexico 
2. Debt includes Funded Debt,Unmatured; Debt in Defaultj Receivers and 
Equipment Obligations; and Amounts Payable to Affiliated Companies. 
. Return on Property Investment Before Depreciation. 
. All Railroads. . 
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TABLE III 
30ME OF GLASS I RAILROADS, 19^0 - 19ll-5» 
19^1 1942 19^3 I9^i^- 19^5 
(In Millions) 
5,3^7 ^7,^66 t.9,055 $9,^37 ^«,902 
3,66k i|-,6oi 5,65g . 6,282 7,052 
54-7 1,199 l,^kS l,g»l>6 825 
137 Igl igg 203 175 
990 1,1^5 1,360 1,106 850 
500 902 87^ 666 1^ 7 
9,6lg 10,9n g,376 7,920 ^,659 
(In Percentages) 
6^15 6i.6 62.5 66.6 79.2 
9 3.75 5.50 ^.92 3.97 3.05 
2.3 2-5 2.7 3.1 3.2 
91 87 S2 76 72 
TonT StatlBtlos of the Hallwayb In the United States, 
19^5: 
reign taxes include those of Mexico and Canada. 
ed; Debt in Default; Receivers and Trustees' Seimritiea; 
te Payable to Affiliated Corapanles. 
ore Depreciation. 
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TABLE IV 
A SUMMARY OF THE Ca:.A3S I RAILWAY OPERATING COSTS, I9IK) 
Item 1914-0 igiH 1911-2 lSk3 1< 
(In Millions) 
Fuel (Coal and Oil) $ 273.6 ^ 34?S.?§ ^ ^26.3 lij; 527.3 | 
Index; 1933 ~ 100 135.1 155-2 lgo.5 
Materials and Supplies 589-9 gll.5 833.5 867.0 : 
Index: 1933 - 100 133-7 lll-6.i]- 153-1 159-5 
Total Materials, 
Supplies and Fuel 8511-.5 1,161.3 1,259-8 1,39^.3 
Number of Employees 1,026 ltl39 1»270 1-355 
Total Payroll #1,961^ |2,332 |2,932 13»5*21 $ 
Annual Comensation 
Per Employee 1,913 2,0l|-5 2,307 2,598 
ii-gouroe; Interstate Oommeroe Commission. Statistics of Railways tia th 
igtl. 19'^g• 1943. 19 W, 19'B. 
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TABLE IV 
,88 I RAILWAY OPFJRATIMG GOSTS, 19lk) - 194-5* 
19^1 19^2 IS^3 19114 1911-5 
(In Millions) 
: $ 1^26.3 f, 527.3 ^ 5^5.3 | 550.2 
llfg.it 155-2 100.5 135-1 195.9 
f5ll.5 £533-5 ^67.0 1,0211.7 1,01^1.0 
Ike.k 153.1 159-5 162.l|- 170.0 
1,161.3 1,259.{3 l,39ll-.3 1,610.5 1,591.1 
1,139 1,270 1-355 1.11-22 
!2,332 12,932 13,521 $3,060 
2,01^5 2,307 2,592 2,727 2,71^ 
lion. StatlstlbB of BallwaysJfcn the United atatea, l9ll-6. 
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TABLE V 
INDEX FIBERS OP EOONOMIC ACTIVITIES 
IN 194-^, COMPARED WITH PREWAR HIGHS^^ 
(Index: 1935-39 100) 
Activity Prewar High 
Year Index 191^1.1 
Industrial Production 
Manufacturing 
Durables 
Nondurables 
Mining 
Fuels 
Metals 
1937 
1937 
1929 
1939 
1937 
1937 
1929 
113 
113 
132 
109 
112 
109 
134 
335 
252 
353 
171 
iko 
Ik3 
113 
Agricultural Production 
Crops 
Livestock 
1937-39 
1937 
193^ & 1939 
106 
117 
106 
136 
129 
ll4-l 
2 Construction (,New) 
Public p 
Private 
1926-27 
1930 
1926 
21g 
137 
296 
7| 
116 
53 
Trade 
Wholesale^ 
Retail^ 
Export8| 
Imports^ 
1920 
1929 
1920 
1920 
151 
125 
2g6 
21g 
201 
igo 
500 
165 
national Income^ 1929 127 2J+6 
Employment 1929 log 
P Factory Payrolls'^ 1920 135 357 
V/holesale Prices^ 1920 192 129 
Cost of Living^ 1920 1^3 126 
••^^Souroe: Industrial Production, manufacturing, and mining; Federal Res( 
Production; United States Department of Agriculture. Oonetn 
United States Department of Commerce. Wholesale Prices, cos' 
employment; United States Department of Labor. 
ft - decrease 
1. Based on 19^4 prices. 
2. Based on 19^ prices. Others are Indexes of volume. 
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TABLE V 
[JMBSR3 OP EOOKOMIO AOTIHTIES 
l|-, COMPARED WITH PREWAR HiaHS^^ 
(Index: 1935-39 100) 
ewar High •, 19^ over Prewar 
Index 19^1- Peak In Peroent 
113 535 lOg.O 
113 252 123.0 
132 353 167 A 
109 171 5^9 
112 140 25.0 
109 lk-5 33.0 
13^ 113 d 15.7 
9 106 136 28.3 
117 129 10.3 
1939 106 llll 33.0 
7 21g 7§ d 611-. 2 
137 116 d 15.3 
296 53 d 02.1 
Si 151 201 125 1^0 
2g6 500 7l<-.g 
2ig 165 d 24-. 3 
127 2k6 93.7 
log iii-3 32 A 
135 357 i6ii-.il-
192 129 d 32.g 
lit-3 126 d 11.9 
'aoturlng, and mining; Federal Reserve Board. Agricultural 
lepartment of Agriculture. Oonetruotlon, trade, national income; 
' Commerce. Wholesale Prices, cost of living, factory payrolls, 
>epartment of Labor. 
) indexes of volume. 
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Investments; 
TABLE VI 
CONDENSED BALANCE SHEET OP THE CLASS. I 3TEAM RAILROAJ 
December 31, 19II-5 
(In Millions) 
ASSETS 
Road and Equipment 
Improvements « Leased Property 
Investments In Affiliated Property 
Miscellaneous Physical property 
Other 
Less Depreciation and Amortization 
Current Assets 
Cash and Deposits 
Temporary Cash Investments 
Receivables 
Materials and Supplies 
Other 
Deferred Assets 
Unadjusted Debits 
$31,627 
338 
7?8 
Total Assets 
LIABILITIES AI^D MKT WORTH 
Capital Stock Outstanding 
Common 
preferred 
Liabilities 
Long Terra Debt 
Current Liabilities 
Deferred Liabilities 
Unadjusted Liabilities 
Surplus 
Total Liabilities and Net Worth 
^feourcej Interstate dommerce Commission. Statistlos of the Railways 
D,0. Govt, print. Off. 19^7, Table 128, pp. II6-II7.—PIgui 

299 
TAHi lS VI 
SHEKT OF THE GLASS, I STEM! RAILROADS^^ 
December 31, 19^5 
(In Millions) 
ASSETS 
?ty 
.on 
$21,627 
33§ 
_Z2i. $27,192 
#21,939 
Assets 
1,151 
1»! 
59IJ. 
600 
275 
196 
^^26,756 
LIABILITIES AND HET WORTH 
t 6,169 
l.f^40 g,009 
Liabilities and Net Worth 
9,2S6 
2»955 
1,193 
70^ 
^•,609 
^ 26,756 
iion. StatistlOB of the Railways in the United States, 19"^^. Washington, 
ky, Table IgjS, pp. 116-117. Figures rounded for clarify/ 
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TABLE VII 
ANNUAL INCREASES IN RAILROAD OPERATING COSTS AND OPERATIl 
DECEMBER, 13^1 - JUNE, I9kj 
(In Millions) 
Increased Coata 
Wage8^ 
19;i-l 1370 
19^3 
19^6 695 
Payroll Taxes on Wage Inoreaaee 
Grosser Act (Effective January 1, 194-7) 
Cost of Vacations with Pay 
Material and Supply Price Increases 
Total Increased Costs 
Increased Revenues (Effective and Prospective) 
Ex Parte iW. Passenger Pare Increase (February, igl^-S) 
Ex Parte l62. Freight R^te Increase (December, 19w) 
Docket 29711' Increased Passenger Fares (Eastern District) 
Ex Parte I63. Railway Express Rates (Interim) 
Ex Parte l6p. Railway Express Rates (Prospective) 
Railway Mall (Prospective) 
Total Revenues (Effective and Prospective) 
Excess of Increased Costs over Increased Revenues 
Source; Interstate Commerce (lionimisalon, atatistios of the Railways ii 
igMt-. 19^5> Interstate Commerce Commissioh, Bureau of Trans] 
Comment on Transportation Statlstios for the years, 194^6 and 
Roads, Monthly Report Service for 1947-
1. Excluding Executives and Officials. 
2. 19^1 average 9*9/^ per hour; 19^3 average 9*2^ per hour; 19^6 avera 
3. Computed at six percent of wage Increases. 
4. S^percent of 19^6 payroll of billion charged to operating expen 
5. Average ohargeout price was |131.35 19^' Purchase price index 
47,3 percent over 19^0. The index was 222.6 in June, , or 15 
6. Nine percent of passenger revenues for 19^6 (#1,259 million) 
7. 17.6 percent of freight revenues for 1946 after deducting Interim 
S. Estimates of Railway Express Agency. 
9. 4-5 percent of mall revenues 

300 
TABLE VII 
SAIl.ROAD OPERATING COSTS AND OPERATING REVEHUICS-^ 
DECEMBER, 194l - JUNE, 19^7 
(In Millions) 
692 #1, 
s 3 
1, 194-7) 90^ 
9ase8 j'i 
fca $2,395 
pospeotlve) 
Increase (Febriiary, 19^2) 1137 
oreas© (December, 19^6) ^Bo' 
nger Pares (Eastern District) 
Hates (Interim) 25 
Rates (Prospective) 
pospeotlve) 
fectlve and prospective) 1,279 
a Costa over Increased Revenues l,ll6 
salon, atatlstlos of the Railways In the^Unlted States, 19^1. 1942, 19^3. 
ommeroe Commission. Bureau of Transport Eeonomics and atatlstlcs, MontCTy 
atatistiog for the years, 194^6 and 19ll-7. American Association of ilail-
ffice for i^^7-
ala. 
3 average 9.2/5 per hour; 1946 average I6/6 to May 22, 18^/6 thereafter, 
increases. 
Mllion charged to operating expenses. 
L.35 in 19'W). Purchase price index stood at 193.5 in 19^6, an increase of 
ndex was 222.6 in June, 19^7, or 15 percent greater than 
Ilea for 19^6 (#1,259 million) 
8 for 194-6 after deducting interim Increase of ^uly 1, 1946. 
ency. 
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TABLE VIII 
Tear 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
193^ 
1935 
193b 
1937 
193s 
19^1 
19'^•2 
19^3 
19^1-
l9!»-5 
1946 
1947 
GROSS REVENUES AND NET INCOME OF OL,AaS I RAILROA 
NET INCOME OF CORPORATIONS, AND REALIZED NET INC' 
OF AGRICULTURE, FOR THE YEARS, I929 through I9 
Total Operating 
Revenues of Glass I 
Roads 
,200 
,281 
3,127 
3,095 
3,272 
3,^52 
4»053 
iflip 
3,565 
3*995 
4,297 
m 
9,055 
9,^37 
g,902 
7,627 
k . e d  
Net Income of 
Class X Roada^ 
(In Millions) 
® % 
135 
d 139 
d 6 
d 17 
g 
165 
9g 
123 
93 
1^9 
500 
902 
373 
667 
450 
Wo3 
Percent Increase: 
1946 over 19L, „ 
1946 over 1941 42.6 d 42.2 H 
29 ?1»4 d 67.8 6 
r - -
«Bouroe: interstate uommerce commisafoni Btatisties of tne Hallwaya 
1945» American Aaoooiation of Raiiroads. A Aeviev of Raiirc 
ment of Oommeroe. ^.rygy.P^r.gurrgPti pusj.nQ8a. 
Oommisalon. Quarterly Industrial Report aeries. Deoemtoer. is 
Bureau of Agriculturkl Eoonomios. .ftgrlouitural Outlook Chart 
d. - Deficit 
1, After Taxes 
2. Before Taxes 
Partly Estimated 
Estimated on the basia of the firat aix months of 1947. I 
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TABLE VIII 
AND NET INCOME OF (31.ASS I RAILROADS, 
Oom'ORATIONS, AND RSALIZiSD NET INCOME 
FUS, FOR THE YEARS, I929 through 
Wet Income of Net Income of^ Resaized Net Inoome 
Olaas I Roada^ Corporations'^ of Agriculture 
(In Millions) 
^ ni 
135 dl,6l4 2,74 
d 139 d 3M6 1,832 
d 6 d 625 2, 6gl 
' 'I xjp m 
Hfl 5,062 
92 3»9M-3 5,139 
d 123 1,658 1^,327 
93 ^,22g 
189 5.^^^ ^,5^1 
500 g,5l9 6,W 
902 &,7ko 9,209 
?573 9i«^2 12,1^7 
667 9,90g 12,399 
^^50 9,000 12,536 
2^9, 12,500, lil.,gg9 
4iS0^ 17,500^ lg,000 
d 67.g 66.g M 
d il-2.2 40.9 130 
si on. atatistloB of the Hallways in tne tjnit'ed states, I9e^9 througlSr 
a of Raiiroaae. a Keview or fiaiiroaa operations in 19^0. u.8. Depart-* 
pufl^^nQeB, R^vi^^y Numberp. geourlties and Exchange 
atrial Report tferiea. Deoember. 19^^.u7S. Department of Agriculture, 
[lomloB. Mrlcultural Outlook Charts, 19^» November, 19^7. 
Lrst six months of 19^7' 
[ 
i 
302 
TABLE IX 
BITUMINOUS GOAL TRANSPORTED BY VARIOUS MODES FOR THE YEARS (In Thousands of Net Tons) 
Index - 1933 « 100 
COMMERCI.AL LOADED AT 
SALES BY MINES FOR SHIP-
YEAR PRODUCTION INDEX TRUCK OR WAGON INDEX MENT BY WATER T 
1933 333,6^ ' lOO 15,^3 100 13,021 
193^ 359,363 log 13,739 121 15,123 
1935 372,373 112 21,960 iii-2 18,327 
1936 4^9,osg 132 27,929 131 
1937 ^»53i y u y 
1933 343,5^5 lok- 25,592 iBfe 16,503 
1939 391^.355 113 29,53^^ 191 22,229 
19^ 460,772 13s 35,5^9 230 29,1^93 
19^1 51^,1% 15^ ^0,056 259 30,240 
1942 532,693 175 45,154 292 - 34.010 
1943 590,177 177 42,433 274 3o;i3g 
1944 619,576 136 40,123 259 31,513 
1945 576,000 173 3^,000 220 27,690 
*Source: Exhibit of Statistical Data Piled on Behalf of Producera and 3 
Ex Parte 162, July, 1946, p. 3. 
1/ Breakdovm not available. 
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TABLE IX 
DRTED BY VARIOUS MODES PGR THE YEARS 1933 THROUGH iglW* 
(In ThousandE of Net Tons) 
Index - 1933 « 100 
INDEX 
100 
121 
1^2 
ISI 
191 
230 
259 
292 
27^ 
259 
220 
LOADED AT 
MINES FOR 3HIP-
MEKT BY WATER 
13,021 
15,12s 
18,327 
2ll-,g6g 
16,503 
22,229 
29.^^93 
30,2W 
3Ji-.0lg 
3o;igf5 
31,518 
27,690 
LOADED AT 
MIKES FOR SHIP-
INDEX MENT BY RAIL 
100 293,259 
116 313,304 
1^1 319,7^1 
191 370,763 
y y 
ifo 295,336 
171 331,190 
227 3{SO,3gg 
232 425,lglf 
261 i|-g2,gli|-
232 ii-95,8611-
2^2 527,135 
213 439,000 
INDEX 
100 
107 
109 
126 
113 
16? 
169 
1^0 
167 
i Piled on Behalf of Producera and Shippers of Bituminous Coal In 
). 3» 
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TABLE X 
•1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
im 
1935 
1936 
1937 
193s 
1939 
19W 
19^1 
1942 
nil 
REVENUE LOSSES TO TH;": BITUMINOUS OO/L IND 
CSLASS I RAILROADS THRU INCREASED CONSUM 
OF COMPETITIVE FUELS. 1920 THRU 19^4 
Revenue Loss 
Thru Increased 
Consumption of Natural 
Bit. coal 
Revenue Loss 
Thru Increased 
Revenue Loss 
Thru Increased Outp 
Cas Consumption of Fuel Oil Hydro-G-enerated EDLec 
Industry 
111,757,941 
11,280,350 
. 7,572,4§g 
2,46l,22g 
Class I RRs, 
T5T 
,225,445 
10,195,247 
7,543,083 
2,993,492 
4,035*502 
21 
3,552,005 
i4,li9,7gg ll,gl3, 
20,167,300 
3gi674,&So ^2,730,546 
-.2,100,035 
6,041,653 
•5,962,005 
14,211,206 
'7,632,575 
^7,374,724 
•47,§53,000 
57,634,964 
72,08^,366 
102,329,174 
137,945,394 87,900,176 
200,197,352 114,291,797 
250.691.198 129.191,850 
Total 11,039,227,881^77,035,403 
B'lt. Coal 
Industry 
(3) 
$8,693,075 
-11,878, 
-21,332,8^0 
Class I 
W 
RRs. 
,56o,o4b 
iO -10,736,034 
__,,,_ _jo -21,250,012 
-26,829,128 -32,631,182 
-24,700,890 -28,063,160 
-21,746,813 -18,194,626 
-10,334,500 -8,762,796 
9,047,720 7,^57,147 
25,354,345 18,604,339 
9,361,950 7,051,1^1 
31,456,180 25,085,27? 
52,971,940 39,«35*454 
90,976,980 60,129,552 
118,755*200 75*671,719 
191,6S9,iK)0 104,723,696 
241.089.070 124,243,436 
FTErnJoaT 
Industry 
-1297,S12 
-2,273,^(27 
-4,545,042 
- 65,S2g 
659,883 
kl6,'fk^ 
7,293,905 
7.764,134 
15,396,810 
15,734,014 
13,597,^-80 
18,518,787 
26,225,053 
47,^95,182 
7^,454,120 
76,975>288 
Class I F 
—rsy-
-125s,s 
-2,054,7 
-4 ,528,3 
80,C 
348,e 
6,184,5 
6,570,2 
11,297,/ 
11,850,i 
10,843,f 
13,926,: 
17,332,5 
30,32S,C 
39.036,1 
?9,>668,( 
#662,572,841^350,923,987 1294,41^•8,292 #181,216,] 
Source; Figures abstracted from last two columns of pages l4, 18, and 19, Exhlbli 
duoers and Shippers of Bituminous Coal in Ex Parte 162, July, 1946. 

303 
TABLE X 
33ES TO THR; BITUMINOUS COJiL INDUSTRY AND 
UILROilDS THRU IKCHli/VSIilD CONSUMPTION 
IPSTITIVB FUEL8> IQgg THRU l^kk-
Loss Revenue Loss Revenue Loss 
sreased Thru Increased Output of Thru Increased 
? Fuel Oil Hydro-&enerated Eleotrlolty Use of Oompetitlve Fuel s Total 
riiiD, uoal 6lt. Coal Revenue 
3.1  RRs. Industry Class I RRs. Industry Class T RRB .  L O S S '  
^  -- ^  —(7) '••• —nn— ( q )  
y6o,oH-p -|297»f5l2 -.1253,996 |20,l53»20il- Ul »5s6 1:37,679,698 
r^6,og4 -2,271,^27 -?»05^.736 2,871,027 -2,595,573 -5,14-67,1100 
00,012 545,042 4,52g:5S9 -lg,306;no4 -ig;235:3is -35;5ii-i;722 
531,l|2 - 65,{32d - 80,063 -2il-,433,72g -29,717,753 -Ri|-,l5l,4Sl 
363,160 659,263 7^*7°^ «20,l}-g9,002 -23,277,952 -^3,766,95'^• 
L94-,626 1^16,71^5 3^8,673 -7,210,2130 -6,032,532 -13,2ll-2,gl2 
j^2,796 7,293,905 6,igij-,572 20,74J,0i^6 17,5^9,076 3^,^^3,122 
?D7,i47 7,764,13^ 6,B70,gW 55,™,5311- i^6,95S,6;3 102,445,167 
304,339 15,396,810 11,297,766 98,125,879 72,002,140 170,128,019 
)51,l8l 15,734,pill- 11,850,456 72,948,964 5^,9^3,290 127,892,254 
>85,278 13,597,480 10,843,547 102,688,624 81,890,830 184,579,454 
535,^5^ 18,518,787 13,926,322 lil-3,579,093 107,972,982 251,552,075 
L29,552 26,225,053 X7,332,961I- 219,531,207 1^5,095,091 364 626 298 
371,719 47,595,182 30,328,01^ ^94,29.6,276 193,^99,908 498;i96;i84 
(^23,696 71,454,120 39,036,794 463,250,872 258,052,287 721,303,159 
2!h2A26 76|975?gg^  39,668,635 568,755,556 293,103.891 861.859, W 
?23,987 1294,411-8,292 |181,216,104 $1,996,249,014 ^1,209,175,1^91^ 13,205,424,508 
f pages l4, 18, and 19, Exhibit of Statlstlopl Data Filed In Behalf of Pro-
3x Parte 162, July, 1946. 
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TABLE XI 
FREIGHT RATES ON 3TEEL PROEUOTS TO MID-V/ESTEHN DESTINATIC 
BASING POINTS PRIOR TO AND FOLLOWING THE F.X PARTE l6j 
Cincinnati, Ohio 
South Bend, Indiana 
Louleville, Kentucky 
Columbus, Ohio 
Dubuque, Iowa 
Rookford, Illinois 
Fittflburfe'h 
36 
23 
m 
(In cents per 100 pounds) 
Bethlehem Cleveland 
Old NevT 
31 
27 32 
32 3? 
20 24-
39 ;^ -7 
35 ^^2 
Hew 
lo 
OlJ± New 
•^ 2 
4-6 55 
^3 117 2g lip 
65 52 55 
% 52 62 
•"•Source: Steel, 120; March 3» 19'^-7' PP« 93-95 
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TABI.E XI 
, PRODUCTS TO MID-VffiSTERN DESTINATIONS PROM SELECTED 
IR TO AND FOLLOWING THE EX PARTE l62 DECISION^* 
(In cents per 100 pounds) 
Bethlehem 
Ol^i New 
"TR "52 
, 55 u n 
55 65 
52 62 
Cleveland 
Old Ne^ 
"^"31 
27 32 
32 3S 
20 2I1-
39 ;^ -7 
35 ^2 
Detroit 
Old Mew 
"T7 "T? 
23 251 
32 38 
23 20 
35 ^2 
32 3g 
Chicago 
om?ew 
IK 17 
27 
29 
19 
13 
32 
35 
2^ 
16 
pp. 93-95>' 
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TABLE XII 
PITTSBURGH FREIGHT DISADVANTAGE COMPARED VUTli OTHER BASING POI 
CENTERS BEFORE AND AFTER THE EX PARTE l62 DE 
(In dollars per ton) 
Destination Sparrows Ft. Bethlehem 
bid New old New 
New York, New York |2.'K) ^2,BO $3.^0 ^ K,Go 
Philadelphia., Pennsylvania 3.00 3.60 4-.10 M-.SO 
Boston, Hassachusetta 1,60 2.00 2.6o 3»20 
Detroit, Michigan 
Milwaukee, Vlsoonsin 
Toledo, Ohio 
*3ource; Iron Age,159t January 9, 19^7* PP» 101-103. 
I 
1 
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TABLE XII 
)ITA&E COMPARED V,1:TH OTHEIl BASING POINTS TO SELECTED OONSU14ING 
3EF0RE AND AFTER THE EX PARTE l62 DECISION 
(In dollars per ton) 
^^2.00 
3.60 
2.00 
Bethlehem 
old New 
^3.^0 ti»-.6o 
iklO 4-. go 
2.60 3.20 
Youngstown 
6id MeW 
$.80 ^1.00 
.60 .go 
.60 .60 
Cleveland 
Old iQew 
i'1.1+0 -^l.gO 
1.20 l.liO 
i.4o 1.60 
Chicago 
ew 
f.2.00 |!2.if0 
5.ik) 6.JK) 
2.M-0 3.00 
19^1-7. pp. 101-103. 
1 
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APPENDIX C 
Suimnuries of the Interterritorlal Freight Rate Problem . 307 
The Clasa Rate Investigation of 1939 319 
r>07 
aUIvMARIES OP TIIP; INTKR'il-^RFlTORIAL PPEIGHT 1V..TF PROBLEM 
In a physical sense, the rnilronds are one system, for 
long ago science and engineering overcame the geographical 
"barriers vAiich orlgimilly prevented unification of sei'vice. 
But tho uniformity which marks the mechanics of service does 
not extend, in an economic sense, to the national structure 
of rates. Charges for equal services - equal frelf^t loads 
of similar coiruAOditles carried equal distances - may and do 
vary widely from region to 3?egion, and f3?equently v/itViin 
indlv idu a1 re glons. 
The large number of coiritiodities transported throu^iout 
the nation makes impossible a separate rate on each and every 
item to and from every point on all routes. To simplify tJie 
process, conij-iodities are "claosifiod" or grouped into divi­
sions, each of which is dosignnted by a number or letter 
knovm as class "rating." Articles are segregated into tho 
various classes on the basis of similar transportation cher-
Qctlstics. The term "rating" should not be confused with 
the actual rate charged, for the designation given to the 
commodity simply specifies tho class assigned, whereas the 
rate is the px'-lce charged for tho frei^t shlpwent. Classi­
fied interstate traffic and much of the intrastate traffic 
is governed by one or more of the ttiree principal classi-
ficationsj Official, Southern, and .Vestern.^' All three are 
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1, See Chart 1, Appendix A, for a geographicRl description 
of the teri-'itorles. 
published in one volume called the Consolidated Rfeiglnt 
Classification, constructed and revised frequently by com­
mittees dravm from the participating railroads. 
In addition to the freight classificutions, the mtion 
is divided into five freight class rate territories, each 
of which has established its ovm particular rate level and 
rate structure. For rate-making purposes, these regions are 
known as Eastern, or Official Territory, governed by Official 
Classification; Southern Territory, governed by Southern 
Classification; and Western Trunk-Line, Southwestern, and 
Mountain-Pacific Territories, governed by VJestern Classifica-
tion,'^ I'-xistence of these regional rate structures causes 
2, Territorial descriptions will be found in Chart 2, 
Appendix A. 
the interterrltorial freight rate problem of the United ^'-tates. 
The number of standard "classes" of freight established and 
the method of designating classes differ in the tla'ee classl-
ficfitions, and the percentage relationship of those classes 
to first-class rates differ to some extent in the various 
frei{^it-rate territories. Similar commodities may havo dif­
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ferent ratings in two or in all three of the classifications. 
In terms of the percentage of first-class, approximately 60 
per cent of the ratings are uniform in all three classifica­
tions; ahout 13 per cent sre conplGtoly different in any two 
clsssificationsJ and 27 per cent are similar in two but not 
in all three classifications."^ 
3, Docket 28300. Class Rate Investii'.ation, 1939, 262 
I»C.C. 447, 469. 1945. " 
Since classification is not the result of scientific 
formulas, but based rather on matters of Judgment, the lack 
of uniformity in the classification ratings may be easily 
understood. Rating differentials betv/een the thiHse classi­
fications also reflect differences in economic factors within 
each of the territories. 
In recent years, there has been an increasiqg nurrijer of 
instances where exceptions to classification have been used. 
These provide ratings somewhat lower than the standard 
classifications. In Official Territory, 17 per cent of the 
coinmodity descriptions have been modified by use of the ex­
ception ratings; Souther Territory, 31 per cent; in Western 
4 
Trunk-Line, 26 per cexit; and in Southwestern, 36 per cent. 
4. Board of Investigation and Research. Report on Inter-
terrltorial ]Freight Rates. 73th Cong, 1st Bess. House 
Document Wo. 303. ' Washington, D.C., Qovt. Print. Off. 
1943. p. 47. ^ 
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Use of exceptions has had the effect of r©dn,clng rntcs "by 
about 20 per cent on the conimoditieB originally moving on 
standard classificfltions. r'>taniai''d classification ratings 
move ovAj a small proxjortlon of tho total freight tormage 
of tlie nation, fend oven when combined vrith the volurao moving 
on clsiBsification excoptions, the amount is not large. By 
far, tlie greater proportion moves on co^Tmodity rntes. 
5. An analysis made by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
on tl.e volume of carload traffic originating on all rail­
roads on September 23, 194S, revealed the following; 
4.1 per cent moved on stariiard class rates, and ^ yielded 
6,3 per cent of the revenues from carload shipments on 
that date. By adding the traffic moving on classifica­
tion oxceptlona to the class rate traffic, the figure 
increased to 14,8 per cent and 22.4 per cent of the car­
load revenues, 85.2 per cent of the carload traffic ac­
counting for 77,6 per cent of the revenues moved on com­
modity rates, 79 per cent of less-tlian-carload lots 
moved on class rates and 21 per cent on conmodity rates, 
but less-carload traffic constituted only 1.16 per cent 
of the tons of revenue freight ci'lginated in 1939, See 
Exhibit No, 288 in I.C.C. Docket 28,-300 Class Rate In­
vestigation, 1959. See also Board of Investigation and 
Research, op. clt'., p. 2. , 
Commodity rates are of tiiree different types. First, 
are those tied dlroctly to class rates, usually by being made 
a certain per cent age of first-class, or of a class other 
than first, "Hiese are known as column rates. lUen there 
are those v/hich are built upon some systematic basis not 
related to class i.-'ates, iTut constituting a consistent vp.te 
structm^e, Frequently, these are constructed upon a distance 
ecule or group baaie. Finally, triere ere coininodifcy rates 
consisting of special point-to-point rntos, built upon no 
consistent baesia, but adjusted to meet the needs of psrticu-
lux' shipper o oniciuiiities, or- BO me ooinpoti tlve situation. 
within the froi^^it-ra to territories, claas; rotes are 
eeaert'lly const.ructod on distance sca],es, with departvires 
resulting from the following precticeft: Eqixalization of 
ruteo between points at dlff' rent distancesj gx-ouping puints 
of crii^n or destination; creating rate blankete; and allow­
ing especially low IG tes to fuvored points. Enixnli;:.ntion, 
grouping and blanketing arise from competition and the desire 
to sinplify to-rtiakinig procetTSoa, f'.pecial rntes are usually 
the result of corapetltion. Each of the territories move 
traffic on a uniform scale of fiI'st-clnss rates as preocribed 
by the Commiselon following comprdiensive investigations of 
the territorial class-rate striicturee. 'ihe objective of ttiese 
decisions was to provide more unifor-mity and consistency in 
the structures than had previously existed. 
6, Intrateri'itorial rate scales are baeed upon the follow-
Eastern Class Rate Investim tion, 164 I.C.C. 314, 
1950; Southern Class Rate Inve3tijz;ation, 100 I.C.C. 513, 
1925, and supplementary decisions in 1926 and 1927 (109 
I.C.C. 300; il3 I.C.C. 200; 128 I.C.C. 567); 'A'estern 
Trunk-Line Class Rates, 164 I.C.C. 1, 1930; Consolidated 
Southwbgtern Cases, 1^5 I.C.C. 203, 1927. Mountain-
Pacific Territory is covered by the Arizona scale author­
ized in Arizona Corporation ConimiBS ion v Arizona and 
Eastern Railway Co., ll5 l.C.C. 52, 1926; by the Oregon, 
Idaho and Montana scales established in State of Idaho 
ex. rel. Public ITtllitioB Comtnlsgion of Idaho v Oregon 
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Short Line Railroad, 146 I.C.C. 168, 1928; and the Vtah 
scale in Otiah Shippers v Oregon Short Line Railroad Co.j 
147 1.0,0. 581, 1928; and U'bah Shippers ^affic As3n."~v 
Atchison, Topeka and Santa Pe Hailway, 172 I.C.C. 306, 
1551. 
The complex nature of the firat-claas rate structures 
within each of the several territories makes difficult a 
precise comparison of the territorial levels of class rates. 
However, rough approximations of the differentials have been 
made. Results of the most recent study show that Southern 
rates are hi^er than Official rates by 33 per cent; V'/estern 
Trunk-Line, Zone I, by 27 per cent. Western Trmk-Line, 
Zone II, has a level 45 per cent hlgjier than Official; 
V/estern Trunk-Line, Zone III, 60 per cent; Western Trunk-
Line, Zone IV, 83 per cent; and Southwestern, 53 per cent.' 
7. Board of Investigation and Research. Report on Inter-
territorlal Freight Rates. Washington, ii. 0., Govt. 
Print. Off. 1943. p. 56. 
Levels of Mountain-Pacific Territory are not indicated because 
of the lack of uniformity in its rate structure. 
'JPhe different bases used In constructing commodity 
rates prevent an adequate comparison of their average levels 
In the different territories. Territorial differences, how­
ever, have been compared on specific commodities. Studies 
have shown that rates are hipher in the Southern and V/esto^n 
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Tert^itoriea than in Official on such articles as sand, 
plaster, plasterboard, livestock, packin^ouse products, 
cotton, textiles, and cei^ient* Higher in the East and lov/er 
in the Kouth and ''Vent, hut particularly in the South, are 
the rate levels on hrick, nnd clay products, fertilizer and 
fertilizer materials, lime, logs, pulpwood, and scrap iron. 
On sugar and coke, the rates in the East and South were 
approximately equal. It wa s concluded that liiere were sig­
nificant territorial differences in commodity rate levels, 
resulting in hi^er rates in the South and »Vest than in the 
East, but the relative differences were less than those in 
Q 
the levels of first-class rates in the same territories.° 
8. Board of Investigation and Research, op. cit., 
pp. 92-149. 
Further comparisons of territorial rate levels may be 
made by combining levels of class and commodity rates into 
average levels of rates. A method of measurement cojnmonly 
used to achieve this objective is the average revenue per 
ton-mile, but it is not entirely satisfactory since allow­
ances are not made for variations in the composition of 
traffic, and for differences in the average length of hauls 
existing from region to region. On a per-mile basis, rates 
are usually lower for long hauls than for short hauls, and 
may be much lower when grouped or blanketed on points of 
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origin or destination. With the above qualifications in mind, 
the r-ough data showing average revenues per ton-mile for the 
principal rate territories are presented in Table I. 
Table I 
Average Revenue Per Ton-Mile, Class I Railroads, By 
Region or Districts, 1930-1941^^ 
TJverage Revenue Per Index 
Region or District Ton-Mile (Mills) Eastern-lOO 
Eastern District 10.19 100.0 
Pocahontas Region 6.35 62.3 
Southern Region 10.25 100. 6  
Western District 10.49 102.8 
"""Source: Interstate Commerce Coimnlssion. Statistics of 
the Railways In the United States", 1941^ Wash­
ington, D. C., Govt, Print, off. 1942. 
The estimates indicate that only slight differences 
occur in ttie average level of rates in Eastern District, 
Southern Region, and Western District, llae one significant 
departure from the Eastern level is in Pocahontas Region, 
where the differential of 37.3 per cent can be explained by 
the high proportion of bituminous coal entering the traffic. 
Compared v/ith Indexes of classrate levels, and the conclu­
sions with respect to levels of commodity rates, average rate 
levels for the South and West do not show the marked varia­
tions indicated previously. A partial e^lanation might be 
found In an examination of the average length of haul in 
each area. 
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In 1939, the Bureau of Transport Ecoiioinlca and Statis­
tics of the Interotnte Commerce Commission estimutod the 
average length of haul in the territories as follov/a: 
Eastern 252 miles; Southern, 282 mllesj and Vi/'estern, 345 
9 
rriiles. The average haul, thuB, is longer in the South 
9, Bureau of Transport rconomics and Statistics. Unit 
Costs for Eastern Territory. Exhibit No. 195. I.C.C. 
Docket ilo. 28 300. p. 15 
than in the East, and longer in the West than in the South. 
Since the average revenue per ton-mile was shovini to he ap­
proximately equal for allareas except Pocahont-is, it v/ould 
seem that a correction for average haul differences would 
result in hl^er average rate levels in the West and South 
than in the East, Even though the above conclusions are 
accepted as reasonably correct, there still remains the 
problem of satisfactorily measuring the differences in the 
average levels of the territories. Attempts in tills direc­
tion were made by comparing the actual revenues received 
in 1939 by the railroads of the South and West with the 
revenues they would have received if the Eastern levels had 
prevailed in those regions. Prom the results, index numbers 
of '^average revenue levels" were prepared. These showed 
Southern rates to be 5.5 per cent higher than rates in 
Official Territory, and rates in Western Territory 16.6 
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per cent higher than the rates in the East. Takai at face 
value, the estimates sixggested that differences in the 
average level of rates by territories vajre less marked 
than differences in levels of class rates. 
Territorial differences in class rate levels coirplicate 
the construction of interterritorial rates. To avoid abrupt 
changes in rates at the borders of the various regions, the 
Commission hr.s attempted to blend the intraterritorSal levels. 
The process is usually applied to the entire haul by taking 
a basic scale in each territory and adding to it a differen­
tial representing the difference in rate levels for the dis­
tance traveled in the higher rated territory. The results 
have not been too satisfactory. Existence of differait 
classification ratings in two rate territoi«ie8 creates a 
difficult problem in blending the levels, and is a reason 
why the interterritorial level is usually higher than v;ould 
result if the scale after blending produced levels propor­
tionate to the length of haul in each territory. 
10. Commission decisions authorizing interterritorial 
rates are us follows; Southern-Official, 100 I.C.C. 
513, 1925, and supplementary decisionsj Western Trunk-
Line—Official, 164 I.C.C. 1, 1930, and supplementary 
decisionsj Western Trunk-Line—Southern, 226 I.C.C. 497, 
1938, and supplementary decisionsj Western Trunk-Line— 
Southwestern, supplamenta • report in 205 I.C.C. 601, 
1934, Southwestern—Official, ibid.j and Southwestern— 
Southern, ibid. 
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For distances ranging from 200 to 1,500 miles, inter-
territorial class rate levels have been compared as follov/s: 
On traffic moving from Eoutiiern to Official Territory, the 
rates ore 35 per cent higher than those applying within 
Official Territory. Rates from Western Trunk-Line to Of­
ficial are 37 per cent higher and between Southwestern and 
Official Territories, rates are 49 per cent higher, 
12, Board of Investigation and Research, cit., Chap­
ter 6, Roe also Tennessee Valley AuthorTty, "^e Inter-
territorlal Prei^t Rate Problem of the United States. 
75th Cong., lat sess. House Document No. 264-, 1937. 
Part 3. 
Justification for territorial differences in avera^ 
rates has often been made on the ground that costs of trans­
portation differ between the various rate territories - -ftiat 
the costs are higher in the higgler rated region, I'fliile it 
cannot be argued that unit costs in each territory are af­
fected by many factors, such as wages, materials costs, 
density of traffic, traffic composition, terminal congestion, 
and character of terrain, there appears to bo little validity 
in the declaration when viewed on the basis of the cost 
studies made by the staff of the Interstate Commerce Commis­
sion, As long ago as 1929, Dr. M, 0, Lorenz directed a study 
v;hich diowed slightly lower costs in the So\ithern Territory. 
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13. Interstate Commerce Commission, 'territorial Variations 
in the Cost of Carload B'rel^t Servl^ on ^ ^Team Railv/ays 
in the United States for "the ^ar 1928. Statement I'lo. 
30181930, Traffic density in the South v/as almost one-
half of that of the East, but terminal costs were enough 
lower in the South to give the region a cost advantage for 
distances up to 300 miles. 
In 1936, another analysis, bused on the cost of handling 
carload freight per loaded car-mile including less-carload 
traffic and passenger deficits, revealed the territories to 
be ranked as follows: Eastern, 100; Central Easter, 104,6; 
New Er^gland, 168,1; IVestern, 102,7; Souther, 94.6; and 
Pocahontas, 78,5.^"^ 
14, Interstate Commerce Commission. Territorial Varia­
tions in Cost of Carload 7reip:ht on Class I"^team Rail~ 
ways in the United States for the Calendar "year 1936. 
Statement No, 3812. 1938, 
llie most significant study of territorial costs v/as 
that made by Dr. Pord K, Edwards in connection with the 
Class Rate Investigation of 1939, Differences in the composi­
tion of traffic were taken into connideration by taking ave­
rages of fully distributed costs of carload traffic for a 
haul of 300 miles based on actual loads, in box, gondola 
and hopper, flat, stock, refrigerator, and tank cars. In 
terms of actual average loads in each territory indexes of 
the relative costs were computed as follows; U.S, Average, 
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100; East, inclitding New England, 101; PocahontcB, 67; 
Sotith, 99; and West, 110, On less-than-carload traffic, 
the following relationships vwre shown to exist; East, 
excluding New England, and northern Illinois, 92; Nev; 
England, 112; Pocahont';.s, 87; Southern, 87; "estern, 122.^® 
15. Board of Investigation and Research. o_£. cit., 
pp. 261. 
\"l'ith the exception of New England which has the Ini^est 
average iinit costs, and the Pocahontas region, where ave­
rage unit costs are lowest, it seems reasonable to conclude 
that the difference in territorial levels of rotes are 
greater than can be Justified by variations in the cost of 
service or composition of traffic, 
THE CLASS HATTi; I1WESTI(JATI0?I OF 1939 
Representatives of both South and V.'est have long ex­
pressed dissatisfaction with the existing class rate struc­
ture. Objections, particularly from the South have been 
primarily focused on the hi^fier inter territorial rates which 
govern shipmenta bet'Ween points in Soutliern Territory and 
points in Official Territory. The structure, it is claimed, 
v;orka a hardship on Southern manufacturers viien competing 
for northern markets against noi'thern producers who ship on 
a lower scale of rates. 
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Purfcliermore, it has iDoen ar. nertod that the rate handi­
caps of the Soiith liBV© prevented normal indvifltrial develop­
ment of that region. Clnss-rate equnlization might tend to 
encourage the growth of Southern industry In the long rnn 
bub it appears unlikely that the effects v/ould he as great 
as alleged. As a practical matter the extent of territorial 
X'etardation of Industry as a result of the interterritorial 
rate structure, is extremely difficult to determine,.^'^ 
16. Paverahle freight rates are of significant importance 
in industrial location only when other comparative loca-
tional factors arc evenly "balanced. However, the advant­
age of freight rates may "be more than offset by disad­
vantages which occur in such basic location factors as 
faw materials, labor, fuel, markets, power, witer, tax 
structvires, etc. For further analysis see Daggett, S., 
op. cit., pp. 452-433. See also Lynch, E. C. ".Tlae In-
Tluence of Transportation in Location of Economic Ac­
tivity." Natural Resources Planning Board Report, op. 
cit., pp. 71-87; and U.S. Department of Commerce. Basic. 
Industrial Location Factors. Industrial Series,No."*747"" 
Washington, D. C., Govt, Print, Off. 1947. 
Many commodities produced in the South and V,'cr,t are shipped 
to Official Territory on freight rates based on the Ea.^ tern 
level or on a scale exceeding the level by less tlian the 
differences in the levels of class-rates.^'^ Adjustments of 
17. Class Rate Investigation, 1939, o^. cit., pp. 603-604, 
this nature, made in some instances by voluntary carrier 
action. In others throu^ decisions of the Commission, did 
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not remove the 1)3810 ceusoe of Routliern and V/estern com-
plsints; namely, the differencoe in the levels of class 
rated as s. whole in the different te ; r-itories , It was "because 
of these ohjections that the ComiTilssion, on its ov/n motion, 
undertook the investitration of the relstionsV.iips between 
class rates as a whole in the several territories. 
llie case did not cover nn examination of bhe class rates 
v/ithin Mountain-Pacific Territory or betv/een that area and 
the remainder of the United States. Closely related to it 
was the proceeding 1-niown as tVie Consolidated Pi'eight Ciaasi-
fication^^ which decision was combined with that of bhe class-
18. Docket No. JS3310. Consolidated Preig^it Classifiuu-
tion. 262 ICC.447. 1945. 
rate case when given on May 15, 1945. 
Existing classifications were found unreasonable in the 
Cotisolidtitod Claasification proceedluKs. It was decided also 
that the numbers of different classification ratings caused 
undue and mirea sonable preference and prejudice in violation 
of Section 3 of the Interstate Commerce Act, The Commission 
ordered the establisliment of a uniform classification, and 
requested the carriers to advise within 90 days as to v/hether 
or not a unifona classification could be constx'ucted and 
submitted for approval. The railroads answered in the af­
firmative. 'The view classification prescribed by the Commission 
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was to contain 30 clasties, ranging from CIRSS 400 (400 per 
cent of first-clnsp) to Class lo (13 por cent of first-
class).^^ 
19, Dockets S8300 and 28310, _OT). cit., pp. 509-512. 
Both inte-rterritori&l and intra ten"*! tori al class rates 
v.'ere found to bo iim'eenonafcle. As a ressilt of the dif-
fei'onces exifiting betv;een inter territorial rates from South-
ei'n. Southwestern and <<estem Trunk-Line Territories to Of­
ficial Territory, shippers and receivers of freight in the 
PO Kast were favored over thoye of the South and vv'est,*^'^ 
20. Ibid.. pp. 700-702. 
It Viae believed that the class rate and classifications 
revision alioiild be accomxJlished simultaneoABly if possible. 
Havever, just and reaaon&ble rates could, not be established 
until the new classifications v/ere ai:'proved, which 3.n all 
probability would require considerable ti;Tie. In view of 
this fact, the Commisalon prescribed an ^d interim revision 
of clase rates based upon existing classifications. Class 
rates within Official Territory v/ere to be increased by 10 
per cent, those v;ithin Southern, Southweatern and Western 
Trunk-Line Territory were to be reduced an equivalent amount. 
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Reductions of 10 per cent were ordered in the cl&tss rates 
between the various territories covered by the Investiga-
o*i 
tion.'^ The temporary revisions were to applj? only on 
21. Ibid., pp. 703-06. 
articles transported on standard classification ratings -
not to traffic movliig on exception ratings nor on comTiodlty 
rates. 
llie new retos were to become effective on January 1, 
1946, but before that date the Conimisaion order v/as tempor­
arily enjoined at the request of nine Saatern states by a 
r>o 
Federal court at tftica, •'lev/ York on December 21, 1946/"'' 
22. Traffic 'A'orld. December 29, 1945, pp. 1591. 
The injunction was dismissed by the Supreme Court on May 12, 
1947, in a decision upholding the "interim" class rate order. 
23. Traffic 'iVorld. May 17, 1945. pp. 1559-1566. 
Class rate revision would seem to bring abotit a greater 
degree of uniformity betv/qen the levels of the territories 
than had formerly existed, and lov/er the scales of inter-
territorial rates. As compared with Eastern manufacturers. 
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Southern and Western producers should find their transpor­
tation position much more favorable. Application of the 
class late adjustment should result in a unified class 
rate level in four of the five major freight rate terri­
tories, and vdll mean a nev/ T» se for construction of in~ 
terterritorial rates. Insofar as class rates are used to 
move commodities, the significant territorial disadvantages 
should disappear. Yet it must be recalled that traffic 
moving on class rates is but a small fraction of the total, 
and furthermore, the rate order did not apply to exception 
ratings and commodity rates. Because of these facts, it is 
probable that the effects of the decision will not be as 
great as is popularly assumed. 
Probably the most important question relative to the 
rate adjustment concerns its effect on industrial location. 
The rate decision miglit remove one obstacle to the develop-
ment of Southern and Western industrialism, but it appears 
highly improbable that the nation v/ill witness a wholesale 
movement of industries from the East to the South and West. 
There seems to be little doubt that Eastern markets will 
continue to absorb a high proportion of the nations' indus­
trial production for years to come, thus granting advantages 
to the industries already located in that area. If and 
when other basic locational factors become equal throughout 
the several regions, a migration of industries to areas 
having real locational advantages might occur. Prom an 
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economic standpoint, the entirs; nution would henefit fji'Din 
this cIrcuriatr.nce for* sounder geograiihical specialir.otion 
••'uuld he developed. 
The importance oj? the clarjr. rotx^ decision should not 
he vnir.ii.iised, .for any r^rsvision of rates which resultr. in 
raore vuiiforraity of rate levels and removal of discriminatory 
practices in the long-run tends to benefit all areas of the 
ntition. Neither should the importance of the decision be 
overly stressed* Other problems of rate reorganljsation 
remain to be solved aiil this i-elatively small step shcrald 
be measured in its true perspective - as reprer.enting a degree 
of progress toward a goal, rather than having attained the 
long sought objective of itself. 
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